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This thesis includes three thorough studies which examine the real effect and 
consequence of regulation reform in banking and corporate finance over the last 
decades.  
It starts with a cross-country study which investigates how regulation and 
supervision over banks affect their systemic risk. Motivated by a new database of 
banking regulation and supervision from the Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey 
of the World Bank, we conduct an empirical analysis for banks from 65 countries from 
the period 2001 to 2013. We find that bank activity restriction, initial capital stringency 
and prompt corrective action are all positively related to systemic risk which is 
measured by Marginal Expected Shortfall. Next, to address the potential endogenous 
issue which can undermine the baseline results, we employ the staggered timing of 
Basel II regulation across countries as an exogenous event, and also instrumental 
variable analysis. Our results are held for both tests. On top of that, we conduct a series 
of robustness tests, including using weighted-least-square regression analysis to 
account for the differences in the number of banks across countries, subsamples, and 
using an alternative measure of systemic risk by SRISK. Last, we provide further 
evidence to show that positive relationship between regulation and supervision and 
systemic risk is through banks’ capability of raising capital: the positive impact of bank 
regulation and supervision on systemic risk tents to be amplified if banks are bigger, 
but the effect can be alleviated of banks are better capitalized or more diversified. 
Overall, this study highlights the importance of capability of banks’ capital raising, 
especially during difficult times. Our findings do not argue that bank regulation and 
supervision are detrimental to systemic risk, but instead call for the proper design and 
implementation of bank regulation.  
 In the second one, we focus on how firms’ CSR performance respond to the 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) passed in the U.S 1994. 
The interstate deregulation increases the bank competition at the state level 
significantly, expanding the availability and reducing the cost of credit. We find that 




CSR, suggesting firms show “doing good” for the access to finance in an 
uncompetitive credit market. To address the potential concern about reverse causality, 
we examine the dynamic effect of interstate banking deregulation on firms’ CSR 
performance. We find no evidence on the pre-trend in the change of firm CSR 
performance prior to deregulation but a significant decrease in the year of bank 
deregulation. We further conduct a placebo test by employing falsified deregulation 
years and randomly assigned to different states. The results show that falsified 
deregulation is unlikely to affect firms CSR performance. Next, we attempt to rule out 
an alternative explanation of bank relationship lending for the main findings. In the 
end, we provide direct evidence on the channel of financial constraints through which 
firms’ CSR performance is reduced after the bank deregulation. The results found in 
this study suggest that banks may engage in CSR as a strategical investment to delight 
external stakeholders. While when the needs from stakeholders decrease, firms’ CSR 
engagement can reduce consequently.  
In the third study, we extend the research scope to examining the effect of 
general corporate income tax on firm investment efficiency. There are well-established 
literature on how corporate tax can affect firms investment decisions, mainly on the 
absolute investment level, while whether the tax-induced investment is efficient for 
firms is underexplored. In this study, we stand from shareholders’ perspective and 
examine the impact of corporate income tax on the efficiency of firms’ investment 
decision by exploiting staggered changes in state-level corporate income tax rates. We 
find that the tax rate changes can asymmetrically affect firms’ investment efficiency: 
the tax increase aggravates overinvestment while tax cut mitigates underinvestment. 
Additional evidence suggests the tax changes are more significant for firms which 
engage aggressively in tax planning or less capable in tax avoidance activities. We 
further confirm the asymmetrical effects of tax changes through financing channel and 
agency cost channel respectively. Our results are held to endogeneity tests and a series 
of robustness tests. Taken together, our study add new evidence to how general tax 
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This thesis examines the real effect and consequence of financial regulatory 
reform and development over the last decades. Due to the importance and uniqueness, 
financial markets have been highly regulated that aims to sustain an efficient and stable 
financial system. In the last twenty years, several financial crises have happened over 
the world and the financial regulations have been changed significantly. Tighter, more 
detailed and more complex standards now are applied to the financial system and the 
overall regulatory framework has been improving over time. Since the 1990s, for 
example, financial regulation in banking has been relaxed through the Interstate Bank 
Branching Effective Act 1994 in the U.S.. While the introduction of the Basel 
framework over the banking system across countries obviously improves the standards 
over banks. Understand the real effect and consequence of financial regulation change 
is not only an interesting research question, but the policy implications from the 
research are also important that contribute to future reforms. In this thesis, three 
thorough studies have been carried out which focus on different aspects of the 
regulation changes in the last decades. 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
One of the most important features of bank regulation is the capital requirement. 
Banks in counties with restrict requirements on capital may ask for higher capital ratio 
as well as limits the categories of funds which are official and can be used to initially 
capitalize a bank. Such banks may experience greater difficulties in raising sufficient 
capital to meet the regulatory requirements, especially when the overall system is 
undercapitalized, therefore are more likely to have capital shortfall. Besides, the level 
of regulation stringency can limit the freedom of bans’ activities. Based on the 
portfolio theory,  the combined cash flows from non-correlated revenue sources should 
be more stable than the constituent parts (Baele et al. 2007). Hence, banks face greater 
stringency in banks activities can access financing source capital through their limited 
business lines. Besides, if banks’ activities are constrained in a limited scope, banks’ 




banks may expose to the shock together but be less capable of raising capital because 
of the limited financing channel, hence, a greater possibility of experiencing a capital 
shortfall. 
In the first chapter, we investigate how bank regulation and supervision affect 
individual banks’ systemic risk across countries. Since the 2007 global financial crisis 
(GFC), government regulators across the world have been working to strengthen the 
regulation in the financial sector. The Basel III framework is a central element of the 
Basel Committee’s, which is introduced to response to the GFC. It addresses several 
overlooked areas in the pre-crisis regulatory framework and provides a foundation for 
making a more resilient and stable banking system (Bank for International Settlements, 
2017). The Basel III reforms significantly tight the regulation framework, especially 
the capital requirement and liquidity measure on banks. However, the inappropriate 
regulations and ineffective monitoring and supervision by official agencies have been 
criticized a lot which were regarded as the key cause of the global financial crisis of 
2007-2009. Although several studies have examined the impact of bank regulation 
and/or supervision on systemic stability, there is rare evidence on how the regulation 
can affect individual banks’ exposure to the systemic risk. The first study intends to 
fill this gap in the literature. 
Regulation reform in banking could redefine the relation between lenders and 
borrowers as well. Asymmetric information increases external financing cost and 
difficulty. In 1994, the U.S. passed the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act (IBBEA) which significantly relaxes bank branching restrictions. 
IBBEA effectively permits bank holding companies to enter other states without 
permission and to operate branches across state borders. The deregulation increases 
competition and consolidation of banks within states, and the effects tend to spill over 
to non-financial sectors, including better external financing access and lower 
borrowing cost (Black and Strahan, 2002; Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006; Rice and 
Strahan, 2010; Krishnan et al., 2015; Cornaggia et al., 2015).  On the other side, a 
growing literature on CSR attempts to understand CSR activities of firms according to 
incentives or conflict of interest among stakeholders. There are two views on firms’ 
engagement in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. The resource-based 




(Mcwilliams and Siegel, 2001; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Johnson and Greening, 
1999; Campbell, 2007; Hong et al., 2012). While based on the profit-maximizing view, 
CSR is treated as a strategical investment that is used to meet corporate strategical 
needs. Previous studies document that socially responsible firms are associated with 
more transparent and reliable financial information (Spence, 1973; Benabou and Tirole, 
2010; Kim et al., 2012). Better CSR performance shows a better disclosure and a lower 
level of information asymmetry, consequently better access to external financing  
(Goss and Roberts, 2011; Cheng et al., 2014). These evidence show that superior CSR 
performance tends to be rewarded. However, as suggested in (Dharmapala and Khanna, 
2018), when the rewarding of CSR activities is reduced, firms will cut their investment 
in CSR activities. Therefore, if firms are involuntarily engaged in CSR activities under 
certain pressures, how would they respond when such pressure is removed? Therefore, 
in the second study, we examine the effect of bank deregulation on firms’ CSR. 
Previous two studies focus on financial regulation development in banking, the 
impact over bank themselves and the potential spillover effect on industry firms. 
Inspired by the previous two studies, in the third study, we extend the research scope 
by examining how the financial regulatory change affect industry firms, specifically, 
how the investment efficiency will response to corporate income tax changes. As the 
most important fiscal instrument, the tax has been employed by the government to 
accelerate firms’ investment and stimulate the local economic growth and employment. 
Under the neoclassical theory framework, the investment is only driven by the 
marginal q ratio (Abel, 1983; Hayashi, 1982; Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Yoshikawa, 
1980). However, because of the frictions in the real world, e.g. information asymmetry, 
the investment decision could be distorted, consequently, firms can expose to either 
under- or over- investment issues (Fazzari et al., 1988; Myers and Majluf, 1984). The 
nature of corporate income tax charge on the net cash flow to companies, which 
increases the investment cost and reduces the after-tax profit. While, because of the 
tax deductibility, firms are motivated to take advantage of tax deductibility and reduce 
the tax burden. Therefore, firms could adjust their investment strategy when they 
expose to corporate tax changes (Atanassov and Liu, 2020; Gaertner et al., 2020; 




Although existing literature on how tax can affect firm investment is well-
established, there is rare studies examine whether the tax-induced investment is 
efficient from shareholders’ perspective. Given that a firm’s investment decision is not 
only affected by firm-specific factors but also the external policy reform, the tax serves 
as a key incentive to affect firms investment decision. When firms expose to a tax 
increase, firms expect to higher tax burden but higher tax saving per dollar tax 
deduction. This indicates that the motivation for taking advantage of tax sheltering 
increase simultaneously. For firms, the investment decision could be distorted when 
they considerate the tax benefits through an investment. Besides, managers can reduce 
the time and efforts in investing when the after-tax return decreases (Atanassov and 
Liu, 2020). In the end, firms can suffer overinvestment issues. While the tax cut brings 
firms tax cash saving, which serves as an internal financing source for investment. 
Specifically, firms which experience the financial constraints will benefit most from 
this additional financing source to support their investment activities. At the same time, 
tax cut also reduces the required rate of return, consequently more investment options 
are profitable for firms to choose. With the cash windfall, which created by the tax cut 
and greater range of investment choices, firms are more likely to capture the growth 
opportunities and therefore reduce underinvestment. In the third study, we test these 
conjecture and examine how corporate income tax change affect firm’s investment 
efficiency.  
1.2 Key Findings and Contribution 
In the first study, we use data for banks from 65 countries for the period 2001-
2013 and find that bank activity restriction, initial capital stringency and prompt 
corrective action are all positively related to systemic risk. To address the potential 
concern of endogeneity, we employ the staggered implementation of Basel II 
regulation across countries as an exogenous event and instrumental variable analysis 
to mitigate the reverse causality concern. We also conduct a series of robustness tests, 
including using weighted least square regression, subsamples and an alternative 
measure of systemic risk. Our results are continuously held after these tests. In the end, 
we conduct further empirical analyses to support our argument that the strict regulation 
and supervision may impede bank’s capability of raising capital when the whole 
system is undercapitalized, therefore expose banks to higher systemic risk. We find 




if the bank is larger since the larger bank may need a greater amount of capital to 
smooth its exposure to the systemic risk, but reduced if the bank holds greater capital 
or has more diversified revenue flows.  
In the second study, we exploit the staggered deregulation across U.S. states as 
the plausible exogenous increases in the credit supply at the state-level. We present 
evidence to show that deregulation leads to a significant and persistent decrease in firm 
CSR, suggesting firms show “doing good” for the access to finance when they are 
captured by an uncompetitive credit market. Next, to enhance the credit of our 
empirical setting, we conduct a dynamic estimation of the relationship between 
deregulation and CSR performance to address the potential pre-trend concern. In 
addition, we conduct a placebo test by falsifying the deregulation year of states and 
randomly assigned to each state. After the series of endogeneity tests and robustness 
tests, our results continue to be held. It suggests that using staggered banking 
deregulation across states should be exogenous to the decreasing CSR performance.  
Next, we rule out the alternative explanation to our results that the deregulation 
change the borrower-lender relationship from relationship lending to transaction basis. 
With large banks enter and decline of small banks after the deregulation, which can 
lead to bank borrowing rely more on “hard information”, e.g. financial statement, 
instead of “soft information”, e.g. CSR performance (Black and Strahan 2002; 
Brammer and Pavelin 2006; Cole, Goldberg, and White 2004; DeYoung, Hunter, and 
Udell 2004; Elyasiani and Goldberg 2004). Therefore, if this is the potential 
mechanism is through relationship lending channel rather than financial constraints 
channel, we expect to see a stronger effect for states with more relationship lending 
prior to the deregulation. However, we find no evidence to support this argument, 
therefore the changed bank lending relationship is unlikely to explain our main results. 
In the end, we further provide direct evidence to show that the channel of financial 
constraints through which firms’ CSR activities are reduced after the bank 
deregulation. 
Following recent studies (Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015; Ljungqvist et al., 2017; 
Mukherjee et al., 2017), in the third study, we adopt a difference-in-differences 




over 1990 to 2015. The results show that firms responses to corporate income tax 
changes are asymmetrical: the tax increase aggravates overinvestment while the tax 
cut mitigates underinvestment. One challenge of studies in that the relation of tax rate 
and investment efficiency can be endogenously determinate. To address the potential 
reverse causality concern which can undermine the baseline findings, we conduct a 
dynamic estimation around the tax change year. The results suggest that there is no 
pre-existing trend in investment efficient, but a significant difference between the 
treatment group and the control group. Although the difference of the investment 
efficiency is only significant in the year after tax rate change and disappear in the 
following years. Next, we address another concern that the changes of state corporate 
income tax rate may be triggered simultaneously with other unobservable factors, like 
local economic conditions, which can be the true reasons affect firm investment 
efficiency. We conduct a falsification test by examining whether firms response to 
their neighbouring state tax changes while there is no tax change in their home state. 
The results found in the falsification test suggest that unobserved local confounding 
factors cannot drive the observed variation in investment efficiency to tax rate change. 
Taken together, these evidence confirm that our baseline result is less likely driven by 
omitted variable issues or reverse causality, and strength the credit of our empirical 
identification.  
To provide further evidence that the effect of corporate tax on investment 
efficiency is indeed tied to the variation in the corporate tax rate, we perform cross-
sectional variation among firms in terms of their sensitivity to tax changes. We find 
that the effect of the tax rate change is stronger for firms which are more aggressive in 
tax planning, or firms who are less capable to manipulate their taxable incomes.  
Finally, we propose two different channels to explain the asymmetrical impact 
of tax rate changes on investment efficiency. We provide evidence to show that the 
mitigated underinvestment after the tax cut is through the financial constraint channel; 
while the aggravated overinvestment after tax increase is through the agency cost 
channel. We also conduct a series of robustness test, including using an alternative 





1.3 Contribution and implication 
This thesis contribute to literature in several ways. In the first study, first, we 
add new evidence to the existing literature in the relationship between regulation and 
systemic risk. Linked with previous studies which examine the relationship between 
bank regulation and bank behaviours, e.g. banks risk-taking at the individual level, we 
provide evidence that regulation and supervision can also affect banks’ systemic risk 
exposure. Besides, this study contributes to the recent emphasis on the determinants 
of bank systemic risk. Although these work does not focus on the effect of regulation 
or supervision on bank systemic risk, they highlight the importance of appropriately 
designed regulation. Our paper provides further evidence in support of these arguments, 
showing that the regulatory and supervisory environment in which banks operate has 
significant impacts on their systemic risk. 
The second study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, 
we provide a clean setting on the exogenous increase in banking competition caused 
by regulations and show firms significantly reduce CSR activities afterwards. This is 
the first study which links firm CSR with external financial environment development 
induced by regulatory reform. Our results support the view that firms use CSR as a 
strategical investment to accessing bank financing when credit supply is likely to be 
rationed due to lack of competition. Our results highlight the importance of a 
competitive credit market, especially for firms that heavily rely on external financing. 
Policymakers and regulators should continue to make reform to dismantle market 
frictions and enhance the competition in the financial market to strength firms 
capability of accessing credit. Besides, the study provides novel empirical evidence to 
suggest that firms’ CSR activities are not socially efficient when borrowers are 
susceptible to being captured by lending groups. Therefore, future policy designs 
should take the institutional development and financial market frictions into 
consideration if the government intends to see more socially responsible activities 
from firms.  
For the third study, we add new evidence to the growing literature on the 
determinates of firm-level investment efficiency. The results show how firms’ 
investment efficiency response to general tax policy changes, expanding existing 




shareholders’ perspective. Besides, this study also has important policy implications. 
Since the federal corporate tax reforms which are rare and intend to affect all firms at 
the same time, state-level tax policy changes are more likely to be exploited by the 
government as a short-term fiscal instrument. Understand the real effects and 
consequence of these general tax changes would benefit to future tax policy designs. 
1.4 Structure of this thesis  
The rest of the thesis constructs as follows. Chapter 2 investigates how bank 
regulation and supervision affect bank systemic risk. Chapter 3 studies how firm CSR 
performance responds to external financial market development. Chapter 4 examines 




















The inappropriate regulations and ineffective monitoring and supervision by 
official agencies have been regarded as a critical cause of the global financial crisis of 
2007-2009 (Acharya 2009; Goodhart 2008; Laeven and Levine 2009; Schwarcz 2008). 
For example, Acharya (2009) argues that Basel regulations require banks to hold a 
certain ratio of capital to reduce individual banks’ liquidity risk but overlook the 
correlated risk banks take which can lead to joint failures. Despite the increasing calls 
for a renewed focus on systemic stability and macro-prudential regulation (e.g. 
Acharya et al., 2012), our understanding of how bank regulation and supervision affect 
systemic stability tends to be very limited (Arnold et al. 2012; Barth, Lin, et al. 2013).  
A few studies have examined the impact of bank regulation and/or supervision 
on systemic stability (Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2004; Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane 2002; 
Houston, Lin, and Ma 2011). Based on bank regulation data from the World Bank 
Survey, Barth et al. (2004) find that banks operating in countries with higher regulatory 
restriction are more likely to experience a banking crisis. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2011), on the other hand, fail to find the relationship between the 
adherence to the Basel core principles and systemic risk measured by a system-wide 
Z-score. However, there is a lack of evidence on how the current bank regulatory 
system affects individual banks’ exposure to systemic risk. Our paper thus attempts to 
fill this gap in the literature. 
Bank regulation comprises two main aspects, capital regulation and 
supervision, and restrictions on non-banking activities. In this paper, we argue that 
both aspects of bank regulation can be positively related to bank’s exposure to 
systemic risk. First, Acharya et al. (2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2017) define a 
bank’s level of systemic risk as its capital shortfall, where a more undercapitalized 
bank compared to its risk level (but not government required level) contributes more 
to the whole financial system’s (in)stability, conditional on severe distress in the entire 
system. In an environment of more stringent bank capital regulation and supervision, 
banks find it is harder to raise capital when the entire system is undercapitalized (i.e. 




shortfall. The higher probability of banks’ capital shortfall would increase the systemic 
instability of the whole system.  
Second, the level of regulation stringency can limit the freedom of banks’ 
activities. With stricter regulation, banks will have less opportunity to engage in a 
wider range of non-traditional bank activities. Based on the portfolio theory, the 
combined cash flows from non-correlated revenue sources should be more stable than 
the constituent parts (Baele, De Jonghe, and Vander Vennet 2007). In other words, 
banks who are able to engage in different business lines tend to have more stable 
revenue flows compared to their peers and are thereby less likely to have capital 
shortfall when external shock happens. In addition, banks who are allowed to engage 
in broader activities are more able to raise capital from different sources, which 
therefore lowers their likelihood of experiencing capital shortfall. Similarly, when 
banks are only allowed to engage in limited activities, they are more likely to share a 
similar business structure, and such similarity in banks’ business lines could result in 
lower systemic stability (Allen, Bali, and Tang 2012). 
To investigate the impact of bank regulation on systemic risk, we use the new 
database by Barth et al. (2013a) bank regulation and supervision and employ data for 
banks from 65 countries for the period 2001-2013. Following Laeven and Levine 
(2009) and Li et al. (2019), we consider four aspects of bank regulation, including 
regulation on bank activities restriction, initial capital stringency, deposit insurer 
power and prompt corrective action. Employing the factor analysis, we reduce the four 
regulation and supervision measures and construct a single measure of bank regulation 
stringency. We use Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES), developed by Acharya et al., 
(2017), as our main systemic risk measure.  
We find that bank activity restriction, initial capital stringency and prompt 
corrective action are positively related to systemic risk. Such a positive association is 
also found for the total regulation index we developed. This is consistent with our 
expectation based on the definition of systemic risk adopted in our study, suggesting 
that banks operating in countries with more stringent regulation and supervision appear 
to suffer from higher exposure to systemic risk. To alleviate the concern of 




regulation across countries to identify the changes in bank regulation. The results show 
that the implementation of Basel II increases the bank’s systemic risk more than those 
countries which have not yet implemented the capital regulation, while there is no such 
a trend before the implementation. Next, we employ the country’s latitude as the 
instrument variable and conduct two-stage least squares regression analysis, and the 
same results are observed for the instrumental variable regression analysis. Our 
findings hold robust after using an alternative measure of systemic risk (Brownlees 
and Engle, (2017) SRISK) and employing the weighted-least-square regression 
analysis to account for the differences in the number of banks across countries.  
We then provide further evidence on our conjecture that the impact of bank 
regulation on systemic risk is through bank’s capital shortfall. We would expect this 
impact to be more intensified if the bank is more likely to experience capital shortfall 
when in a distressed period, and vice versa. Specifically, we posit that the positive 
impact of bank regulation on systemic risk will be intensified if the bank is larger since 
a larger bank needs a higher level of capital to smooth its exposure to the systemic risk, 
but reduced if the bank holds a higher level of capital, and if the bank has more 
diversified revenue flows. We thus introduce three interaction terms of our main 
regulation measures with bank size (measured by log total assets), bank equity to assets 
ratio and diversification (measured by non-interest income to total operation income, 
respectively, and include them in the main regressions. Our results confirm the 
hypotheses indicated above.  
Our findings do not suggest that bank regulation and supervision are 
detrimental to systemic stability, but instead call for the proper design and 
implementation of bank regulation. Literature on regulatory forbearance points out that 
policymakers’ control strategy tends to be influenced by strong political forces (e.g. 
Kane, 1980). The global financial crisis has drawn much attention and critiques from 
the government and public to the banking sector, imposing considerable political 
forces to the banking regulators and supervisors. As a response, an increasing level of 
bank regulation stringency has been implemented in different countries. However, 
whether bank regulatory and supervision rules could effectively address the concerns 
raised by the market and the public appears to be unclear due to limited empirical 




risk based on cross-country evidence and has important policy implications. We 
contribute to the literature in several ways.  
First, the extant literature on bank regulation paid little attention to its impact 
on systemic risk. Although a few empirical studies have examined this relationship, 
the measures of systemic risk they used appear to be limited at the country level 
(Hoque et al. 2015). Our paper contributes to the literature in this regard, examining 
the impact of bank regulation on individual banks’ exposure to the overall systemic 
risk and providing important evidence. Our findings suggest that the increased 
similarity in the banking system due to the restrictions on non-banking activities would 
increase systemic risk. This is consistent with the recent theoretical work on financial 
stability that highlights the importance of diversity in banking (Allen et al. 2012; 
Wagner 2010, 2011), showing that some degree of diversification in banks’ asset 
portfolios is socially optimal so that banks do not have to liquidate their identical assets 
at the same time when financial shocks happen and generate a fire-sale externality that 
lowers welfare. Our results also highlight the importance of bank regulation in 
allowing banks more capability to raise capital when the whole system is 
undercapitalized. This is consistent with the recent changes to Basel III regulation, 
which promote the build-up of buffers in good times that can be drawn down in periods 
of stress. Although our paper does not directly test the effect of government capital 
injection to the financial system during crisis periods, the implication of our results is 
supportive of government action to reduce the capital shortfall of the banking system. 
This is also consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Berger et al. (2019) 
that the U.S. Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) significantly reduced banks’ 
contributions to systemic risk.  
Second, our paper contributes to the recent emphasis on the determinants of 
bank systemic risk. Existing literature has found that bank systemic risk is affected by 
the degree of competition (Anginer, Demirguc-Kunt, and Zhu 2014a), consolidation 
(Weiß, Neumann, and Bostandzic 2014), the structure of the financial network 
(Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi 2015), bank size and their capital level 
(Laeven, Ratnovski, and Tong 2016). For example, Acemoglu et al. (2015) argue that 
the structure of the financial network is a determinant of systemic risk, with more 




shock is below a critical threshold and vice versa. Laeven et al. (2016) show that 
systemic risk increases with bank size, but the systemic risk is significantly lower for 
well-capitalized banks. Although their work does not focus on the effect of regulation 
or supervision on bank systemic risk, it highlights the importance of appropriately 
designed regulation. Our paper provides further evidence in support of these arguments, 
showing that the regulatory and supervisory environment in which banks operate has 
a significant impact on their systemic risk.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we summarize 
relevant literature about bank regulation and supervision and systemic risk. In Section 
3, we develop the hypotheses. Our data, variables and descriptive statistics are 
presented in section 4. Section 5 discusses the main results of our analyses, and section 
6 concludes the paper. 
2.2 Literature review  
In this section, we summarize relevant literature on the regulation and 
supervision and systemic risk in banking. 
2.2.1 Regulation and supervision in banking  
Since the Global Financial Crisis in 2007, the importance of banks for the real 
economy is brought into sharp focus. At the same time, this crisis also uncovers the 
weaknesses in the design and implementation of bank regulation and supervision, and 
it has sparked a heated discussion on the lessons to be learned. Moreover, how to 
design efficient and safer banking systems draw a lot of attention from the government 
and policymakers. One clear outcome of the GFC has been a period of intense 
regulation, with several initiatives put in motion to address the flaws that were revealed 
during the crisis (Anginer et al. 2019). The World Bank (2013) report suggests that the 
GFC was caused by excessive risk-taking by financial institutions and little capital 
buffer hold by the financial institutions to cover the unexpected financial losses. For 
example, a disproportionate reliance on wholesale funding to support bank lending, 
lower lending standards, inaccurate credit ratings and complex financial derivatives. 




regulation design also stimulates banks to engage in speculative investments.  The 
poorly designed, e.g. deposit insurance scheme, provides banks incentives to take on 
excessive risk since banks are expected to be rescued if they fail (Anginer and 
Demirgüç-Kunt 2019; Caprio, Demirguc-Kunt, and Kane 2010). The GFC has 
highlighted the importance of adequate bank regulation and supervision, with the 
passage of the Doff-Frank Wall Street Reform and the Consumer Protection Act in the 
United States in 2010. There is an extensive debate on the effect of tighter bank 
regulation. In general, policymakers believe that strengthened bank regulation may 
promote a more resilient and stable banking sector, while practitioners and researchers 
raise their concern in terms of the cost of regulatory compliance which may outweigh 
the benefits. Existing researches also show mixed results regarding the relationship 
between bank regulation and bank behaviours, e.g. risk-taking, lending behaviours and 
efficiency etc.. 
The rules on bank capital are one of the most prominent aspects of regulation 
over banks. If banks are required to hold more capital at risk, they would enjoy from 
greater risk taking by the potential loss of their capital. Therefore, official capital 
adequacy regulation is employed to play an essential role in aligning the incentive of 
banks owners with depositors and other creditors, which generates more careful 
lending (Barth et al., 2008; Barth et al., 2013b). However, this view only considers the 
public interest while ignores the high regulatory cost of capital holding by banks. 
Banks who bear high cost are induced to take excessive risk for better return. Hakenes 
and Schnabel (2011)’s model shows that capital regulation may destabilize the banking 
sector through its effect on banking competition. The ambiguous effect of competition 
on banks’ risk taking translates into an ambiguous effect of capital regulation. Their 
model suggests that’s that capital regulation may not be suited in all circumstances to 
prevent excessive risk-taking in banking. Repullo (2004) examines the role of capital 
requirements and deposit rate ceilings as a regulatory tool to reduce risk-shifting 
incentives in the situation of increased competition in banking. The study suggests that 
for impacted competition in the deposit market, both instruments are in general 
effective in preventing the banks from taking excessive risks.  
In addition to the theoretical work in capital requirement and bank performance, 




bank capital regulations on bank loan growth of 125 countries. They find that overall 
capital stringency only has a weak negative effect on loan growth. Moreover, such 
effect is completely offset if banks hold moderately high levels of capital. Besides, 
capital stringency that has the strongest negative effect on loan growth are those related 
to the prevention of banks to use capital borrowed funds and assets other than cash or 
government securities. This result suggests that increased capital stringency targeted 
at the risk side of banking activities and increased freedom in the use of alternative 
assets as capital. 
The scope of activities helps define what is meant by a “bank” and the scope 
of permissible activities differs across countries, therefore, the activities engaged by 
banks are not the same across counties (Barth et al., 2013a). Moreover, bank 
regulations define the extent to which banks and nonbanks may combine to form 
financial or mixed conglomerates. Boyd et al. (1998) suggest that broad financial 
activities can intensify moral hazard problems and provide banks with more 
opportunities to increase risk.  However, Barth et al. (2004) suggest that restrict bank 
activities is negatively associated with bank stability and increases the probability of a 
banking crisis. They first point out five main theoretical reasons for restricting bank 
activities and banking commerce links. First, conflict of interest may arise if banks are 
involved in diverse activities, e.g. securities, insurance, underwriting and real estate 
investment. Under this situation, banks may utilize their information advantage over 
investors and to sale troubled securities. Second, as stated in Boyd et al. (1998), the 
moral hazard problem can incentive banks to engage in riskier investments, thus 
increase banks’ overall risk. On top of these two reasons, the allowance of broader 
activities of banks will lead to the complexity of banks and more difficult to monitor 
such banks. Also, the large size of the bank leads to the “too-big-to-fail” problem, 
which makes them both politically and economically powerful (Laeven and Levine 
2007). Last, large financial conglomerates may reduce competition and efficiency 
(Barth et al., 2013b). On the contrary side, there are alternative theoretical reasons for 
allowing banks to engage in a broad range of activities. For example, fewer regulatory 
restrictions permit the exploitation of economies of scale and scope. Besides, fewer 
regulatory restrictions can increase the franchise value of banks and consequently 
augment incentives for more prudent behaviours. Lastly, broader activities provide 
banks with opportunities to diversify their income streams and thereby create more 




support the later view that the effect of restrictions on bank activities. Similarly, Barth 
et al., (2013b) suggest tighter restrictions are negatively associated with bank 
efficiency. 
A widely adopted policy to promote financial stability in the banking section 
is the deposit insurance scheme, which has been proven very successful in protecting 
bank runs but in turn, causes moral hazard problem. The empirical evidence points out 
the importance of design features and shows that poorly designed schemes can increase 
the likelihood that a country will experience a banking crisis. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Kane (2002) suggest that in institutionally weak environments, it is hard to design 
deposit insurance arrangements that will not increase the probability and depth of 
future banking crisis. For countries with weak institutions, adopting explicit deposit 
insurance promises to spur financial development only in the very short run, if at all. 
Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt (2019) imply the importance of deposit insurance 
schemes to incorporate features to help internalize risk-taking by banks. In addition to 
the specific design feature, deposit insurance that is complemented by more stringent 
capital regulations and a system in which supervisors are empowered to take prompt 
corrective action, tend to function more effectively in practice. In countries that lack 
strong institutional environments, explicit deposit insurance can end up doing more 
harm than good in terms of improving financial stability. More empirical evidence 
tends to support these argument. For example, Barth et al. (2004) find a positive 
association between the generosity of the deposit insurance scheme and the possibility 
of suffering a major banking crisis, and such a relationship is economically large. More 
recently, Anginer et al. (2014b) find that deposit insurance increases systemic fragility 
in the former period, but lower bank systemic risk in countries with deposit insurance 
coverage during the crisis. Their findings suggest that the “moral hazard effect” of 
deposit insurance dominates in good times, while the ‘‘stabilization effect’’ of deposit 
insurance dominates in turbulent times.  
Emphasising the role of the central bank as the last resort of failed financial 
institutions, Ponce and Rennert, (2015) propose a model where systemic and non-
systemic banks are exposed to liquidity shortfalls so that a lender of last resort policy 
is required. Under this framework, a systemic bank coexists with a non-systemic bank 




system. The failure of the systemic bank may hurt the non-systemic bank but not vice 
versa. They suggest that the existence of systemically important banks implies that the 
central bank should act as lender of last resort for non-systemic banks in a larger range 
of its liquidity shortfalls. They find that it is first-best socially optimal to provide 
emergency liquidity assistance to banks with assets of high quality, while the support 
for lower assets quality banks should be refused support. Hence, keeping other things 
equal, it is more desirable to use the unconditional support rule. Other the other hand, 
the central bank, in providing liquidity assistance to a systemic bank, will be softer 
than for a non-systemic bank. Therefore, the allocation of more responsibilities as the 
lender of last resort to the central bank. This study highlight the role and responsibility 
of the central bank, and how the central bank can play its role to sustain the stability 
of the banking system. 
In addition to the studies discussed above, there is a serial of empirical studies 
that examine the impact of regulation and supervision on banks’ performance. Many 
of them examine the relationship between regulation and supervision on banks’ 
performance by employing the Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey from the 
World Bank and conducting a cross country study. For example, Barth et al. (2013b)  
examine whether bank regulation, supervision and monitoring enhance or impede bank 
operating efficiency by analysing 4050 banks in 72 countries. They find that tighter 
restrictions on bank activities are negatively associated with bank efficiency, while 
greater capital regulation stringency is marginally and positively related to bank 
efficiency. In addition, strengthening of official supervisory power is positively 
associated with bank efficiency, but only in countries with independent supervisory 
authorities. This result points out that the independence of supervisory agencies from 
both politicians and banking firms is conducive to improved bank efficiency. Putting 
the official supervisory power in the hands of independent supervisors may be helpful 
to improve the efficiency of the banking system. Also, supervisor experience is 
important as it positively related to bank efficiency. Last, they suggest that market-
based monitoring of banks in terms of more financial transparency is positively 
associated with bank efficiency, while generous deposit insurance coverage is negative 
associated with bank operating efficiency. Li et al. (2019) study the relation between 
bank regulation stringency and announcement effects of seconded equity offering 
across 21 countries. They find that bank regulation has a nonlinear relation with bank-




announcement effect. This effect increases as the level of bank regulation increases 
and then decreases as the level of bank regulation continues to increase. Specifically,  
higher initial capital stringency, prompt corrective action, deposit insurer power, and 
total regulation particularly exert a positive impact on the SEO announcement effect 
initially but that the impact becomes negative when these regulations rise too high. 
They conclude that bank regulation may play a dual role in affecting the stock pricing 
reaction to SEO announcements.   
On the other side of this strand of literature, studies show the effect of 
regulation depends on the structure of banks as well as the overall macro institutional 
environment. Laeven and Levine (2009) show that the relation between bank risk and 
capital regulation, deposit insurance policies and restriction on bank activities depends 
critically on each bank’s ownership structure. Same regulation can exert different 
effects on bank risk taking depending on the bank’s corporate governance structure. In 
Agoraki et al. (2011), they consider the regulation including capital requirements, 
restrictions on bank activities and official supervisory power and focus on the Central 
and Eastern European banking sectors. The highlight of empirical tests is placed on 
whether these regulations have an independent effect on bank risk taking, and whether 
their effect changes with the level of market power possessed by banks. An important 
finding is that capital requirements and supervisory power tend to show a direct impact 
on credit risk by reducing non-performing loans. While the stabilizing effects of capital 
regulations diminish when banks have sufficient market power to increase their credit 
risk and are reversed for banks that possess moderate to high market power. These 
results point out that regulations alone may not be adequate to control banks credit risk 
and that a thorough investigation of the market power of banks is also needed. 
Therefore, one implication of this paper is that regulators may be able to limit bank 
risk-taking by placing restrictions on banks’ activities. In the study, further test results 
show that higher bank activities restrictions in combination with more market power 
reduce both credit risk and risk of default. Using data from 1900 to 1930, where a 
period that predates active federal government stabilization policies, Kupiec and 
Ramirez (2013) show that different regulatory and economic environments affect the 
relationship between bank failures and economic distress. Specifically, state deposit 
insurance systems amplify the degree to which bank failures propagated economic 
distress. Taken together, official supervisory power is a direct and effective channel in 




For policymakers, they need to consider improving the auditing of banks and impose 
sanctions where appropriate.                                                 
2.2.2 Systemic risk 
2.2.2.1 Systemic risk measurement 
In existing studies of systemic risk, some researchers have focused on 
individual measures of systemic risk, which predicts how much a stock is expected to 
fall in a market downturn. Acharya et al. (2012) lay the theoretical foundation of such 
an approach. When the systemic is under distress, financial institutions may fall short 
of capital that can lead to a bank run unless the regulator will need to replenish capital, 
and such bank run can be contagious. They develop a theoretical approach to systemic 
risk by postulating that the aggregate capital shortfall of the financial sector imposes a 
negative externality on the real economy. Whenever the capital shortfall exceeds some 
fraction of total assets, the externality becomes effective. Specifically, when the 
externality is large enough, there is a financial crisis. Therefore, they propose an 
estimation of the capital shortfall of the financial sector, where the first step is to 
estimate the marginal expected shortfall (MES) of a financial institution. Later, 
Acharya et al. (2017) propose an economic model of systemic risk in which 
undercapitalization of the financial sector as a whole is assumed to harm the real 
economy, leading to a systemic risk externality. In this model, they define each 
financial institution’s contribution to systemic risk can be measured as its systemic 
expected shortfall (SES), which is the propensity to be undercapitalized when the 
system as a whole is undercapitalized. SES increases in the institution’s leverage and 
its MES, which is its losses in the tail of the system’s loss distribution. As an extension 
of MES, Brownlees and Engle, (2016) introduce SRISK to measure the systemic risk 
contribution of a financial firm. SRISK measures the capital shortfall of a firm 
conditional on a severe market decline, and is a function of its size of firm, its degree 
of leverage, and its expected equity loss conditional on the market decline, which they 
call Long Run MES. SRISK is used to construct rankings of systemically risky 
institutions that firms with the highest SRISK are the largest contributors to the 
undercapitalization of the financial system in the time of distress. In addition, SRISK 
can be used as a measure of overall systemic risk in the entire financial system as the 




approach is based on structural assumptions and requires observing a realization of the 
systemic crisis for estimation, therefore, cannot be used for ex-ante measurement. 
A related and very influential paper is Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) who 
propose a measure of systemic risk, ΔCoVaR, defined as the change in the value at risk 
of the financial system conditional on an institution being under distress relative to its 
median state. Specifically, where an institution’ CoVaR related to the system is defined 
as the VaR of the whole financial sector conditional on the institution being in a 
particular state. Therefore, the ΔCoVaR is the difference between the CoVaR 
conditional on the distress of an institution and the CoVaR conditional on the median 
state of that institution. Different from MES which is conditional on a large negative 
market return realization, CoVaR measures conditions on the distress of a single 
financial institution. As argued in Engle (2018), CoVaR ignores the externality that is 
the focus of many systemic risk theories, e.g. MES and SRISK. Acharya et al. (2012) 
suggest that under certain distributional assumptions about firm’s returns, CoVaR 
treats two firms identically in terms of systemic risk if the firms have the same return 
correlation with the aggregate market even though they might have very different 
return volatilities. While the conditioning events differ, both CoVaR and MES focus 
on extreme left-tail events and either can be used to identify extremal left-tail stock 
return dependence (Kupiec and Güntay, 2016).  
In addition to the systemic risk measures we discussed above, several papers 
use different methods to measure systemic risk. Some researchers have used market-
based indices as the measure of systemic risk. For example, Huang et al., (2009) use 
data on credit default swaps (CDSs) of financial firms and stock return correlations 
across these firms to estimate expected credit losses above a given share of the 
financial sector’s total liability. Following that, Huang et al., (2012) develop the 
measure of systemic risk as to the price of insurance against systemic financial distress 
and assess individual banks’ marginal contribution to the systemic risk. Allen et al., 
(2012) propose an aggregate systemic risk index called CATFIN, which associates 
systemic risk to the VaR of the financial system. Another strand of studies connects 
the market-based systemic risk measurement with the degree of interdependence 
among financial firms. Billio et al., (2012) measure systemic risk based on principal 




the financial sector. Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) regard the financial sector as a 
portfolio of individual financial firms, and look at how individual firms contribute to 
the potential distress of the system by using the CDSs of these firms within a 
multivariate setting. Gravelle and Li, (2013) propose a set of market-based measures 
on systemic importance of a financial institution or a group of financial institutions by 
its contribution to systemic risk, and use multivariate extreme value theory approach 
to estimate these measures.  
2.2.2.2 Application of systemic risk measures in empirical studies 
One set of studies conduct empirical analyses of systemic risk by examining 
the relationship between competition and bank stability. In Beck et al. (2013), they 
examine how bank competition affects bank stability and the role of regulation which 
interact with the relationship. They document significant cross-country heterogeneity 
in the competition-stability relationship. They show that an increase in competition 
will have a larger impact on banks’ fragility in countries with stricter activity 
restrictions, lower systemic fragility, better developed stock changes, more general 
deposit insurance and more effective systems of credit information sharing. They 
highlight that activities restrictions and herding trends can exacerbate the negative 
impact of competition on bank stability so that regulatory reforms have to take this 
into account. Besides, the results also stress the importance of the moral hazard risk of 
generous deposit insurance, which exacerbated in a more competitive environment. 
They suggest a direct effect of policies on risk-taking incentive of banks, as well as 
the indirect effect by dampening or exacerbating the effect of competition on banks’ 
riskiness. Anginer et al. (2014) study the relationship between bank competition and 
systemic risk and find conflict results. They find that greater competition encourages 
banks to take on more diversified risks, making the banking system less fragile to 
shocks. Besides, the institutional and regulatory environment on bank systemic risk 
shows that banking systems are more fragile in countries with weak supervision and 
private monitoring, greater government ownership of banks, and with public policies 
that restrict competition. Similar to Anginer et al. (2014), Fu et al. (2014) analysis the 
tradeoff between competition and financial stability, but shifting the study focus to 14 
Asia pacific economies. They find that greater concentration foster financial fragility 
and the lower pricing power induce bank risk exposure. Moreover, tougher entry 




positively related to bank fragility. The results from these two studies suggest that the 
competition among banks helps to sustain the stability of banking system, while 
regulation and supervision stringency tend to moderate such positive relationship. In 
all these studies, they use the Distance to Default Model (Merton 1974) as the market-
based risk measure and/or Z-score as the accounting-based risk measure to estimate 
the individual bank fragility. Weiß et al. (2014) analyse the systemic risk effects of 
bank mergers to test the “concentration- fragility” hypothesis. They adopt MES as 
systemic risk measure to capture the merger-related change in an acquirer’s 
contribution to systemic risk. They find a significant increase in the merging banks’, 
the combined banks’ and their competitors’ contribution to systemic risk following 
mergers, therefore confirming the “concentration-fragility” hypothesis. Overall, these 
studies suggest that regulation and supervision policies can directly or indirectly 
induce banks competition, consequently affect the fragility of banking system.  
Another strand of existing studies use the systemic risk measurement and 
conduct empirical studies by connecting some factors with systemic risk. For example, 
Laeven et al. (2016) adopt ΔCoVaR and SRISK as the systemic risk measure to test 
the relationship with bank size. They find that systemic risk increases with bank size, 
and systemic risk is lower in more-capitalized banks, with the effects particularly more 
pronounced for large banks. They suggest that large banks pose excessive systemic 
risk, and could be seen as evidence in support of calls to limit the size or activities of 
banks. López-Espinosa et al. (2012) use the CoVaR approach to identify the main 
factors behind systemic risk in a set of large international banks. They find that short-
term wholesale funding is a key determinant in triggering systemic risk episodes. Their 
result suggests that short-term wholesale funding emerges as the most relevant 
systemic factor, which supports the Basel Committee’s proposal to introduce a net 
stable funding ratio, penalizing excessive exposure to liquidity risk. The recent 
financial crisis also highlights the importance of going beyond a purely micro-based 
approach to financial regulation and supervision. Gauthier et al. (2012) suggest 
financial stability can be enhanced by implementing a systemic perspective on banking 
regulation. Macroprudential capital requirements need a fixed point at which each 
bank’s capital is consistent with its contribution to the total risk of the banking system 
under a proposed capital allocation. They derive macroprudential capital requirements 
as a fixed point using five risk allocation mechanisms, including MES and ΔCoVaR. 




the default probabilities of individual banks as well as the probability of a systemic 
crisis. 
In terms of most recent studies in systemic risk, Berger et al. (2019) employ 
the U.S. Trouble Assets Relief Programme (TARP) to examine how the bank bailouts 
affect systemic risk. Using a Difference-in-difference analysis, the results suggest that 
TARP significantly reduced contributions to systemic risk, particularly for large and 
safer banks located in better local economies. Furthermore, they document a capital 
cushion channel that reduces bank leverage risk. Brunnermeier et al. (2019) find non-
interest income to be positively correlated with total systemic risk. Specifically, by 
decomposing total systemic risk measured by ΔCoVaR, they find non-interest income 
has a positive relationship with a bank’s tail risk, a positive relationship with a bank’s 
interconnectedness risk, and an insignificant or positive relationship with bank’s 
exposure to macroeconomic and financial factors.  
2.2.3 Hypothesis development 
2.2.3.1 Bank activity restriction and systemic risk 
Some may argue that giving banks more freedom in their activities could also 
encourage banks to take excessive risk. For example, the moral hazard that may arise 
under this situation is likely to provide more opportunities for banks to engage in risky 
behaviour (Boyd et al. 1998), consequently increases the possibility of systemic failure. 
Therefore, restricting bank activities, to some extent, can help improve the financial 
stability of the market. However, traditionally, portfolio theory predicts that the 
combined cash flows from non-correlated revenue sources should be more stable than 
the constituent parts (Baele et al. 2007). Less restriction on bank activities allows 
banks to engage in a broad range of activities, which has the potential to decrease 
conglomerate risk (Kwan and Laderman 1999). If this is the case, banks under strict 
activity regulation will be less likely to diversify their business line. As a result, they 
may experience a higher individual risk and be exposed to greater capital shortfall 
when a crisis comes. In addition, when banks are only allowed to engage in limited 
business lines, the structure of their portfolios will become more similar. This means 
that risks are highly correlated among those banks compared with their peers who have 




heterogeneity in banks’ activity mix can reduce systemic risk and increase welfare, 
while similarity cannot. Barth et al. (2004) use a country-level database to analyse the 
influence of bank activity restrictions on the likelihood of a banking crisis, showing 
that greater regulatory restrictions on bank activities are associated with an increase in 
the likelihood of suffering a major crisis. Beck et al. (2006) find that imposing fewer 
restrictions on bank activities can reduce banking system fragility. Based on the 
aforementioned arguments, we would expect that banks under greater activity 
restrictions would experience greater systemic risk. 
H1: Greater restriction on bank’s activities leads to higher systemic risk.  
2.2.3.2 Capital requirements and systemic risk 
Since the global financial crisis, bank capital requirements have been 
substantially tightened. Capital can absorb losses and mitigate against credit risk. 
When systemic shock happens, banks with higher capital ratio are more likely to 
survive compared with their counterparts which have a lower capital ratio. If there 
exists a systemic shock, banks with higher capital ratio might be easier to survival 
compared with their counterparts with lower capital ratio. Capital requirements put 
into place to ensure that banks are not involving or holding high risk portfolio which 
can increase the risk of default and make sure they have sufficient capital to sustain 
operating losses while still honouring withdrawals. Regulators would hold the view 
that banks should hold a contain ratio of capital to minimise insolvency risk and the 
contingent system breakdown. The The World Bank (2013) shows that crisis countries 
tended to have lower stringency on capital and lower actual capital ratios in the 2007~ 
09 financial crisis. However, banks prefer to hold less capital due to the high cost. At 
the same time, banks are more likely to seek opportunities to compensate for the high 
cost of holding unprofitable capital. Unregulated sectors are banks’ preference due to 
the higher return compare with regulated sectors. However, when a banking crisis 
develops, business in unregulated sectors will be first attacked and lead to the ‘domino 
effect’ to the whole financial system (Goodhart 2008). Bahaj and Malherebe (2020) 
develop a model in which capital is costly from a bank’s perspective due to an implicit 
subsidy from a government guarantee. They suggest that at a given level of lending, a 




average cost of funds consequently. If the systemic risk is defined as capital shortfall, 
greater capital stringency may lead to increased systemic risk as it can create 
challenges for banks, especially in the crisis time. When the system is undercapitalized, 
it will no longer supply a credit for the routine business. Banks under greater capital 
stringency will find it more difficult to raise capital, and hence will be more likely to 
experience capital shortfall and exposure to greater systemic instability. Hakenes and 
Schnabel (2011) point out that capital regulation may destabilize the banking sector 
through its effect on banking competition and suggest that capital regulation may not 
be suited in all circumstances to prevent excessive risk-taking in the banking sector. 
Therefore, we would expect that greater capital stringency could cause higher systemic 
risk for individual banks. 
H2: Greater capital stringency leads to higher systemic risk of banks.  
2.2.3.3 Official supervisory action and systemic risk 
Strong theoretical explanations are arguing for greater official supervision 
power. Banks are difficult to monitor, especially for the debtholders who are not in a 
position to monitor managers because they are small and uninformed (Dewatripont 
and Tirole 1993; Santos 2001). From this perspective, strong official supervision can 
monitor and discipline banks, prevent managers from excessive risk-taking behaviour, 
and thus reduce market failure (Beck et al. 2006). However, such an argument is based 
on the assumption that the supervisory agencies are acting according to the public 
interest. Under the private interest or regulatory capture view (Agoraki et al. 2011; 
Barth et al. 2004), governments and supervisors may act in the interest of a few specific 
groups, e.g. powerful banks, rather than the society. If this held then a stronger 
supervisory power might have uncertain and even adverse implications for the bank’s 
lending behaviour (Agoraki et al. 2011; Beck et al. 2006). Beck et al. (2006)  
investigate the relationship between bank supervision and corruption in lending and 
find that the empowerment of official supervisory agencies to monitor, discipline, and 
influence banks directly does not improve the integrity of bank lending. In the study 
by Barth et al., (2004), no significant association is found between official supervisory 
power and the likelihood of suffering a crisis. Moreover, greater government 




increase moral hazard due to a decline in the market discipline (Gropp and Vesala 
2004; Hryckiewicz 2014). If banks engage in excessive risk taking, they may suffer 
higher individual risks that could in the end lead to systemic instability. Hryckiewicz, 
(2014) investigates the impact of policy injections into banks in 23 countries during 
the 2007-2009 financial crisis, and find that government interventions are strongly 
correlated with subsequent risk increase in the bank sector. The paper argues that the 
increased role of the government in the banking sector might encourage politicians to 
act in self-interests. In line with the view of private interest, we would therefore expect 
a positive relationship between prompt corrective power and systemic risk. 
H3: Greater prompt corrective power leads to higher systemic risk of banks.  
2.2.3.4 Depositor protection and systemic risk   
Explicit deposit insurance has been gaining popularity in recent years since 
1908s and has become the standard for the newly created single banking market 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Sobaci 2001). Deposit insurance helps to reduce the likelihood 
of bank runs and enhance the financial stability. However, it has been widely 
recognised that deposit insurance can aggravate the moral hazard problem in the 
banking sector by encouraging excessive risk-taking behaviour (Anginer et al. 2014b; 
Barth et al. 2004; Bisias et al. 2012). Besides, banks’ ability to attract deposits no 
longer depend on the risk of their asset portfolio. Depositors can monitor bank risk-
taking behaviour by charging higher interest rates, but they may have less incentive to 
monitor banks if deposits are insured, and the lack of market discipline is likely to 
result in excessive risk taking culminating in banking crises (Anginer et al. 2014b). 
The higher the individual risk, the greater the capital shortfall when banks are in 
distress, and consequently the more they contribute to systemic instability. 
Introduction of explicit deposit insurance helps banks to attract additional external 
liabilities. If there is a guarantee provided by the State to cover losses stemming from 
a systemic crisis, banks will have incentives to take on correlated risks (Acharya 2009). 
Banks are encouraged to invest high-risk, high-return projects, which undermine bank 
stability in the long run (Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane 2002). Guaranteed banks are less 
willing to diversify their operations since the guarantee takes effect only if other banks 




to take higher risk with explicit deposit insurance. Cull et al. (2002)argue that deposit 
insurance can increase risk taking of banks and in turn leads to increased systemic 
instability. Countries with generous insurance schemes tend to be more bank fragile 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Sobaci 2001). Deposit insurance has a greater adverse effect on 
systemic stability in countries less regulated and supervised. Based on these discussion, 
the positive impact and negative impact of deposit insurer power on systemic risk may 
cancel off each other. Therefore, we expect an insignificant relationship between 
depositor insurer power and systemic risk: 
H4: The depositor insurer power is insignificantly related to systemic risk of 
banks.  
2.3 Data, variables and descriptive statistics 
2.3.1 Data and sample 
The dataset used in this study is compiled from several sources. First, we obtain 
bank-level financial information from Datastream. Second, the data of banking 
regulation and supervision are selected from the Bank Regulation and Supervision 
Survey database of the World Bank. This database is developed by Barth et al., (2013b)  
based on four world-wide surveys they completed before1. Following Barth et al. 
(2013b) and Li et al. (2019), we use the Survey I information for the value of the 
regulatory and supervisor variables for the year 2001, Survey II data for the period 
2002-2004, Survey III data for the period 2005-2008 and Survey IV data for the period 
2009-2013. Third, in order to measure the systemic risk, we collect the daily stock 
returns data from Datastream. Fourth, we obtain economic development measures 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI) database.     
We then match bank-level information, information about regulation and 
supervision in different countries and other national data based on data availability. 
Because of the incomplete overlap among the three datasets, there are a significant 
number of missing data and the final sample used in our study contains 6305 
 
1 Survey I was completed in 1999 and covered 118 countries; Survey II provided information on bank 
regulatory and supervisory policies in 151 countries for 2002;  Survey III captured information on 
banking policies in 2006 for 142 countries; and Survey IV provided information in 125 countries for 




observations, including 1588 individual banks from 65 countries over the sample 
period of 2001-20132. It should be noted that the observations in our sample appear to 
be unbalanced and we attempt to address this concern in the robustness test. 
2.3.2 Variables of bank regulation and supervision 
The extensive database on bank regulation and supervision is based on four 
surveys conducted by the World Bank3. The Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey 
is a unique source of comparable economy-level data on how banks are regulated and 
supervised around the world. Following previous studies (Anginer et al., 2014; Barth 
et al., 2013; Beck et al., 2013; Li et al., 2019), we are concerned with four types of 
regulation and supervision: restriction on bank activities, initial capital stringency, 
prompt corrective action and deposit insurer power. Variables are defined following 
the work of Barth et al. (2004) and Barth et al. (2013b)4.  
2.3.2.1 Activity restriction 
 The regulators license banks and specify permissible activities. Banks’ in 
countries may be allowed for engaging a narrow range of activities, such as traditional 
bank activities of depositing and lending. Or they can engage in a broad array, for 
example, securities and insurance. Therefore, bank regulations define the scope of 
bank activities can vary from country to country. We use Activity restriction index to 
capture the degree to which the national regulatory authorities in countries allow banks 
to engage in (1) Securities (2) Insurance (3) Real estate. More specifically, securities 
activities include securities underwriting, brokering, dealing and all aspects of the 
mutual fund industry.  Insurance activities refer to insurance underwriting and selling, 
and real estate activities involve real estate investment, development and management. 
A value of 1 to 4 is added if an activity is  
 
2 Due to the high advanced banking system and large number of banks from US and UK, banks from 
these two countries have been excluded in our baseline analysis.  
3 https://www.worldbank.org/en/research/brief/BRSS 
4 Detailed information about variable definition, including the specific survey questions used and how 





(1) Unrestricted – A full range of activities in the given category can be conducted 
directly in the bank. 
(2) Permitted – A full range of activities can be conducted, but all or some must 
be conducted in subsidiaries. 
(3) Restricted – Less than a full range of activities can be conducted in the bank or 
subsidiaries. 
(4) Prohibited – the activities cannot be conducted in either the bank or subsidiaries. 
By adding the values together and then dividing by 12, the activity restriction 
index can range from 0 to 1 and higher value indicates greater activity restriction. 
2.3.2.2 Initial capital stringency 
Capital regulations are the key pillar of banking sector policies. Many rules 
and regulations require the precise amount and nature of capital that banks must hold. 
In terms of the nature of capital, there are policies concerning the definition of capital 
beyond cash or government securities, the definition and valuation of bank assets, and 
whether the regulatory and supervisory authorities’ variations are needed. Therefore, 
we use the Initial capital stringency, which measures whether certain funds may be 
used to initially capitalize a bank and whether they are official. To be specific, 
questions include: 
(1) Are the sources of funds to be used as capital verified by the 
regulatory/supervisory authorities?  
(2) Can the initial disbursement or subsequent injections of capital be performed 
with assets other than cash or government securities?  
(3) Can the initial disbursement of capital be performed with borrowed funds? 
For question (1), we assign a value of 1 to a ‘yes’ answer and 0 to a ‘no’ answer. 
For question (2) and (3), we assign 0 to a ‘yes’ answer and 1 to a ‘no’ answer. By 
adding the values together and dividing by three, we get the Initial capital stringency 




2.3.2.3 Prompt corrective action 
An important aspect of supervision is whether the supervisory authorities 
possess the powers to acquire information from banks and take an assortment of 
actions to change the behaviour of banks based on the assessments of the official 
supervisory authority. Authorities in countries may be authorised to take corrective 
actions to address a problem, while authorities in other countries may have the 
discretionary power to act as they see sit. Moreover, for example, courts may intervene 
in some cases and consequently limit, delay or even reverse actions taken by the 
supervisory authorities, while in other cases, the courts have less power over the 
regulatory and supervisory agencies. We construct Prompt corrective action, which is 
used to measure whether a law establishes pre-determined levels of bank solvency 
deterioration which force automatic enforcement actions, such as intervention, and the 
extent to which supervisors have the requisite, suitable powers to take such actions. 
Specific questions include:  
(1) Can the supervisory authority force a bank to change its internal organizational 
structure? 
(2) Are there any mechanisms of cease and desist-type orders, whose infraction 
leads to the automatic imposition of civil and penal sanctions against the bank’s 
directors and managers? 
(3) Can the supervisory agency order the bank’s directors or management to 
constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses? 
(4) Can the supervisory agency suspend the director’s decision to distribute 
dividends?  
(5) Can the supervisory agency suspend the director’s decision to distribute 
bonuses?  
(6) Can the supervisory agency suspend the director’s decision to distribute 
management fees?  
We assign a value of 1 if the answer is yes and a 0 otherwise. This variable is 




from 0 to 1. Higher value of the variable implies more promptness in responding to 
problems. 
2.3.2.4 Deposit insurer power 
Policies associated with insuring the deposits of banks may also shape the 
performance of the banking system. Countries usually adopt deposit insurance to 
prevent bank runs. When depositors ask to withdraw their money all at once, this will 
lead some illiquid but solvent individual banks may be forced into insolvency and there 
is also the potential for contagious bank runs to the rest of the banking system. 
Therefore, many countries implement deposit insurance schemes to alleviate the 
probability of systemic crises. However, deposit insurance also encourages excessive 
risk-taking by banks since this reduces the incentives of depositors to monitor bank 
executives and curtail excessive risk taking. Therefore, the precise design of deposit 
insurance schemes, including coverage limits, the scope of coverage, whether 
coinsurance is a feature, sources of funding, premia structure, and management and 
membership requirements, may materially shape bank and depositor behaviours. We 
use the Deposit insurer power which is an index used to measure each country’s 
deposit insurance regime and to trace its evolution from 1999 to 2011. The index is 
based on the answers to the following questions, for which we assign a value of 1 to a 
‘yes’ answer and 0 to a ‘no’ answer: 
(1) Does the deposit insurance authority make the decision to intervene in a bank? 
(2) Can the deposit insurance agency/fund take legal action for violations of laws, 
regulations, and bylaws (of the deposit insurance agency) against bank 
directors or other bank officials?  
(3) Has the deposit insurance agency/fund ever taken legal action for violations of 
laws, regulations, and bylaws (of the deposit insurance agency) against bank 
directors or other bank officials?  
(4) Were any deposits not explicitly covered by the deposit insurance at the time 
of the failure compensated when the bank failed (excluding funds later paid out 




This index is equal to {[(1)+(2)+(3)]/3 + (4)}/2, with a range from 0 to 1, where 
higher value indicates more power. 
2.3.2.5 Total regulation 
Based on the above four measures of specific types of bank regulation and 
supervision, we develop a single regulation measure using factor analysis. We estimate 
the following equation: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 (2.1) 
Where the subscripts i, s, and t refer to countries, the four regulation measures, 
and years, respectively. The left-hand-side variables (Yi,s,t) are the four regulation 
measures, all of which are stacked into a single factor, whereas Regulation is not 
observed and is estimated along with the factor loadings 𝛽. We follow the standard 
practice of normalizing proxy measures included on the left-hand side to have a mean 
of zero and a variance of one before we conduct the factor analysis. The estimation of 
Equation (2.1) generates predicted values for both a set of factors (𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡) and 
a set of factor loadings 𝛽𝑖. As our data are well described by a one-factor model that 
captures approximately 52% of the variation in the four regulation measures, we take 
the factor with the greatest explanatory power as our measure of total regulation. 
Higher value means greater stringency. 
2.3.3 Measure of systemic risk 
Following Acharya et al. (2017), our study adopts the Marginal Expected 
Shortfall (MES) as the measure for determining the systemic risk exposure of 
individual banks. The systemic expected shortfall of an institution describes the capital 
shortage a financial institution would experience when there is a systemic event. The 
capital shortfall depends on the institution’s leverage and equity loss conditional on an 
aggregate market decline. Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) of a financial institution 
is the expected loss to which an equity investor in a financial institution would be 




adopt MES as our systemic risk measure. MES evaluates the average daily return for 




𝑚 < 𝐶) (2.2) 
𝑅𝑡
𝑖 is the equity return of financial firm 𝑖, and 𝑅𝑡
𝑚 is the aggregate equity return 
of the entire banking system at the country level. A systemic event is defined as a drop 
of the market index below a threshold, 𝐶, over a given time horizon. We estimate the 
MES by following Acharya et al. (2017) at a standard risk level of 5%, using daily 
data for equity return from Datastream. For better interpretation of our results, we take 
the negative value of MES to ensure that our measures are increasing in systemic risk.   
2.3.4 Other control variables 
We control for a set of bank-specific and country-specific variables in the 
regression analysis, including bank size, profitability, market-to-book value, loan loss 
provision, GDP growth, inflation and economic freedom, which have been used in 
some previous studies of bank regulation and risk (Anginer et al. 2014a; Barth et al. 
2004; Delis, Molyneux, and Pasiouras 2011). For example, Anginer et al. (2014a) find 
that larger banks pose greater systemic risk, while banks with higher market-to-book 
value tend to have lower systemic risk exposure. Nijskens and Wagner (2011) find that 
banks with higher ROA tend to use CDS to protect against defaults on their portfolios, 
and this helps to decrease individual risk while increasing the joint risks.  
Bank size is measured by the natural logarithm of individual bank’s total assets. 
We use return on average assets (ROA) to capture the profitability of banks, and 
market-to-book value (MTBV) to control for bank growth opportunities. Loan loss 
provisioning is an accounting indicator that directly influences the volatility and 
cyclicality of bank earnings, as well as information properties of banks’ financial 
reports with respect to reflecting loan portfolios’ risk attributes (Bushman and 




With regard to the country-level factors, GDP growth is the annual growth rate 
of GDP, and inflation is defined as the annual growth rate of GDP deflator. Following 
Li et al. (2019), we derive the variable of Economic Freedom from the Heritage 
Foundation. It is the mean value of an index of economic freedom in terms of trade 
freedom, business freedom, investment freedom, and property rights for the period 
2001-2013. The Economic Freedom measures the extent of the freedom individuals 
and firms can obtain from their governments to conduct their business. All variable 
definitions can be found in Appendix A.1. 
2.3.5 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.1 Panel A summarises the mean value for the regulation variables in 
each country during the sample period 2001-2013. We observe a wide variation in the 
four specific regulation measures and also the total regulation index. Activity 
Restriction varies from the lowest value of zero in Kazakhstan and of 0.15 in Germany 
to a high value of 0.692 in China and of 0.714 in Indonesia, indicating that Indonesia 
and China forbid banks from engaging in most non-bank activities, while banks in 
Germany and Kazakhstan have relatively more freedom to extend their operations into 
securities, insurance or real estate markets. Finland has the highest Initial Capital 
Stringency, with a value of 0.869, while the mean value of Initial Capital Stringency 
in countries including Kazakhstan, Tunisia and Croatia are equal to zero, representing 
that banks in these countries can include assets other than cash or government 
securities and borrowed funds as regulatory capital. With respect to Prompt Corrective 
Action, Panama and Slovakia have the highest value of 1, while Sweden has the lowest 
value of 0.167. Deposit insurer power varies from the lowest value of zero in fifteen 
countries, including Brazil, China, India, Israel and Italy, to the highest value of 0.877 
in Canada. This suggests that in Brazil, China and Cyprus etc., which indicates that 
deposit insurer power is very limited in these countries. Among the sample countries, 
Kenya has the highest Total Regulation Index value (0.872), while Kazakhstan has the 
lowest (0.113).  
In Panel B, we report the number of observations under each survey period. As 
discussed in section 2.3.1, we use the Survey I information for the value of the 




2002-2004, Survey III data for the period 2005-2008 and Survey IV data for the period 
2009-2013. From Panel B, we observe that countries with more total observations 
usually are covered by four survey period, e.g. Demark, France and Germany, etc. 
While countries with less total observations tend to be covered only by one or two 
survey period, for example, Ecuador with total 16 observations are all under by Survey 
IV period. The main reason for the unbalanced observation distribution under four 
survey period across countries is due to data availability. We will address this 





Table 2.1 Summary statistics for the regulation variables 
This table includes the countries that are included in our study. Panel A report the regulation restrictions 
across countries in the sample period 2001 to 2013.  Column N represents the number of observations. The 
remainder of the table reports the mean figures (in percentage form) of the regulation variables over the 
sample period for each country. In panel B, we report the number of observation under each Survey period. 
We use the Survey I information for the value of the regulatory and supervisor variables for the year 2001, 
Survey II data for the period 2002-2004, Survey III data for the period 2005-2008 and Survey IV data for 
the period 2009-2013. A detailed description of the definitions of the variables is included in Appendix. 












Argentina 71 0.418 0.531 0.511 0.707 0.564 
Australia 127 0.445 0.780 0.880 0.139 0.633 
Austria 108 0.468 0.441 0.674 0.0540 0.446 
Bahrain 75 0.613 0.489 0.849 0.0889 0.600 
Bangladesh 115 0.470 0.333 0.964 0.464 0.619 
Belgium 20 0.394 0.583 0.825 0.300 0.571 
Botswana 15 0.438 0.333 0.800 0 0.427 
Brazil 124 0.573 0.543 0.867 0 0.580 
Bulgaria 13 0.466 0.333 0.554 0.231 0.417 
Canada 129 0.532 0.793 0.407 0.616 0.642 
Chile 81 0.610 0.309 0.747 0.208 0.538 
China 13 0.692 0.0256 0.808 0 0.456 
Colombia 53 0.568 0.509 0.594 0.160 0.516 
Croatia 44 0.607 0 0.598 0.333 0.422 
Cyprus 25 0.532 0.333 0.920 0 0.514 
Czech 11 0.409 0.485 0.530 0.561 0.514 
Denmark 231 0.341 0.766 0.561 0.181 0.481 
Ecuador 16 0.500 0.667 0.600 0.167 0.536 
Egypt 99 0.383 0.316 0.899 0.167 0.472 
Finland 28 0.536 0.869 0.286 0.0536 0.479 
France 361 0.386 0.695 0.554 0.391 0.533 
Germany 248 0.150 0.536 0.502 0.490 0.378 
Greece 58 0.444 0.833 0.604 0.0144 0.523 
Hong Kong SAR 70 0.584 0.505 0.821 0.124 0.590 
Hungary 17 0.548 0.431 0.941 0.176 0.605 
Iceland 14 0.554 0.190 0.381 0.119 0.326 
India 380 0.434 0.344 0.781 0.0158 0.426 
Indonesia 150 0.714 0.333 0.988 0.341 0.713 
Ireland 13 0.462 0.333 0.769 0.167 0.471 
Israel 91 0.420 0.667 0.799 0.0440 0.534 
Italy 301 0.509 0.762 0.328 0.203 0.486 
Japan 875 0.484 0.623 0.939 0.0838 0.609 
Jordan 106 0.352 0.333 0.628 0 0.327 
Kazakhstan 8 0 0 0.800 0 0.113 
Kenya 33 0.625 0.859 0.885 0.621 0.872 
Kuwait 166 0.667 0.333 0.509 0 0.438 
Lebanon 33 0.616 0.333 0.770 0.212 0.558 




Luxembourg 23 0.283 0.667 0.804 0.0362 0.467 
Malaysia 139 0.249 0.667 0.622 0.157 0.420 
Malta 20 0.406 0.833 0.900 0.0833 0.624 
Mexico 74 0.429 0.802 0.786 0.273 0.635 
Morocco 68 0.413 0.647 0.831 0.0662 0.541 
Niger 6 0.542 0.389 0.611 0 0.430 
Nigeria 20 0.625 0.333 0.800 0.333 0.604 
Norway 201 0.428 0.333 0.477 0.558 0.457 
Oman 23 0.435 0.667 0.696 0.0580 0.509 
Pakistan 173 0.413 0.541 0.910 0 0.518 
Panama 2 0.563 0.333 1 0 0.556 
Peru 68 0.479 0.711 0.708 0.206 0.587 
Poland 159 0.307 0.667 0.642 0 0.414 
Portugal 47 0.431 0.695 0.706 0.0426 0.516 
Qatar 34 0.463 0.333 0.765 0 0.427 
Russian 8 0.656 0.667 0.550 0.167 0.594 
Singapore 38 0.257 0.675 0.654 0.0746 0.416 
Slovakia 33 0.419 0.798 1 0.232 0.692 
South Africa 23 0.688 0.667 0.400 0 0.515 
Spain 94 0.328 0.397 0.555 0.291 0.386 
Sri Lanka 109 0.636 0.538 0.583 0 0.513 
Sweden 41 0.329 0.561 0.167 0.0610 0.245 
Switzerland 235 0.609 0.694 0.792 0.294 0.695 
Thailand 163 0.248 0.444 0.803 0.0542 0.386 
Tunisia 56 0.375 0 0.600 0 0.225 
Venezuela 109 0.398 0.502 0.811 0.0734 0.483 
Zimbabwe 4 0.625 0.667 0.800 0.167 0.665 





Panel B: Observations under each survey period by country 
Country N Survey I Survey II Survey III Survey IV 
Argentina 71 5 15 22 29 
Australia 127 10 33 46 38 
Austria 108 9 29 35 35 
Bahrain 75 0 6 34 35 
Bangladesh 115 0 0 25 90 
Belgium 20 2 8 5 5 
Botswana 15 0 0 0 15 
Brazil 124 12 34 34 44 
Bulgaria 13 0 0 6 7 
Canada 129 10 30 40 49 
Chile 81 6 14 21 40 
China 13 1 0 12 0 
Colombia 53 0 11 17 25 
Croatia 44 0 0 19 25 
Cyprus 25 0 0 12 13 
Czech 11 2 5 4 0 
Denmark 231 23 58 77 73 
Ecuador 16 0 0 0 16 
Egypt 99 5 15 33 46 
Finland 28 2 7 9 10 
France 361 37 99 105 120 
Germany 248 28 69 80 71 
Greece 58 5 12 22 19 
Hong Kong SAR 70 0 18 26 26 
Hungary 17 1 5 6 5 
Iceland 14 0 4 10 0 
India 380 12 65 127 176 
Indonesia 150 11 0 66 73 
Ireland 13 1 4 3 5 
Israel 91 6 21 29 35 
Italy 301 36 87 92 86 
Japan 875 114 321 440 0 
Jordan 106 0 0 39 67 
Kazakhstan 8 0 0 0 8 
Kenya 33 0 0 14 19 
Kuwait 166 0 12 67 87 
Lebanon 33 0 0 14 19 
Lithuania 13 0 0 7 6 
Luxembourg 23 4 7 7 5 
Malaysia 139 11 41 43 44 
Malta 20 0 0 10 10 
Mexico 74 5 17 22 30 
Morocco 68 4 14 23 27 
Niger 6 0 0 1 5 
Nigeria 20 0 0 0 20 




Oman 23 0 0 8 15 
Pakistan 173 0 30 65 78 
Panama 2 0 0 0 2 
Peru 68 5 17 25 21 
Poland 159 12 39 53 55 
Portugal 47 4 12 14 17 
Qatar 34 0 4 0 30 
Russian 8 0 0 4 4 
Singapore 38 8 13 17 0 
Slovakia 33 1 3 12 17 
South Africa 23 0 0 0 23 
Spain 94 12 32 32 18 
Sri Lanka 109 4 14 34 57 
Sweden 41 5 18 18 0 
Switzerland 235 19 56 69 91 
Thailand 163 11 43 56 53 
Tunisia 56 0 0 0 56 
Venezuela 109 7 24 41 37 
Zimbabwe 4 0 0 0 4 





Table 2.2 Descriptive statistics 
This table provides the summary statistics in Panel A and the correlation matrix in Panel B for the variables of the regulation, bank-specific and country-specific 
variables used in baseline analysis over the sample period of 2001to 2013, * indicates the correlation is significant at 95% significance level. The sample consists of 
6305 banks across 65 countries. The variables are defined as outlined in Appendix. N denotes the number of observations.  
Panel A: Summary statistics       
Variable N Mean Standard Deviation 25th  Medium 75th 
MES 6305 0.992 1.140 0.0959 0.751 1.640 
Activity Restriction 6305 0.450 0.222 0.313 0.438 0.563 
Initial Capital Stringency 6305 0.554 0.241 0.333 0.667 0.667 
Prompt Corrective Action 6305 0.708 0.263 0.500 0.800 1 
Depositor 6305 0.183 0.244 0 0 0.333 
Regulation Total 6305 0.518 0.178 0.395 0.526 0.673 
MTBV 6305 1.398 0.980 0.760 1.160 1.750 
LgTA 6305 9.322 2.389 7.632 9.153 10.96 
LLP 6305 0.233 2.973 0.0488 0.140 0.271 
ROA 6305 1.005 4.516 0.320 0.830 1.600 
GDP Growth 6305 2.970 3.702 1.136 2.587 5.278 
Inflation 6305 4.263 6.348 0.795 2.555 6.387 







Panel B: Correlation Matrix 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) MES 1             
(2) 
Activity 
Restriction 0 1            
(3) 
Initial Capital 




Action 0.139*** 0.189*** 0.034*** 1          
(5) 
Deposit Insuer 
Power -0.072*** -0.047*** 0.077*** -0.162*** 1         
(6) 
Regulation 
Total 0.056*** 0.683*** 0.474*** 0.576*** 0.278*** 1        
(7) MTBV 0.094*** -0.042*** -0.061*** -0.058*** 0.014 -0.076*** 1       
(8) lgTA 0.167*** 0.058*** -0.062*** 0.025** 0.085*** 0.052*** 0.090*** 1      
(9) LLP -0.024* -0.004 -0.016 0.001 -0.020* -0.016 -0.012 0.025** 1     
(10) ROA -0.073*** -0.028** -0.012 -0.016 0.013 -0.026** 0.019 -0.016 -0.303*** 1    
(11) GDP Growth -0.048*** -0.075*** -0.216*** 0.070*** -0.068*** -0.125*** 0.149*** 0.125*** -0.01 0.109*** 1   
(12) Inflation -0.116*** 0.018 -0.252*** -0.036*** -0.02 -0.121*** 0.093*** 0.116*** 0.009 0.119*** 0.216*** 1  
(13) 
Economic 
Freedom 0.029** 0.033*** 0.248*** -0.038*** 0.081*** 0.135*** -0.006 -0.155*** -0.006 -0.068*** -0.269*** -0.468*** 1 





Table 2.2 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables of systemic risk, 
regulation, bank-specific and country-specific factors for the entire sample. In panel 
A, we report the summary statistics for all the variables we used in our baseline 
analysis. We observe a wide variation in the systemic risk measure for the sample 
banks over the period of 2001 to 2013, with a mean value 0.992 and standard deviation 
1.140. 
The mean value of the Activity Restriction variable is 0.45, showing that the 
average level of restriction on bank activities is medium. Banks on average have a 
value of 0.554 for Initial Capital Stringency, suggesting that more than half of the 
banks in the sample can include funds other than cash, government securities and 
borrowed funds as regulatory capital. The Prompt Corrective Action variable shows a 
mean value of 0.708, indicating that on average the supervision power is high in the 
sample banks. However, the power of the deposit insurer in most countries appears to 
be limited as the average value of Deposit Insurer Power is only 0.183.  
In terms of control variables, the average of Market-to-book-value (MTBV) is 
1.398, ranging from 25th percentile of 0.760 to 75th percentile of 1.750. We use the 
natural logarithm of total assets to measure the size of the banks. On average, the 
logarithm value of total assets is 9.322, with a standard deviation of 2.389. We observe 
a large variation in the LLP variable, with an average value of 0.233% and standard 
deviation of 2.973. The value at 25th percentile is 0.0488% while it reaches to 0.271% 
at 75th percentile. GDP growth and Inflation reports the mean value as 2.970 and 4.263 
respectively.  The Economic Freedom Index presents significant variation from 59.20 
(25th percentile) to 70.90 (75th percentile), with 65.35 on average. 
In panel B, we report the Pearson correlations for the variables used in this 
paper. Overall, the table suggests the multicollinearity is not a serious problem. Most 
of the correlation coefficients are below 0.3, which allows us to include these variables 
simultaneously in the regression model. We find some preliminary evidence suggests 
that regulation stringency tend to positively related to systemic risk. Furthermore, we 
see that countries with greater regulation and supervision stringency over banks tend 




banks in these countries tend to be larger but lower market-to-book value. We will 
explore the relation more rigorously in later multivariate analysis. 
2.4 Empirical results 
2.4.1 Baseline results 
We start with five baseline models using OLS to examine the association 
between bank regulation and systemic risk. More specifically, we estimate the 
following equation: 
 𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 × 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑗𝑡
+ Ω × 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡 
(2.3) 
The dependent variable is the systemic risk measured by MES of bank i in 
country j in year t. The main independent variable is the regulation variables, namely 
Activity Restriction, Initial Capital Stringency, Prompt Corrective Action, Deposit 
Insurer Power and the Total Regulation Index, respectively. Control variables include 
bank-level and country-level variables since these factors could potentially affect 
systemic risk. 𝛾𝑖  is bank fixed effects to control time invariant bank heterogeneity and 
𝜆𝑡  is calendar year fixed effects. The standard errors for the regressions are estimated 
as heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for banks and presented in 




Table 2.3 Baseline Results  
This table reports the panel regression results of the estimation of different regulations and systemic risk from 65 countries for the period from 2001 to 2013. The dependent variable 
is the systemic risk measure by MES. Control variables include MTBV, lgTA, LLP, ROAA, GDP Growth, Inflation and Economic Freedom. Detailed definitions of the variables can 
be found in Appendix. Bank fixed effect and year fixed effects are both included. The standard errors for the regressions are estimated as heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
clustered for banks and are presented in brackets *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Activity Restriction Initial Capital Stringency Prompt Corrective Action Depositor Regulation Total 
Regulation 0.204** 0.361*** 0.200*** -0.093 0.419*** 
 (0.091) (0.081) (0.077) (0.062) (0.105) 
MTBV 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.076*** 0.071*** 0.076*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
lgTA -0.110** -0.113** -0.108** -0.128*** -0.090** 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
LLP -0.010* -0.010* -0.010* -0.010* -0.010* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
ROA -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
GDP Growth 0.006* 0.004 0.006* 0.005 0.006* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Inflation -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Economic Freedom 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
_cons 1.335** 1.323** 1.292** 1.629*** 1.051* 
 (0.598) (0.590) (0.595) (0.589) (0.595) 
Bank-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 6305 6305 6305 6305 6305 




We find a positive relationship between the majority of regulation stringency 
variables (Activity Restriction, Initial Capital Stringency, Prompt Corrective Action 
and Regulation Total) and systemic risk. In column (1), we observe a positive relation 
between Activity Restriction and MES, suggesting that banks in countries with tough 
activity restriction are exposed to higher systemic risk. Specifically, compared to 
countries with no restriction on banks activities, the systemic risk is 20.4 percentage 
points higher which is 21% of the sample mean for MES. Traditional portfolio theory 
predicts that the combined cash flows from non-correlated revenue sources should be 
more stable than the constituent parts (Baele et al. 2007). Activity restrictions may 
result in herding behaviour and greater correlated risk taking (Anginer et al. 2014a), 
as the structure of bank portfolios will become more similar and risks are highly 
correlated among those banks. Wagner (2010) argues that diversification in banks’ 
activities can reduce systemic risk and increase welfare, while similarity cannot.  Less 
restriction on bank activities allows banks to engage in a broad range of activities, 
which has the potential to decrease conglomerate risk (Kwan and Laderman 1999). 
Our results provide evidence to support the above arguments. This is also consistent 
with the findings of previous empirical work. Based a country-level database to 
analyse the influence of bank activity restrictions on the likelihood of a banking crisis, 
Barth et al. (2004) find that greater regulatory restrictions on bank activities are 
associated with an increase in the likelihood of suffering a major crisis. Beck et al., 
(2006) show that imposing fewer restrictions on bank activities can reduce banking 
system fragility.  
Similarly, we find a significantly positive association between Initial Capital 
Stringency and systemic risk in column (2). Capital requirement has been one of the 
most important bank regulatory instruments under the work of the Basel Committee 
of Banking Supervision. Capital, as a buffer for losses in bad times and also an 
incentive adjustor, is likely to reduce the principal-agent problem between 
shareholders and debt-holders and prevent excessive risk taking (Chortareas et al., 
2012; Ellis et al., 2014).  In this sense, better capitalized banks seem to contribute less 
to systemic risk (Laeven et al. 2016).  
However, if the systemic risk is defined as capital shortfall of an individual 




lead to increased systemic risk as it can create challenges for banks, especially in the 
crisis time. When the system is undercapitalized, it will no longer supply credit for the 
routine business. Banks under greater capital stringency will find it more difficult to 
raise capital, and hence will be more likely to experience capital shortfall and exposure 
to greater systemic instability. Moreover, stringent regulation design in banking can 
cause the boundary problem (Goodhart 2008). If regulations are asymmetric between 
the banking industry and other financial sectors, such as the insurance sector, banks 
will be tempted to engage in regulatory arbitrage which could conceivably lead to an 
increase in overall systemic risk (Allen and Gale 2007). Therefore, it is not surprising 
that a positive association between Initial Capital Stringency and systemic risk is 
found in this study, suggesting that banks under greater initial capital stringency tend 
to have higher systemic risk.  
Our results in Column (3) show that the enhanced Prompt Corrective Power 
can also contribute negatively to the financial stability of the market in the sample 
countries. There are strong theoretical explanations arguing for greater official 
supervision power. Banks are difficult to monitor, especially for the debtholders who 
are not in a position to monitor managers because they are small and uninformed 
(Dewatripont and Tirole 1993; Santos 2001). From this perspective, strong official 
supervision can monitor and discipline banks, prevent managers from excessive risk-
taking behaviour, and thus reduce market failure (Beck et al. 2006).  
However, such an argument is based on the assumption that the supervisory 
agencies are acting according to the public interest. Under the private interest or 
regulatory capture view (Agoraki et al. 2011; Barth et al. 2004), governments and 
supervisors may act in the interest of a few specific groups, e.g. powerful banks, rather 
than the society. If this held true then a stronger supervisory power might actually have 
uncertain and even adverse implications for banks’ lending behaviour (Agoraki et al. 
2011; Beck et al. 2006). In the study by Barth et al. (2004), no significant association 
is found between official supervisory power and the likelihood of suffering a crisis. 
Greater government intervention may also undermine the self-regulation faction in the 
banking system and increase moral hazard due to a decline in the market discipline 
(Gropp and Vesala 2004; Hryckiewicz 2014). Hryckiewicz (2014) investigates the 




crisis, and find that government interventions are strongly correlated with subsequent 
risk increase in the bank sector. He argues that the increased role of the government in 
the banking sector might encourage politicians to act in self-interests. Our results 
provide evidence to support the latter view, showing higher prompt corrective power 
leads to increased systemic risk. 
Last, the coefficient for the Total Regulation Index shown in column (5) is 
significantly positive, consistent with the aforementioned results. All these results 
suggest that banks under strict regulation and supervision tend to have higher systemic 
risk. One potential reason is that under more stringent regulation and supervision, 
banks are more likely to have moral hazard problem and less self-monitored, and also 
they will have more difficulty in raising capital and be more likely to experience capital 
shortfall5.  
The only regulation variable for which no significant relationship exists is 
Depositor Insurer Power. Following the establishment of the first national insurance 
system in the U.S. in 1934, explicit deposit insurance schemes to prevent widespread 
bank runs have been adopted in different countries since the 1980s (Barth et al. 2004; 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane 2002). However, it has been widely recognised that deposit 
insurance can aggravate the moral hazard problem in the banking sector by 
encouraging excessive risk-taking behaviour (Anginer et al. 2014b; Barth et al. 2004; 
Bisias et al. 2012). Depositors can monitor bank risk-taking behaviour by charging 
higher interest rates, but they may have less incentive to monitor banks if deposits are 
insured, and the lack of market discipline is likely to result in excessive risk taking 
culminating in banking crises (Anginer et al. 2014b). The higher the individual risk, 
the greater the capital shortfall when banks are in distress, and consequently the more 
they contribute to systemic instability.  
More empirical evidence tends to support this argument (Barth et al. 2004; 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane 2002). For example, Barth et al. (2004) find a positive 
association between the generosity of the deposit insurance scheme and the possibility 
 
5 As we stated before, we exclude banks from US and banks because of  their high developed banking 
system and the large number of banks. However, we estimate the baseline regression include US and 
UK banks which represents one third observation of the whole sample. The results are reported in 




of suffering a major banking crisis, and such a relationship is economically large. More 
recently, Anginer et al. (2014b) find that deposit insurance increases systemic fragility 
in the years leading to 2007-2009 financial crisis, but lower bank systemic risk in 
countries with deposit insurance coverage during crisis. Their findings suggest that the 
‘‘moral hazard effect’’ of deposit insurance dominates in good times, while the 
‘‘stabilization effect’’ of deposit insurance dominates in turbulent times. The 
cancelling effects of deposit insurer power in the sample countries may explain why 
there is no significant relationship found in our study. 
In terms of control variables, the signs and significance levels of these variables 
are in line with our expectations. For bank specific characteristics, the coefficient on 
bank size (measured as logarithm of total assets) appears to be negatively and 
statistically significant in all regressions, indicating that larger banks are less likely to 
be exposed to higher systemic risk. While the MTBV is positively related to the 
systemic risk, which suggests that higher market valued banks are exposing to higher 
systemic risk.  Besides, we find weak evidence showing that the GDP growth is 
positively related to systemic risk, which suggests that banks in countries with higher 
GDP growth tend to be exposed to higher systemic risk.  Similar results are reported 
in existing studies (Anginer et al. 2014a; Berger et al. 2019).  
2.4.2 Endogeneity test  
The results from our baseline regression analysis have documented a positive 
relationship between regulation stringency and systemic risk. One question which can 
undermine our main result is that our results derive from reversed causality. For 
example, when policymakers or government observed that banks in their countries are 
exposing to a higher systemic risk, and they would like to limit this risk exposure by 
exposing restricted regulation and supervision. If this is the case, it would lead to the 
results we observed in section 2.4.1 that greater restriction in banking regulation and 
supervision is positively related to banks’ systemic risk. Therefore, in this section, we 
conduct a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) analysis by employing the staggered timing 
of the introduction of Basel II regulation across countries and Instrument Variable 





2.4.2.1 Basel II implementation and systemic risk 
First, we conduct a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) analysis to address the 
potential endogeneity between bank regulation and systemic risk by employing the 
staggered timing of the introduction of Basel II regulation across countries. Basel II 
was designed to improve the way that regulatory capital requirements could reflect 
underlying risks and address the financial innovation accrued in previous years 6 .   
Following the release of Basel II in June 2004, different countries adopted this new 
framework at a staggered process. In our sample, Australia was the first country 
implementing Basel II in 2005, followed by Japan, a serial of EU member countries 
and others which implemented it in 2007. The staggered introduction of Basel II 
provides a DiD empirical setting, which allows us to use countries that had not adopted 
it at a point of time to control for potentially confounding effects. We estimate the 
difference in systemic risk exposure of banks in a country before and after the Basel 
II implementation to such differences for banks in countries where Basel II has not 
been implemented during the same time period. If strict regulation and supervision 
increase the individual banks’ exposure to systemic risk, we would expect an increase 
in systemic risk after the implementation of Basel II. We manually collect the time of 
individual countries implementing Basel II, and then introduce a dummy variable of 
Basel II, which equals to one for the time after the country adopted Basel II and 0 
otherwise. The baseline regression was re-run by replacing the variable of  
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 with Basel II Dummy. The result is reported in column (1) of Table 
2.4.  
 
6 Basel II comprises three pillars:  a) Minimum Capital Requirements, which seeks to develop and 
expand the standardised rules on the calculation of total minimum capital requirements for credit, 
market and operational risk; b) supervisory review process, which is intended to encourage banks to 
develop and use better risk management techniques in monitoring and managing their risks; c.) Market 
Discipline, which aims to promote effective use of disclosure as a lever to strengthen market discipline 




Table 2.4: Additional Evidence: Basel II implementation and systemic risk 
This table reports the panel regression results of the estimation of different regulations and systemic risk from 65 countries for the period from 2001 to 2013. The dependent 
variable is the systemic risk measure by MES. Column (1) reports the results of estimation Basel II  implementation and systemic risk. Basel II is a series of  dummy variables 
set to one in the t year after (before) the country in which bank is located implement the Basel II and zero otherwise. Column (2) reports the dynamic change of systemic risk 
prior/after the Basel II implementation.  𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙  II 𝑖 𝑡  is a series of  dummy variables which sets to one in the t
th after (before) the country in which bank is located implement the 
Basel II and zero otherwise. Control variables include MTBV, lgTA, LLP, ROAA, GDP Growth Inflation and Economic Freedom. Detailed definitions of the variables can be 
found in Appendix. Bank fixed effect and year fixed effects are both included. The standard errors for the regressions are estimated as heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
clustered for banks and are presented in brackets *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable MES MES 
Basel II Dummy 0.175**  
 (0.085)  
Basel II t-4  -0.275 
  (0.213) 
Basel II t-3  -0.063 
  (0.177) 
Basel II t-2  -0.074 
  (0.127) 
Basel II t-1  -0.084 
  (0.090) 
Basel II t+1  0.281*** 
  (0.094) 
Basel II t+2  0.269** 
  (0.131) 
Basel II t+3  0.478*** 
  (0.170) 
Basel II t+4  0.484** 
  (0.215) 
Basel II t+5  0.781*** 
  (0.265) 
Basel II t+6  0.999*** 
  (0.314) 
_cons 1.204* 1.061 
 (0.715) (0.787) 




Continue:   
Bank fixed effect Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes  Yes 
N 4880 4880 




As expected, the coefficient of Basel II Dummy is positive and significant at 
95% confidence level, showing that the adoption of Basel II is related to higher 
systemic risk, which suggests the implementation of Basel II tends to increase systemic 
risk in a country. 
One key assumption of the DiD setting is that without the treatment effects, the 
treated group should experience the same trend in systemic risk as the control group. 
Although the staggered adoption of Basel II represents an exogenous shock to bank 
regulation, country-level factors that manifest differently across countries could affect 
the timing of Basel II adoption in different countries. To ensure there is no trend before 
the event, we further examine the dynamics of the relation between Basel II 
implementation and bank systemic risk exposure by including a series of dummy 
variables in equation (3) to trace out the year-by-year effects of Basel II 
implementation on systemic risk. Specifically, we conduct analysis for the following 
equation (4): 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽−4𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙  II 𝑖 𝑡−4 + 𝛽−3Basel II𝑖 𝑡−3 + 𝛽−2Basel II𝑖 𝑡−2
+ 𝛽−1Basel II𝑖 𝑡−1 + 𝛽1Basel II𝑖 𝑡+1 + ⋯
+ 𝛽6Basel II𝑖 𝑡+6 + Ω × 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡. 
(2.4) 
Where the 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙  II 𝑖 𝑡 equals to one in the years before (after) the country in 
which bank is located implement the Basel II in year 𝑡  and zero 
otherwise. 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙  II 𝑖 𝑡−4  is set to one for years up to and including four years prior to 
Basel II implementation and zero otherwise; 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙  II 𝑖 𝑡+6 set to one for years up to 
and including six years after Basel II implementation. The omitted variable in this 
regression is the year of Basel II introduction (t=0). Therefore, we can estimate the 
dynamic effect of Basel II implementation on systemic risk relative to the year of 
implementation. If there is an increasing systemic risk simultaneously happened with 
the implementation of Basel II, we should observe a trend before and after the 
implementation of Basel II. Otherwise, the result derived from column (1) should not 




Figure 1. plots the coefficients estimate of Basel II implementation and their 
associated 95% confidence intervals as shown by the vertical bars of Equation (2.4) 
and the regression results are reported in Column (2) of Table 2.4. Overall, we find 
that the coefficients on Basel II are insignificant for years before implementation, 
therefore we can confirm that there is no trend of systemic risk change prior to Basel 
II implementation. On the other side, we observe that the coefficients become 
significantly positive since the first and following years after Basel II implemented. 
On top of the statistical significance, the magnitudes of the coefficients are increasing 
since the year introduced Basel II. These results have important implications. Firstly, 
it suggests that there is no trend on systemic risk before the implementation of Basel 
II, and support our main findings are less likely derived from reverse causality. 
Secondly, the results found in this section also show an increasing trending after the 
Basel II implementation, indicating that implementation of Basel II has a positive 







Figure 2.1 Basel II implementation and systemic risk: dynamic results 
 
This figure presents the dynamic impact of Basel II implementation on systemic risk. The impact of 
Basel II on systemic risk is shown by the connected dots; the vertical bars correspond to 95% confidence 
intervals with bank-level clustered standard error. All estimates are relative to the year before Basel II 
implementation. Specifically, we report estimated coefficients from the following specification: 𝑌𝑖𝑡 =
𝛼 + 𝛽−4𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙  II 𝑖 𝑡−4 + 𝛽−3Basel II𝑖 𝑡−3 + 𝛽−2Basel II𝑖 𝑡−2 + 𝛽−1Basel II𝑖 𝑡−1 + 𝛽1Basel II𝑖 𝑡+1 +
⋯ + 𝛽6Basel II𝑖 𝑡+6 + Ω × 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡 .  Where the 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙  II 𝑖 𝑡 
equals to one in the years after the country in which bank is located implement the Basel II in year 𝑡 and 
zero otherwise. 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙  II 𝑖 𝑡−4  is set to one for years up to and including four years prior to Basel II 
implementation and zero otherwise, Basel II𝑖 𝑡+6 set to one for years up to and including six years after 
Basel II implementation . The omitted variable in this regression is the year of Basel II implementation 







2.4.2.2 Instrumental Variable Analysis 
  Next, we use an Instrument Variable approach to conduct further analysis to 
address the potential endogeneity issue. Following previous studies of theoretical and 
empirical work in the law, institution and finance literature  (Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson 2001; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2003), the latitude is selected as 
our exogenous variable.  
The endowment theory suggests that the initial endowment and geographical 
environment shape the construction of institution and policies, which can be used to 
explain the cross-country variation in financial intermediary and financial institution 
development (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Beck et al. 2003; La Porta et al. 1999). Both the 
location and ethnic fractionalization tend to affect the bank regulation and supervision 
framework in different countries, but they are less likely to directly affect banks 
systemic risk nowadays. We use Latitude, which is the absolute value of the latitude 
of the country and normalized to take a value between 0 and 1, as instrumental 
variables for causal inference. Similar approach and instrumental variable have been 
used in previous studies for estimating the impact of bank regulation and supervision 
(Barth et al. 2009; Barth, Lin, et al. 2013; Beck et al. 2006; Houston et al. 2011). We 
employ a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model to conduct the instrumental variable 
analysis, and the results are reported in Table 2.5. 
In panel A, we present the first stage results of the two-stage least squares 
regressions. It can be seen that instrumental variable, Latitude, is significantly and 
negatively related to regulation variables (except for Activity Restrictions), suggesting 
that the historical endowments can affect the regulation and supervision framework in 
different countries. Previous studies suggest that countries located in high latitude area 
are richer and less interventionist, therefore the regulation and supervision in banking 
of these countries tend to be less restrict (La Porta et al. 1999). The results of F-test 
also suggest that the instrumental variables are valid in our first stage estimation.  
In panel B, we report the second stage results by using the predicted value of 
regulation variables of the two-stage least squares regressions. We find that the 
coefficient of Activity Restriction, Initial Capital Stringency, Prompt Corrective 
Action, Deposit Insurer Power and Regulation Total are all positively and significantly 




instrumental variable regression analysis, confirming the positive impact of bank 




Table 2.5 Endogenous test: Instrumental  variables analysis 
This table reports the two-stage least squares regression results of the estimation of different regulations and systemic risk from 65 countries for the period from 2001 to 2013. The 
dependent variable is the systemic risk measure by MES. Instrumental variables for bank regulations is latitude. We report both the first and second stage results. In the first stage 
regression, we regress bank regulation measures on the latitude of the country. In the second stage, we use the predicted value of bank regulation measures from the first stage as the 
independent variable. Panel A reports the corresponding first-stage regression results with endogenous variable bank regulation as dependent variable. Panel B reports the second-stage 
regression results from the 2SLS analysis. The independent variable is the systemic risk measured by MES. Bank-fixed effect and time-fixed effects are included. The standard errors for 
the regressions are estimated as heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for banks and are presented in brackets *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% significance level, respectively 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Activity Restriction Initial Capital Stringency Prompt Corrective Action Deposit Insurer Power Regulation Total 
Panel A: First stage      
Latitude 0.496*** -0.641*** -0.336*** -1.195*** -0.387*** 
 (0.111) (0.248) (0.108) (0.087) (0.077) 
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First stage F-test (p-value) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Panel B: Second stage      
Regulation 0.412* 1.354* 1.061* 1.793* 0.536* 
 (0.224) (0.735) (0.576) (0.973) (0.291) 
MTBV 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.086*** 0.078*** 0.075*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) 
lgTA -0.125*** -0.122*** -0.123*** -0.129*** -0.125*** 
 (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.044) 
LLP -0.009* -0.010* -0.009* -0.011* -0.009* 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
ROAA -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
GDP Growth 0.007* 0.005 0.009** 0.002 0.006* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Inflation -0.001 0.004 0.003 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Economic Freedom 0.005 0.009* 0.003 0.007 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
_cons 1.432*** 0.611 0.934** 1.322*** 1.322*** 
 (0.538) (0.506) (0.471) (0.512) (0.512) 




Continue:      
Time-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 6305 6305 6305 6305 6305 




2.4.3 Robustness test 
In this section, we conduct a series of additional regression analyses to verify 
the robustness of our main results. As mentioned in section 2.3, the countries included 
in our sample are based on data availability. As a result, there might be concerns with 
our baseline results because of the existence of unbalanced observations cross 
countries. Therefore, we first run the analysis for equation (2.3) by employing the 
weighted-least-square regression to address the issue of unbalanced panel data. We 
take the inverse of the number of observations for a country as the weight for each 
bank in the country so that each country receives the equal weight in the estimation. 
The results are reported in Table 2.6. Consistent with our main regression results 
presented in section 2.4.1, the relationship between the majority of regulation variables 
and systemic risk is positive and significant, showing that our main findings are robust 




Table 2.6 Robustness test: WLS regression 
This table reports the WLS regression results of the estimation of different regulations and systemic risk from 65 countries for the period from 2001 to 2013. The weight is the 
inverse of the number of observations for a country. The dependent variable is the systemic risk measure by MES. Control variables include MTBV, lgTA, LLP, ROAA, GDP 
Growth Inflation and Economic Freedom. Detailed definitions of the variables can be found in Appendix. Bank fixed effect and year fixed effects are both included. The 
standard errors for the regressions are estimated as heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for banks and are presented in brackets *, **, and *** represent statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Activity Restriction Initial Capital Stringency Prompt Corrective Action Depositor Regulation Total 
Regulation 0.410*** 0.551*** 0.433*** -0.084 0.766*** 
 (0.111) (0.100) (0.096) (0.080) (0.129) 
MTBV 0.042 0.047 0.050 0.044 0.049 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
lgTA -0.154** -0.149** -0.133** -0.188*** -0.103* 
 (0.060) (0.058) (0.060) (0.059) (0.060) 
LLP -0.010 -0.011* -0.010 -0.011 -0.010 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
ROA 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
GDP Growth 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Inflation -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Economic Freedom 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.008 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
_cons 1.875** 1.586** 1.559** 2.405*** 1.144 
 (0.749) (0.714) (0.732) (0.726) (0.741) 
Bank-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 6305 6305 6305 6305 6305 





Table 2.7 Robustness test: Subsamples 
This table presents the results of regression analyses of the relationship between systemic risk and regulations by using the subsample a.) without countries less than 10 
observations in each year b.) the subsample excluded observations of Japan since it counts around 13.88% of the full sample. Detailed definitions of the variables can be found 
in Appendix. Bank fixed effect and year fixed effects are both included. The standard errors for the regressions are estimated as heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered 
for banks and are presented in brackets. . *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively 






















Regulation 0.288** 0.652*** 0.328*** -0.074 0.706*** 0.249*** 0.317*** 0.241*** -0.088 0.445*** 
 (0.114) (0.112) (0.095) (0.071) (0.134) (0.090) (0.083) (0.079) (0.061) (0.105) 
MTBV 0.047 0.052* 0.058* 0.047 0.057* 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.096*** 0.090*** 0.096*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
lgTA -0.188*** -0.195*** -0.168*** -0.215*** -0.140** -0.066 -0.084* -0.067 -0.092** -0.050 
 (0.064) (0.061) (0.065) (0.063) (0.063) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
LLP -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009* -0.009* -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
ROA -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
GDP Growth 0.010 0.007 0.013* 0.009 0.013 0.008** 0.006* 0.008** 0.007** 0.008** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Inflation -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Economic Freedom 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.022** 0.022** 0.026*** 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.006 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
_cons 0.906 0.826 0.744 1.396* 0.211 0.892 1.111* 0.811 1.289** 0.624 
 (0.768) (0.734) (0.751) (0.750) (0.750) (0.648) (0.634) (0.649) (0.637) (0.646) 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 4391 4391 4391 4391 4391 5430 5430 5430 5430 5430 




Second, regressions are run to test the relationship between systemic risk and 
the five variables of bank regulation and supervision based on two subsamples. For 
the first subsample, we exclude countries with less than 10 observations in each year, 
and the results are shown on the left side of Table 6. The total observations of Japan 
account for around 13.88% of the full sample and the predominance of the banks in 
Japan may bias our results. So we run the regressions after dropping banks in Japan 
from our sample. Results of regression analyses with the subsample of excluding Japan 
are presented on the right side of Table 2.7. All regressions include year and bank fixed 
effects. Our main findings still hold for both subsamples. 
Third, we employ an alternative measure of systemic risk, namely SRISK, to 
assess the relationship between bank regulation and systemic risk. Brownlees and 
Engle (2017) introduce SRISK to measure an individual financial institution’s 
contribution to the systemic risk. SRISK is concerned with the capital shortfall of a 
firm conditional on a severe market decline, and is a function of its size, leverage and 
risk. Specifically, SRISK measures how much capital the financial institution would 
need in a crisis time to maintain a given capital-to-assets ratio. The measure can readily 
be computed using balance sheet information and an appropriate LRMES (Long Run 
Marginal Expected Shortfall) estimator. Following previous studies such as Brownless 
and Engle (2016) and Berger et al. (2019), we measure SRISK based on the following 
equation: 
 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 =  𝐸𝑡−1( 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖|𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠)
= 𝐸𝑡−1(𝑘(𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖 + 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖) − 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖|𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠)
= 𝑘𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1
− (1 − 𝑘)(1 − 𝐿𝑅𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡)𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡                                   
(2.5) 
where 𝑘  is the capital requirement, and we set 𝑘 =8% in this research. 
𝐿𝑅𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the long-run marginal expected shortfall at time 𝑡 for bank 𝑖,  defined as 
the decline in equity values conditional on a financial crisis. Higher value of SRISK 




We run the baseline regression by using SRISK as the systemic risk measure. 
The results are reported in Table 2.8. Overall, the results are consistent with the main 
results. We find that the coefficients for Activity Restriction, Initial Capital Stringency, 
Prompt Corrective Action and Total Regulation Index are still significantly positive, 
suggesting that the stringency of regulation and supervision have a positive impact on 
banks’ systemic risk as measured by SRISK. Besides, we also find weak evidence 
show that the regulation stringency of depositor protection is negatively related to 
systemic risk. As we argued in the previous section that the impact of depositor 
policies should have both positive and negative impact on bank systemic risk. 
Therefore we observe no significant on the coefficient between the Depositor and 
systemic risk because these effects are cancelling off each other. While the weak result 
find is this section may suggest that the negative impact of depositor protection on 
systemic risk tends to be stronger, and this may result from different measures of 




Table 2.8 Alternative measure of systemic risk: SRISK 
This table reports the panel regression results of the estimation of different regulations and systemic risk measured by SRISK from 35 countries for the period from 2001 to 2013. 
The dependent variable is the systemic risk measure by MES. Control variables include MTBV, lgTA, LLP, ROAA, GDP Growth Inflation and Economic Freedom. Detailed 
definitions of the variables can be found in Appendix. Bank fixed effect and year fixed effects are both included. The standard errors for the regressions are estimated as 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for banks and are presented in brackets *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance 
level, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Activity Restriction Initial Capital Stringency Prompt Corrective Action Depositor Regulation Total 
Regulation 0.581*** 0.279*** 0.212* -0.239* 0.561*** 
 (0.205) (0.098) (0.114) (0.130) (0.196) 
MTBV -0.044 -0.047 -0.045 -0.051 -0.040 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.040) 
lgTA -0.152 -0.213 -0.193 -0.222 -0.159 
 (0.149) (0.150) (0.154) (0.151) (0.154) 
LLP -0.037 -0.036 -0.035 -0.036 -0.036 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) 
ROA -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
GDP Growth -0.007 -0.010* -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Inflation 0.012* 0.011* 0.012* 0.011 0.013* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Economic Freedom -0.026*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.029*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
_cons 2.600 3.618* 3.388* 3.903** 2.788 
 (1.847) (1.887) (1.949) (1.913) (1.940) 
Bank-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5510 5510 5510 5510 5510 





2.4.4 Heterogeneity effects 
In previous sections, we present results of our main regression analyses and 
robustness tests, showing that stringent regulation and supervision can increase 
systemic risk through greater capital shortfall. In this section, we conduct further 
empirical tests to support our arguments by looking at three interaction terms. 
First, we argue that if the greater capital shortfall results in an increase in 
systemic risk, the effect is likely to be amplified for larger banks since larger banks 
may need a higher level of capital to smooth their shortage which may lead to systemic 
instability. It is probably more difficult for larger banks to raise sufficient capital 
during hard times as they could experience a larger capital gap compared with small 
banks. Hence, we introduce the interaction term between regulatory variables and bank 
size measured by the logarithm value of their total assets. The results are presented in 




Table 2.9 Heterogeneity effects 
This table reports the panel regression results of the estimation of different regulations and systemic risk measure by MES. In Panel A, we introduce the interaction between the bank 
size measured by lgTA and regulation stringency level. In Panel B, we introduce the interaction between the bank regulation stringency and Equity-to-Assets ratio. In Panel C, we 
introduce the interaction between the bank regulations and bank diversification. The standard errors for the regressions are estimated as heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
clustered for banks and are presented in brackets. . *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: Activity Restriction Initial Capital Stringency Prompt Corrective Action Depositor Regulation Total 
Regulation -1.216*** 0.290 -1.594*** -1.229*** -1.936*** 
 (0.376) (0.355) (0.306) (0.356) (0.385) 
Regulation*lgTA 0.148*** 0.008 0.194*** 0.121*** 0.249*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.033) (0.037) (0.040) 
lgTA -0.182*** -0.116** -0.236*** -0.151*** -0.216*** 
 (0.050) (0.048) (0.051) (0.045) (0.051) 
_cons 2.158*** 1.351** 2.448*** 1.827*** 2.257*** 
 (0.646) (0.611) (0.628) (0.587) (0.635) 
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 6305 6305 6305 6305 6305 
adj. R-sq 0.272 0.270 0.275 0.269 0.277 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel B: Activity Restriction Initial Capital Stringency Prompt Corrective Action Depositor Regulation Total 
Regulation 0.292*** 0.564*** 0.424*** -0.045 0.705*** 
 (0.110) (0.119) (0.110) (0.087) (0.133) 
Regulation × Equity/Assets -0.008 -0.018** -0.019*** -0.004 -0.024*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Equity/Assets 0.005 0.010* 0.014** 0.001 0.013*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
_cons 1.226* 1.129* 1.102* 1.594** 0.850 
 (0.671) (0.660) (0.661) (0.657) (0.668) 
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 6305 6305 6305 6305 6305 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel C: Activity Restriction Initial Capital Stringency Prompt Corrective Action Depositor Regulation Total 
Regulation 0.206** 0.356*** 0.273*** -0.108* 0.529*** 
 (0.100) (0.108) (0.079) (0.064) (0.123) 
Regulation*Diversification  -0.014 0.017 -0.180*** 0.045 -0.273* 
 (0.107) (0.204) (0.047) (0.053) (0.163) 
Diversification 0.021 0.012 0.192*** -0.003 0.160* 
 (0.030) (0.069) (0.047) (0.023) (0.087) 
_cons 1.371** 1.358** 1.239** 1.672*** 1.018* 
 (0.598) (0.588) (0.590) (0.588) (0.596) 
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 6296 6296 6296 6296 6296 





We find a significant and positive coefficient of the interaction between bank 
size and Activity Restriction, Prompt Corrective Action, Deposit Insurer Power and 
Regulation Total, respectively, indicating that the positive effect of bank regulation on 
systemic risk is amplified for large banks. It supports our main argument that stringent 
regulation and supervision can increase banks’ systemic risk through their potentially 
greater capital shortfall. Although we observe that the coefficients of regulatory 
variables turn negative after including the interaction between bank size in the 
regression. If we take the mean of LgTA 9.322, the total effects of regulation on 
systemic risk still stay positive. Our argument is still held.  
Second, if the increase in banks’ systemic risk is due to their greater capital 
shortfall, we would expect that such an impact is likely to be alleviated for banks which 
hold more capital as capital can absorb the potential loss and thereby reduce capital 
shortfall. To validate this hypothesis, we introduce the interaction between regulatory 
variables and Equity-to-Assets ratio. The results are presented in Panel B of Table 2.9. 
Overall, we observe that the interaction terms are significant and negative (except the 
interaction between Activity Restriction /Depositor and Equity-to-Assets ratio which 
are insignificant), indicating that the positive impact of regulation on systemic risk will 
be reduced if banks hold more capital. These results support our assumption that bank 
regulation increases systemic risk through banks having greater capital shortfall.  
Last, if the capital shortfall is the channel through which regulation and 
supervision increase systemic risk, we would expect that diversification of banks can 
alleviate such impact. First, based on the portfolio theory, the combined cash flows 
from non-correlated revenue sources should be more stable than the constituent parts 
(Baele et al. 2007). If banks can maintain stable income flows, the likelihood of 
suffering capital shortage will be lower. In addition, diversification also provides more 
choices for banks to raise capital. In other words, banks who succeed in diversifying 
their business lines tend to have more channels to raise capital when they meet capital 
shortage, and thereby tend to be safer compared to their counterparts who rely on 
onefold source. We then introduce the interaction between regulatory variables and 




income. If our argument holds true, we would expect a negative relationship between 
the interaction term and the dependent variable in the regression models. Panel C of 
Table 2.9 shows the results of this heterogeneity test. We observe that the coefficients 
of interaction terms are negative and significant in columns (3) and (5). These results 
suggest that the positive influence of regulation and supervision on systemic risk can 
be alleviated for better diversified banks, which is consistent with our earlier 
expectation. Overall, our heterogeneity tests provide further evidence to support our 
main argument that stringent regulation and supervision can increase systemic risk and 
such an impact is likely to occur through intensified capital shortfall.  
2.5 Conclusions 
There has been increasing interest in academic research on bank regulation and 
supervision since the financial crisis of 2007-2009. However, the theoretical debates 
on whether bank regulation and supervision can help to maintain financial stability 
remain open due to limited evidence on the relationship between bank regulation and 
systemic risk. Hoque et al. (2015) argue that the correlation in the risk-taking 
behaviour of banks is much more relevant than the absolute level of risk that individual 
banks take. The paper aims to investigate how some specific types of bank regulation 
and supervision affect individual banks’ systemic risk across countries. Based on a 
new database developed by Barth et al. (2013a), we provide robust evidence on the 
impact of bank activity restriction, capital requirements, official supervision and 
deposit insurer power on systemic risk in 65 countries during the period 2001-2013. 
We also develop a Total Regulation Index based on the four specific regulation 
variables in order to examine the combined effect of regulatory and supervisory 
policies. 
We find that more stringent regulation and supervision lead to higher systemic 
risk. Specifically, countries with more restrictions on bank activities, higher initial 
capital stringency or stronger prompt correction power tend to suffer from higher 
systemic risk. We also find that the Total Regulation Index is positively related to the 
systemic index measure, confirming that increased systemic risk is more likely to 
happen in a stringent regulatory and supervisory environment. This is consistent with 




shortfall of a financial institution conditional on a severe market decline (Acharya et 
al. 2017; Brownlees and Engle 2017) and a bank is more likely to have capital shortfall 
when it is in an environment with more stringent regulation. To address the potential 
endogeneity issue, we employ Basel II staggered implementation across countries as 
exogenous event and use latitude for Instrument Variable analysis. Our findings appear 
to be robust after employing WLS to control the potential effect of unbalanced panel 
data, regressing on subsamples and using alternative systemic risk measure. We also 
provide further evidence by examining interaction effects. By interacting regulatory 
variables with bank size, equity-to-asset ratio and diversification, we find the positive 
impact of bank regulation and supervision on systemic risk would be amplified if the 
bank is large, but reduced if the bank holds more capital and has a diversified income 
flow.  
Our findings contribute to the limited understanding of the association between 
bank regulation and systemic stability, and have important implications for 
governments and regulators. Since the financial crisis of 2007-2009, we have seen a 
growing awareness of the need for a macroprudential approach to regulation (Arnold 
et al. 2012). Governments in different countries have introduced a variety of regulatory 
and supervisory policies to regulate the banking industry and manage the financial 
cycle. However, these stringent regulations have potential drawbacks. They may 
indeed decrease banks’ standalone risks but fail to look at the correlated risks they take. 
Our findings show that, opposite to what governments and regulators have expected, 
stringent regulatory and supervisory policies result in less systemic stability, although 
such effect could be alleviated by the banks having a greater level of equity. 
Our paper has important implications for policymakers. Despite the significant 
policy reforms introduced after the financial crisis, there have been increasing 
concerns on whether regulatory mechanisms designed according to stringent 
regulatory and supervisory policies, such as activity restrictions, based only on the 
perspective of individual bank risk, are effective in reducing the probability of 
systemic crises. Indeed, the “utopian” objective function of policymakers, that is, to 
maximize the expected value of a constrained social welfare function (Kane, 1980), 
has been long questioned due to influence of politic forces. Kane (1980) argues that 




targets and policy goals. To achieve long term policy goals, it is important for 
policymakers to have appropriate intermediate policy targets that can be tracked 
closely and are based on theoretical and empirical predictions. In this sense, timely 
empirical studies on the impact of bank regulation and systemic risk are in dire need.  
Our findings suggest that the currently designed tight regulation appears to have effects 
opposite to the expectations of governments. In order to sustain the stability of banking, 
regulatory and supervisory mechanisms should be designed based on inter-bank 
correlation. This is consistent with other researchers’ call for prudential regulation that 












Doing Good For Borrowing? Evidence from a Quasi Natural 






What drives Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)? Understanding the 
determinants of CSR is important because CSR helps to establish companies’ social 
capital (Sacconi and Antoni, 2010) and trust among stakeholders (Lins et al., 2017). 
The answer to this question is closely related to other important questions on how CSR 
affects firm value. “Shareholder expense” and “shareholder value maximization” are 
the two competing theories. The empirical evidence is also inconclusive, partly 
because most existing literature fails to identify the causality relation between CSR 
and firm value. Several recent empirical studies using a natural experiment in India 
find that mandatorily increased CSR activities will lead to a significant drop in firm 
value (Manchiraju and Rajgopal, 2017; Dharmapala and Khanna, 2018), which 
supports the view that firms voluntarily choose CSR levels to maximize firm value, 
and an enforcement on CSR may trigger negative responses from the markets.  
In this paper, we present evidence that firms involuntarily engage in CSR 
activities under certain pressure, and consequently reduce their CSR engagement when 
such pressure is removed. Specifically, we examine how firms change their CSR 
activities in response to the reduction in financial constraints due to exogenous change 
in the lending market. If firms are under pressure from banks to conduct CSR activities, 
i.e., involuntarily “doing good” for borrowing, we would expect their CSR levels to 
be decreased once their financial constraints are reduced.  
Asymmetric information can cause external financing costly and difficult 
(Sharpe, 1990; Sufi, 2007). As a complement of firm information disclosure, CSR 
performance provides a new information stream beyond traditional financial 
statements. Socially responsible firms are shown to be linked with more transparent 
and reliable financial information, and a lower likelihood of subjecting to regulatory 
investigation (Spence, 1973; Benabou and Tirole, 2010; Kim et al., 2012). Empirical 
researches find that firms behave in CSR are rewarded externally, e.g. better external 
financing, lower financing cost and improved competitiveness (Cheng et al., 2014; 
Goss and Roberts, 2011; Flammer, 2015). However, the engagement in CSR activities 
can be involuntary when there is strong demand from the external environment (Cao 




an underinvestment and social welfare loss. Once the external pressure on CSR is 
alleviated permanently, firms will reduce CSR levels significantly.  
Empirically, we exploit the staggered deregulation of interstate bank branching 
laws in the United States. The Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act 
(IBBEA), which allowed unrestricted interstate banking, was passed by the U.S. 
Congress in 1994. The deregulation process varied from different states and lasted 
until 1997 when IBBEA was formally legalized across the country. Rice and Strahan 
(2010) find that more bank branches were opened and competed with one another due 
to IBBEA. Existing evidence suggests that this increase in competition expands the 
availability of credit within a state, lowers the cost of capital therein and increase 
access to bank financing (Krishnan et al., 2015; Rice and Strahan, 2010). As such, we 
conjecture that before IBBEA, firms in the U.S. tend to be captured by banks who have 
exclusive lending relationship due to lack of competition. Firms have strong incentives 
to invest more in CSR to please the lending banks, and such incentives will then be 
reduced after the enforcement of IBBEA, which alleviates financial constraints for 
these firms, especially external-finance-dependence firms.  
We construct the tests using this deregulation event as the plausibly exogenous 
increases in the credit supply of state-level finance. For CSR measure, we employ an 
improved measure introduced by Carroll et al. (2016) which is called D-SOCIAL-KLD 
index. Compared to traditionally CSR measure - KLD index, this measure uses the 
same underlying dataset rather than simply adding up the binary indices, thus offering 
a more reliable comparison of firms. Besides, the new measure differentiates firms that 
have identical scores on an additive scale by treating every underlying CSR indicator 
differently. Empirical tests show that firms in the states that are completely open to 
interstate branching decrease by 0.32, which is about 11% of the median level of CSR 
performance, after the branching deregulation compared to those in the states with the 
most restrictions on interstate branching. This result is robust in analysis controlling 
for firm-level characteristics, state fixed effect, year fixed effect, and different sample 
period.   
Although the staggered deregulation of interstate bank branching laws provides 




existing trend of firms’ CSR change, which is parallel to the bank deregulation change. 
To address this potential concern about reverse causality, we examine the dynamic 
effect of interstate banking deregulation on firms’ CSR performance. We do not find 
any pre-existing trend in the changes in firm CSR performance prior to deregulation. 
The decrease in CSR performance occurred on the year of bank deregulation, 
suggesting the effect is immediate. Further, such a decrease in CSR performance after 
the deregulation continues to remain statistically significant for at least five years after 
the banking deregulation, with an increasing magnitude over time.   
Another potential endogeneity of our results is that an omitted variable 
coinciding with the branching deregulation could be the true underlying cause of the 
change in CSR performance. If this is the case, the change in CSR before and after the 
banking deregulation may reflect merely an association rather than a causal effect. To 
address this concern, we conduct a placebo test. We employ a falsified deregulation 
year and randomly assign it to different states. Therefore, if an unobservable shock 
happens at approximately the same time as the deregulation events, it should show a 
great impact on the testing framework and drive similar results. On the contrary, if no 
such shock exists, our artificial deregulation to the assigned but randomly chosen states 
should yield insignificant results in the baseline regression. Indeed, we cannot find a 
significant result from this placebo test, which indicates that it is unlikely that an 
omitted variable unrelated to the branching deregulation drives the decrease of CSR 
performance. Therefore, our strategy of using staggered banking deregulation across 
states should be exogenous to the decreasing CSR performance.  
Next, we attempt to rule out an alternative explanation on bank relationship 
lending for our main findings. While the bank deregulation leads to a reduction in firm 
financial constraints, it may also result in a change in bank’s lending methods. Banks 
tend to rely more on “soft information”, i.e., relationship lending prior to the 
deregulation. Post-deregulation, banks would shift to more “hard information”, i.e., 
transactional lending due to large bank’s entry. If CSR performance were used by firms 
to signal their long-term focus and differentiate themselves to increase transparency 
(Spence, 1973; Benabou and Tirole, 2010), they may have more incentives to do so 
prior to the deregulation when relationship lending dominates, and these incentives 




information” shown in financial balance sheets that matters more after the deregulation. 
If the true mechanism is through relationship lending channel rather than financial 
constraints, we would expect this effect to be stronger for the states with more 
relationship lending prior to the deregulation. It is empirically challenging to measure 
the two different lending methods over the two periods. As such, we focus on the role 
of small banks in different states and assume that small banks rely more on “soft 
information” (Deyoung et al.,2004) while large banks rely more on “hard information” 
(Elyasiani and Goldberg, 2004). We fail to find that the CSR reduction effect is more 
pronounced in the states with more small banks after the deregulation, which is against 
this alternative explanation. 
Finally, we provide direct evidence on the channel of financial constraints 
through which firms’ CSR activities are reduced after the bank deregulation. We 
would expect that the effects of the bank deregulation on firm CSR levels become 
more intensified for firms more external-financial-dependence. We first use three 
proxies to measure the level of external-financial-dependence level: firms age, WW 
index and SA index (Barrot, 2016; Whited and Wu,  2006; Hadlock and Pierce, 2010; 
Cornaggia et al., 2015). On top of that, we conduct an additional test conditional on 
firm’s financial strength, including firm size, leverage, cash holding, payout and 
collateral (Barrot, 2016). All the results confirm our predictions.  
This paper contributes to the research on finance and economics in several 
ways. We provide a clean setting on the exogenous increase in banking competition 
caused by regulations and show firms significantly reduce CSR activities afterwards. 
This is the first paper linking firm CSR with financial environment related to the 
lending market. Goss and Roberts (2011) investigate the impact of CSR performance 
on the cost of bank loans and suggest that banks charge more for loans to firms with 
social responsibility activities concerns but do not reward firms with CSR strengths. 
Hong et al., (2012) argue that goodness is costly and goodness is a complement to 
profits, and firms do so only when they have financial slack. We provide evidence that 
firms more susceptible to capture by banks exhibit a more pronounced decrease in 
CSR when such capture is dismantled by IBBEA. The exogenous event with IBBEA 
in the lending market allows us to reveal that banks with market monopolistic power 




disappears, firms will make optimal decision in CSR by suppressing excessive 
investment. The evidence suggests that CSR is socially inefficient in uncompetitive 
markets. 
Our paper provides new empirical results to support recent studies on CSR. 
Although there are a growing number of studies on why firms engage in CSR activities 
(Barnea and Rubin, 2010; Cespa and Cestone, 2007; Elfenbein et al., 2012; Jensen, 
2001), most researchers either consider CSR from shareholder view (Friedman, 1962) 
or stakeholder interest (Jones, 1995). Flammer (2015a) provides evidence viewing 
“CSR as a competitive strategy” and finds that the product market competition affects 
CSR performance. These papers emphasize that CSR is the outcome of managerial 
decisions related to incentives or corporate governance. Differently from the literature 
on the economic role of CSR to maximize firm or stakeholder value, we consider CSR 
as a strategical investment caused by the firms’ financial constraints due to lack of 
competition in banking. One related paper is Dharmapala and Khanna (2018) that 
analyses CSR activity using quasi-experimental variation created by Section 135 of 
India’s Companies Act of 2013.1. Indian firms used to invest more than 2% prior to 
the Act but decreased their CSR spending after the Act coming into effect. In this sense, 
CSR needs to be studied in the joint consideration of managerial incentives, corporate 
governance and regulatory environment. The evidence in this paper suggests that CSR 
serves as “doing good for borrowing” when firms operate in an uncompetitive lending 
market facing bank capture.  
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature 
in bank deregulation and CSR, and develop the hypothesis in section 3.  Section 4 
summarizes the data, variable constructions and sample statistics. Section 5 reports the 
main regression results and discusses their implications. Section 6 concludes the paper.      
3.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
To derive the theoretical predictions on the firms CSR performance and the 
impact of external lending market development, we draw from different strands of the 
 
1 The Act requires firms satisfying specific size or profit thresholds spend a minimum of 2% of their 




literature. We begin this section by introducing the background of the bank 
deregulation and the research on the real effect and consequence of the deregulation. 
Next, we discuss the nature of CSR and how CSR activities may be affected by some 
exogenous shock. In the end, we put forward two contradictory predictions based on 
the reviews and discussions made in this section. 
3.2.1 The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 
1994 (IBBEA) 
The McFadden Act which passes in 1927 prohibit interstate branching banking, 
therefore, U.S. banks could only operate within one state.  From 1978 to 1994, several 
states allow bank holding companies (BHC) to own commercial banks across state 
borders (interstate banking) while interstate branching was not allowed. During the 
same period, some states repealed the unit banking laws and other intrastate restriction 
within the state. Until 1994, with the passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking 
and Branching Efficiency Act, which effectively permitted BHC to enter other states 
without permission and to operate branches across state lines and allowed the transition 
to full interstate banking. However, IBBEA gave permission of nationwide branching, 
it also allowed the individual state to have flexibility over the restriction or limitation 
of interstate branching. States could use the provisions contained in IBBEA to erect 
barriers to some forms of out-of-state entry, to raise the cost of entry, and to distort the 
means of entry. From the time of implementation in 1994 until the branching trigger 
date of June 1, 1997, IBBEA gave states to employ various manners to erect these 
barriers.  
Rice and Strahan (2010) summarize regulations on interstate branching with 
regard to four important provisions: (1) the minimum age of the target institution. This 
means states are allowed to set their own minimum age requirements with respect to 
how long a bank must have been in existence prior to its acquisition in an interstate 
bank merger, with a maximum age limitation of 5 years. Many states set this age 
requirement at 5 years, but several states implemented a lower age requirement, like 3 
years or less, or required no minimum age limit at all. (2) de novo interstate branching. 
De novo interstate branching means a bank may only open a new interstate branch if 




banks to more new competition by out-of-state institutions by making it easier for an 
entering bank to locate its branches in markets with the greatest demand for financial 
service. Without de novo branching, entry into a particular out-of-state market 
becomes more difficult as it is only possible via an interstate whole-bank merger, and 
it also potentially distorts or limits the entering bank’s choice of where to locate within 
the state. (3) the acquisition of individual branches. This indicates that an interstate 
merger transaction may involve the acquisition of a branch (or a number of branches) 
of a bank without the acquisition of the whole bank, only if the state in which the 
branch is located permits such an acquisition. Different from being required to enter 
the market by purchasing a whole bank, an entering bank can instead pick and choose 
those interstate branches which it wants to acquire. With this permission, the entry cost 
for interstate banks decreases. (4) a statewide deposit cap. Under IBBEA, each state is 
authorized to cap, by statute, regulation or order, the percentage of deposits in insured 
depository institutions in the state that is held or controlled by any single bank or BHC. 
IBBEA specifies a statewide deposit concentration limitation of 30% with respect to 
interstate mergers that constitute an initial entry of a bank into a state. While a state is 
flexible to set the concentration limitation to above 30% or to impose a deposit cap on 
an interstate bank merger transaction below 30% and with respect to initial entry. This 
requirement would be to prevent a bank from entering into a large interstate merger in 
the state. For example, if a state set a deposit cap of 15%, a bank could not enter into 
an interstate merger transaction with any institution that holds more than 15% of the 
deposit in that particular state. (Rice and Strahan 2010) employ these four state powers 
to build a simple index of interstate branching restrictions, ranging from zero which 
proxies the most open to out-of-state entry to four which proxies the least open state. 
The state deregulations have continued and the restrictions on interstate branch of each 
state revised since 1997. This regulatory shock provides excellent quasi-natural 
experiment to study the effects of banks on the real economy. As the changes happened 
at different time across the state, the impacts may be seen in the different state 
economies.  
3.2.2.1 Deregulation and Bank Performance 
The bank deregulation significantly increases banking competition and 
efficiency. For example, Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) find that bank performance 




operating costs and loan losses decrease sharply after states permit statewide branching 
and, to a lesser extent, after states allow interstate banking. They explain that 
improvement after interstate branch deregulation is because better banks grow at the 
expense of their less efficient rivals. Branching restrictions also reduce the 
performance of the average banking assets. Most of the reduced cost were passed along 
to bank borrowers in the form of lower loan rates. Johnson and Rice (2008) first 
summarize the interstate branching regulation changes and analysis the empirical 
association between the restrictiveness and out-of-state branch banking entry. They 
show that states with greater restrictions have fewer interstate branches as a share of 
total branches. The reduced protection of competition for inefficiency local banks by 
allowing more efficiency banking organizations to enter, consequently improve bank 
output. However, evidence found in Jiang et al. (2019) suggest that an intensification 
of competition exert a negative effect on liquidity creation per bank assets. Specifically, 
regulatory induced competition decreases liquidity creation more among banks with 
less risk-absorbing capacity, such as less profitable banks. In additional, Goetz et al. 
(2013) suggest geographic diversity intensifies agency problems by making it more 
difficult for outside investors to monitor a BHC and exert effective corporate control. 
The increases in geographic diversity due to interstate bank deregulation reduced BHC 
valuations. More lending by BHCs to the executives of their subsidiary banks and an 
increase in nonperforming loans drive the drops in the valuations.  
3.2.2.2  Deregulation and Industry Firms 
There is a cluster of empirical researches on the geographic bank branching 
deregulation and its effects on nonfinancial firms. Black and Strahan (2002) test 
whether the deregulation fostered competition and consolidation of in banking helps 
or harms entrepreneurs. They find that the rate of new incorporations increases 
following deregulation of branching restrictions and that deregulation reduces the 
negative effect of concentration on new incorporation. Besides, the formation of new 
incorporations increases as the share of small banks decreases, indicating that 
diversification benefits of size outweigh the possible comparative advantage small 
banks may have in forging long-term relationships with borrowers. When the banking 
market becomes more open to competition, the banking industry has experienced 
nationwide consolidation and a consequent decline in the importance of small banks. 




help entrepreneurs. Similarly, Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) examine how competition 
affects the market structure of nonfinancial sectors. The empirical evidence found in 
this study suggests that in markets with concentrated banking, potential entrants face 
greater difficulty gaining access to credit than in markets in which banking is more 
competitive. The competition reduces the size of the typical establishment. Better bank 
competition also increases the share of establishments in the smallest size group and 
increases the total number of establishment. While the increased competition shows 
no effect on the largest establishments. Consistent with these findings, Kerr et al. (2009) 
takes a further step and examine entrepreneurship and creative destruction following 
the banking deregulation. They find the exceptional growth in entrepreneurship but 
also business closures, and most closures are the new ventures themselves. The 
banking deregulation causes a greater firm turnover. They argue that creative 
destruction requires many business failures along with the few great success, and 
highlight the importance of democratizing entry which is a key feature of a well-
functioning capital market.  
Rice and Strahan (2010) construct the IBBEA deregulation index to exploit the 
effect on small business finance. The differences in states’ branching restrictions affect 
credit supply. In states more open to branching, small firms borrow at interest rates 80 
to 100 basis points lower than firms operating in less open states. Besides, firms in 
open states are better access to bank financing. Although the interstate branch 
openness expands credit supply, there is no evidence shows that state restrictions on 
branching on the number of small firms borrowing. Overall, the study suggests that 
decreased cost and improved access to bank financing is positively related to the state 
branch openness. The increased access to bank financing created by banking 
deregulation also positively affect firm productivity. As suggested in Krishnan et al. 
(2015), greater access to financing benefits firms total factor productivity significantly, 
especially the financially constrained firms, allowing them to invest in productive 
projects that they may otherwise have to forego. The increased bank competitive 
following deregulation intends to affect investment differently in terms of firms’ age. 
Given the greater competition among banks, Zarutskie (2006) finds that newly formed 
firms (i.e. aged five years or less) used significantly less outside debt financing and 
more external financing from their equity holders and internal financing (i.e. retained 
earnings) to fund investment. At the same time, newly founded firms also invest less, 




firms. On the contrary side, for older firms (i.e. aged 16 or more) used more outside 
debt financing and invested more when bank competition increase. But, overall, the 
total economic impact of increased bank competition following the bank deregulation 
on the borrowing and investment of privately held firms was likely positive. Jiang et 
al. (2020) suggest the deregulation intensified competition among banks reduced 
corporate risk, especially among firms which heavily rely on bank financing. Since the 
enhanced competition eases credit constraints when firms experience adverse shock 
and reduce the procyclicality of borrowing, consequently reduce corporate volatility.  
Several studies connect the bank deregulation and its impact on firm innovation, 
while the results of empirical studies are somewhat mixed. Amore et al. (2013) suggest 
interstate banking deregulation significantly benefit the quality and quantity of 
innovation activities, especially for firms highly dependent on external capital and 
located closer to entering banking. The explanation for this result is because of the 
greater ability of deregulated banks to geographically diversify credit risk. Chava et al. 
(2013) find that intrastate banking deregulation increases the local market power of 
banks, which leads to a decrease in the innovation level and risk of young, private 
firms. However, interstate banking deregulation which decreased the local market 
power of banks increased the level and risk of innovation by young, private firms. 
These results further confirmed in Cornaggia et al. (2015). They find that innovation 
increases among private firms, especially for the one dependent on external finance 
and the one have limited access to credit from local banks. They argue that banking 
competition enables small, innovative firms to secure financing instead of being 
acquired by public corporations. Hence, greater bank competition reduced the supply 
of innovative targets, which reduces the portion of state-level innovation attributable 
to public corporations. However, Hombert and Matray (2017) show that the 
deregulation exerts a negative shock to relationship lending, which reduced the number 
of innovative firms, especially those that depend more on relationship lending, such as 
small, opaque firms. This is because that the credit supply shock created by 
deregulation leads to reallocation of inventors whereby young and productive 
inventors leave small firms and move out of geographic areas where lending 
relationships are hurt. Deregulation increased access to credit for non-innovative firms, 
but lead to further tightening of financial constraints for innovative firms, particular 




3.2.2.3 Deregulation and Economic Environment  
Another strand of bank deregulation studies examines the impact on the overall 
economic environment. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) show that financial markets can 
directly affect economic growth with the relaxation of bank branch restrictions. The 
rates of real, per capita growth in income and output increase significantly following 
intrastate branch reform. They argue that these changes in growth derive from the 
changes in the banking system. Specifically, the improved quality of bank lending 
instead of the increased volume of bank lending is the reason for faster growth. Morgan 
et al. (2004) investigate how the integration of bank ownership across state induced by 
bank deregulation affect economic volatility within states. Deregulation allows bank 
holding companies operating banks across many states, therefore a much more 
integrated banking system. This helps stabilize growth fluctuation within states and 
reduce divergence between states. In the end, state business cycles become smaller but 
more alike. In conclusion, deregulation reduces economic growth fluctuations. Beck 
et al. (2010) assess the impact of bank deregulation on the distribution of income. They 
find that the intensified bank competition and improved bank performance result from 
the deregulation materially tightened the distribution of incomes by boosting incomes 
in the lower part of the income distribution. While such impact is less significant on 
incomes above the median. Bank deregulation tightened the distribution of income by 
increasing the relative wage rates and working hours of unskilled workers, therefore 
reduces the income inequality. 
3.2.3 Corporate social responsibility and firm behaviours 
In recent years, a significant increase in academic research devoted to the 
exploration of potential links between CSR and firm behaviours. CSR activities not 
only affect investing stakeholders such as stockholders and debtholders but also non-
investing stakeholders such as customers, community, social organizations and so on 
(Mcwilliams and Siegel, 2001). At the same time, according to the resource-based 
view, firms need inputs or resource to generate CSR attributes. For example, capital, 
material and service and labour. However, existing researches show mixed results on 





3.2.3.1 CSR and CSR outputs 
Many studies exploit the benefits and costs of CSR activities and contribute to 
the investment implication for socially responsible investments. Albuquerque et al. 
(2019) model CSR as an investment to increase product differentiation that allows 
firms to benefit firm higher profit margins. By formalizing and testing a channel 
through which CSR policies affect firms systematic risk and value, they find CSR 
decrease systematic risk and increase firm value that these effects are stronger for firms 
with high production differentiation. They argue that customers who are more 
important stakeholders than investors in determining firms’ CSR policies. More 
detailed tests have been undertaken in Buchanan et al. (2018), which examines how 
CSR jointly with influential institutional ownership affect firms value around the 2008 
global financial crisis. They find that the effect of CSR on firm value variable with the 
level of influential ownership and depends upon economic conditions. Specifically, 
compare with non-CSR firms, CSR firms have higher firm value before the financial 
crisis but experience more loss in firm value during the crisis. This result indicates that 
the overall CSR effect depends on the two effects: conflict-resolution and 
overinvestment effect. Besides, in terms of the level of influential institutional 
ownership, CSR positively affects the value of lower institutional ownership firms and 
the effect is significantly weaker for firms with higher influential ownership before the 
crisis. While during the crisis, the CSR-firm value relation is positive for higher 
institutional ownership firms, indicating that overinvestment concerns dominate when 
the crisis occurs. But such a positive institutional ownership effect is not significant 
for CSR firms with high rollover risks. Similarly, Cornett et al. (2016) focus on banks 
and examine the relation between banks’ CSR and financial performance in the context 
of the 2007 global financial crisis. In general, banks appear to be rewarded for being 
socially responsible as financial performance (i.e. ROE) is positively and significantly 
related to CSR score. Compare with smaller banks, the biggest banks pursue socially 
responsible activities to a significantly greater extent. Also, these largest banks 
significantly increase their CSR strengths and decrease CSR concerns after the crisis.  
There are several studies dedicatedly examine how CSR activities affect firm 
performance in controversial industries. Cai et al. (2012) specifically examine CSR 
engagement of firms in controversial industries and document a positive association 




consistent with the premise that the top management of U.S. firm in controversial 
industries, in general, considers social responsibility important even though their 
products are harmful to human being, society, or environment. Similarly, Jo and Na 
(2012) examine the relation between CSR and firm risk in controversial industry 
sectors. They find that CSR engagement inversely affects firm risk. Specifically, the 
effect of risk reduction through CSR engagement is more economically and 
statistically significant in controversial industry firms than in non-controversial 
industry firms. Overall, these evidence further support the argument in Cai et al. (2012) 
that top management of U.S. firms in controversial industries is risk-averse and their 
CSR engagement helps their risk management efforts. 
Another strand of literature focus on how CSR affects firms’ financial 
behaviours. Cheung (2016) examines the relation between CSR and firm cash holdings. 
This study finds that CSR is correlated with corporate cash holding significantly and 
positively. Furthermore, the study document that the systematic risk channel is a major 
channel through which CSR affects corporate cash holdings. It explains that price-
inelastic demand due to customer loyalty and/or investor loyalty to CSR firms makes 
these firms less sensitive to aggregate market shocks (i.e., lowers the systematic risk), 
and this may increase or decrease the cash holding. The need for cash holding may 
decrease because of lower systematic risk, while the need may increase because firms 
with lower systematic risk tend to have a shorter debt maturity structure and therefore 
a higher refinancing risk. The findings in this study support the latter view and rule out 
another two channels, namely the idiosyncratic risk channel and the corporate 
governance channel through which CSR affects corporate cash holdings. Dutordoir et 
al. (2018) examine whether CSR creates value for seasoned equity issuers (SEO) and 
document a positive association between CSR performance and stock price reaction to 
SEO announcements. However, they argue that high CSR scores can mislead 
shareholders into attributing value-increasing motives to seasoned equity issues. 
Specifically, they find seasoned equity issuers with high CSR scores tend to have a 
higher post-SEO increase in cash holding, and lower investment in real assets, than 
issuers with lower CSR scores. Also, high-CSR issuers have worse post-SEO 
operating and stock price performance than low-CSR issuers. Bhandari and 
Javakhadze (2017) investigate the relationship between CSR strategies and firm-level 
resource allocation efficiency, suggesting CSR can distort investment sensitivity to Q. 




Moreover, the distortionary CSR on investment sensitivity to Q is stronger for firms 
with imperfectly aligned shareholder-manager incentives. While stakeholder 
engagement and financial slacks can alleviate the relation that CSR reduces external 
finance sensitivity to Q. In the end, they provide evidence to show that CSR can reduce 
both accounting and stock-based future corporate performance. Overall, the authors 
argue that focusing on aggregate CSR strategy may impose costs to a firm in the form 
of foregone investment opportunities that in the long run is manifested in the loss of 
shareholder wealth.    
Firms’ CSR performance can affect their access to external finance. Goss and 
Roberts (2011) examine the link between CSR and bank debt, focusing on banks 
exploits their specialized role as delegated monitors of the firm. They find that firms 
with social responsibility concerns face a higher loan spread than more responsible 
firms. Banks are more sensitivity to CSR concerns and regard concerns as risks, 
responding with less attractive loan contract terms. While in terms of discretionary 
CSR investment, low-quality borrowers that engage in discretionary CSR spending 
face higher loan spreads and shorter maturities, while there is no difference among 
high-quality borrowers. Similarly, Cheng et al. (2014) find that firms with better CSR 
performance face significantly lower capital constraints. The negative relation 
between CSR performance and capital constraints can result from better stakeholder 
management and transparency around CSR performance which consequently reduce 
capital constraints. Barigozzi and Tedeschi (2015) model how CSR of banks impacts 
the lending behaviours. Lenders offer loans to standard and motivated borrowers who 
undertake ethical projects (i.e. projects with both social and economic profitability but 
lower expected revenue) or standard projects. The ethical banks are lenders who 
commit to financing only ethical projects and are not interested in operating in markets 
for standard projects. While standard banks have no restriction on the types of projects 
which they can support. Their models suggest that motivated borrowers are keen to 
invest in ethical projects and to deal with ethical banks. When these lenders and 
borrowers are both active, ethical banks can increase social welfare because the 
matching of ethical lenders with motivated borrowers reduces the frictions caused by 




Firms’ CSR performance can also affect investors evaluation directly or 
indirectly. Elliott et al. (2014) use an experiment to investigate how investors value a 
firm fundamental value conditional on the firm’s CSR performance. Their results 
support the perdition: when CSR performance is positive (negative), investors who do 
not explicitly assess CSR performance will estimate the firm’s fundamental value to 
be higher (lower), but the influence of CSR performance will diminish with an explicit 
assessment of CSR performance. The results support the theory “affect-as-information” 
that firm’s CSR performance can create unintended influence on investors’ behaviours. 
Cho et al. (2013) suggest CSR disclosure can reduce information asymmetry, either 
CSR concerns or strengths. While the influence of negative CSR performance is much 
stronger than that of positive CSR performance in reducing information asymmetry. 
Moreover, the negative association between CSR performance and bid-ask spread 
decreases for firms with a high level of institutional investors compared to those with 
a low level of institutional investors, indicating that informed investors may exploit 
their CSR information advantage. In addition, Kim et al. (2012) suggest that socially 
responsible firms also behave in a responsible manner to constrain earnings 
management, thereby delivering more transparent and reliable financial information to 
investors as compared to firms that do not meet the same social criteria. Taken together, 
the results suggest that CSR performance plays a positive role for investors by 
reducing information asymmetry and that regulatory action may be appropriate to 
mitigate the adverse selection problem faced by less-informed investors.  
3.2.3.2  CSR and CSR Input 
On the contrary, CSR can be regarded as investment output, which can vary 
upon different conditional. However, many of previous studies fail to disentangle 
whether better financial conditions lead to superior CSR performance or vice versa, 
and whether firm’s financial performance and CSR engagement are both respond to 
variables omitted from the estimation model. Campbell (2007) provides a theoretical 
study of CSR consisting of a series of propositions specifying the conditions under 
which corporations are likely to behave in a socially responsible way. The study 
proposes two conditions, i.e. economic conditions and institutional conditions impact 
firms’ CSR engagement. Many studies argue that CSR is a product of financial 
conditions. For example, Hong et al. (2012) argue that financial constraint is an 




this study show that during the Internet bubble, previously constrained firms 
experience a temporary relaxation of their constraints and their goodness temporarily 
increased relative to their previously unconstrained peers. On top of that, a constrained 
firm’s sustainability score increases more with its idiosyncratic equity valuation and 
lower cost of capital than a less-constrained counterpart. Overall, firms are more likely 
to engage in CSR activities when they have enough resource. Consistent with the 
resource-based view, Sun and Gunia (2018) suggest that firms condition their CSR 
policies on the availability of economic resources by employing a firm’s real estate as 
a measure of exogenous shocks on the firm’s economic resource. They find that 
increases in resources reduce CSR concerns and decreases in resources increase CSR 
concerns, while such relationship between resources and CSR concerns depends on 
several organizational variables that influence a firm’s preferences for CSR investment. 
Besides, they show that firms reactions for resources availability tend to be asymmetric 
that the resource losses increase CSR concerns are more markedly compare to resource 
gains. Overall, these evidence imply that firms employ CSR decision in much the same 
way as other investment decisions.  
Several papers examine the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on 
CSR. Cheng et al. (2013) use the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut as an exogenous shock which 
increases after-tax insider ownership. In this study, they find that increasing 
managerial ownership decreases measures of firm goodness. Specifically, firms with 
moderate levels of insider ownership cut goodness by more than firms with low levels 
(where the tax cut has no effect) and high levels (where agency is less of an issue). On 
top of that, better monitoring also reduces corporate goodness that passage of 
shareholder governance proposals leads to slower growth in goodness. Taken together, 
these evidence show that improvements in managerial incentives and governance lead 
to a reduction in firm goodness, which supports the view of agency theory of 
unproductive corporate social responsibility. Consistent with the view of agency 
theory on CSR, the work conduct by Adhikari (2016) examine this relation through 
external monitoring channel. Adhikari (2016) suggests that firms with greater analyst 
coverage tend to be less socially responsible. Analyst coverage can influence CSR 
activities via analysts’ influence on the value of managerial ownership and 
discretionary spending. The results imply that CSR is a manifestation of agency 
problem and that financial analysts curb such discretionary spending by discipline 




Another view of CSR engagement argument that treats CSR as an investment 
strategy which rewards firms in turn. Flammer (2015b) shows product market 
competition affects CSR by employing a quasi-natural experiment provided by a large 
import tariff reductions that occurred between 1992 and 2005 in the U.S. 
manufacturing sector. The study finds that domestic companies respond to tariff 
reductions by increasing their engagement in CSR. This funding supports the view of 
“CSR as a competitive strategy” that allows companies to differentiate themselves 
from their foreign rivals. The study highlights the importance of trade liberalization, 
which is an important factor shapes CSR practices.   
Firms with different ownership structure will have different incentives for 
engaging CSR activities. Abeysekera and Fernando (2020) study the differences in 
policy toward CSR between family and non-family firms, showing that family firms 
are more responsible to shareholders than non-family firms in making environment 
investments. When shareholder interests and societal interests are consistent, there is 
no difference between family firms and non-family firms in protecting shareholder 
interests. However, when the interests diverge, i.e. the environmental investment only 
benefit society but not shareholders, family firms protect shareholder interests by 
undertaking a significantly lower level of such investment than non-family firms. This 
finding implies that lack of diversification by controlling families creates strong 
incentives for them to act in the financial interest of all shareholders, which more than 
overcomes any noneconomic benefits families may derive from engaging in social 
causes that do not benefit non-controlling shareholders. 
3.2.4 Hypothesis development 
A cluster of studies in finance examines the impact of the deregulation on 
banks and the spillover effect on firms. Prior to the interstate deregulation, interstate 
bank branching was not allowed until the passage of the Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (IBBEA). IBBEA effectively permitted bank 
holding companies to enter other states without permission and to operate branches 
across state lines. The deregulation increases competition/consolidation of banks and 
reduces the share of small banks at the state level (Black and Strahan, 2002). The 




sectors, as the consequence of the bank expansion, the rate of new incorporation 
increases (Black and Strahan, 2002). Potential entrants in markets with concentrated 
banking face greater difficulty gaining access to credit than in markets in which 
banking is more competitive (Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006). Furthermore, firms in states 
more open to branching enjoy a lower interest rate than firms operating in less open 
states; firms in open states are more likely to borrow from banks (Rice and Stranhan, 
2010). Also, banking competition fosters the innovation and business productivity 
especially for small firms, which benefited from the greater credit supply provided by 
banks (Krishman et al, 2014; Cornaggia et al, 2015).  
Current research argues that financial condition is a key factor impacting CSR 
performance. According to the resource-based view, firms must devote resources to 
generate CSR characteristics (Mcwilliams and Siegel, 2001; Waddock and Graves, 
1997; Johnson and Greening, 1999). The resources include capital, materials and 
services, such as special equipment and machinery. Human resource is also needed to 
implement policies and manage practices which are relevant to CSR. Previous studies 
suggest that firms’ financial performance is positively related to CSR activities 
(Campbell, 2007). Empirical findings in Hong et al. (2012) suggest that financially 
constrained firms do less CSR activities and their goodness will be temporarily 
increased once their financial constraints were temporarily relaxed. The IBBEA 
deregulation served as an exogenous shock to bank competition, which increases the 
credit supply and provides firms with greater access to external bank financing. If 
firm’s CSR performance is positively associated with the spare resources they have, 
firms should be more likely to invest in CSR when the financial resource are relaxed 
due to the increase in credit supply. Therefore, we have the following prediction:  
Ha: The IBBEA deregulation has a positive impact on firm CSR.   
On the other hand, based on the profit-maximizing view, CSR is treated as a 
strategical investment that is used to meet corporate strategical needs. Firms engaging 
in CSR activities are likely to be rewarded since CSR can be used to differentiate 
themselves from competitors (Mcwilliams and Siegel, 2001; Campbell, 2007; 
Flammer, 2015). (Flammer 2015a) suggests that CSR as a product differentiation 




the tariff reductions that increase competition in the local market. Besides, better CSR 
performance indicates more transparency, lower level of informational asymmetry 
between firms and investors, and lower the likelihood of negative regulatory, 
legislative, or fiscal action. For example, (Goss and Roberts 2011) find that lower CSR 
performance firms face higher loan spreads and shorter maturities. Cheng et al., 
(2014)find that firms with better CSR performance face significantly lower capital 
constraints. However, a recent study by (Dharmapala and Khanna 2018) suggest that 
when the rewarding of CSR activities is not held the same level as before, firm’s 
voluntary engagement in CSR activities will reduce. The Section 135 of India’s 
Company Act of 2013 requires firms who meet specific size or profit thresholds to 
spend a minimum of 2% of their net profit on CSR. Their study finds that for firms 
initially spending less than 2% increase their CSR activity after the implementation of 
the act. In the setting provided in our paper, when the banking market is less 
competitive, firms are more likely to be captured by banks. Firms are induced to 
engage in CSR activities to differentiate themselves from their peers to gain better 
access to finance. However, with the bank deregulation, more availability of credit 
supply eases the bank financing access, rendering firms less likely to be captured by 
banks. Therefore, we have the following prediction which is contradictory to the 
previous one: 
Hb: The IBBEA deregulation has a negative impact on firm CSR.  
3.3 Sample selection and summary statistics 
3.3.3 Data 
To assess the effect of branch deregulation on CSR performance, we gather 
data on the timing of deregulation from (Rice and Strahan 2010). CSR performance 
index is obtained from Carroll et al. (2016), firm and banking specific characteristics 
are from the Compustat. We merge these three datasets and keep observations only 
when consolidated data is available.  We further restrict our observation with available 
data throughout the IBBEA deregulation, although several states further deregulated 
banking sectors after 1997 by removing the barriers set before. To enrich our sample’s 
observation  firms with available data throughout the further deregulation are also 




number of observations in the baseline analysis is 4,696 with 364 unique companies 
from 1994 to 20092.  
3.3.4 Measure of CSR 
We derive our CSR measure from Carroll et al. (2016). Previous researchers 
have suggested several measures for CSR performance, and the most used one is 
Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini, & Co. (KLD) index.  This dataset includes more than 80 
binary indicators across eight broad dimensions related to CSR, including the 
environment, community, human rights, employee relations, diversity, product 
attributes, governance and involvement in controversial business issues, etc. KLD 
refers to indicators as ‘strengths’, which proxies social responsibility, and other 
indicators as ‘concerns’, which proxies social irresponsibility. From 1991 to 2000, the 
dataset covers only those firms in the S&P 500 and Domini 400 Social index. From 
2001 onward, KLD expanded its coverage to include all firms that were among the 
1,000 largest in the United States. In most cases, researches construct the CSR proxy 
by subtracting all binary “concerns” index from all binary “strength” index, which is 
the ‘net’ KLD index (Cornett, et al., 2016; Goss and Roberts, 2011; Hong and 
Kacperczyk, 2009), or by adding up all “strengths” or “concerns” index along these 
dimensions as the proxies (Flammer, 2015; Kacperczyk, 2009). Although these 
methods have been widely used in academics, some raise questions on the precision 
of the KLD index. First, constructing the CSR index by using additive indices means 
each observable is treated as equally weighted, but this may not be true in many cases. 
Besides, using “net” KLD index fails to provide a valid measure of CSR since the 
“strengths” and “concerns” lack convergent validity (Mattingly and Berman, 2006). In 
addition, Entine (2003) argues that KLD Index may lead to bias of firms CSR 
performance because the differences in different industries are not considered.   
A consus is raised by Carroll et al. (2016) with the introduction of an improved 
measurement technique that treats these observables in test questions with different 
weights, which is called D-SOCIAL-KLD index. They adopt Item Response Theory 
 
2 Our sample period is shorter than the dataset provide by Carroll et al. (2016) which covers 
observation until 2012. This is because the Dodd-Frank Act which enacted in 2010 also affected 
interstate branching requirements. Based on Rice and Strahan (2010), the last recorded interstate 




(IRT) model and use the binary KLD dataset to estimate latent traits may be a set of 
responses to a series of questions or a set of other observed measures. The basic model 
is presented as follows: 
 Pr(𝑦𝑖,𝑗 = 1| 𝜌𝑖, 𝛼𝑗 , 𝛽𝑗) = 𝐹(−𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑖𝜌𝑖) (3.1) 
Where 𝑖 refers to individual respondents, 𝑗 refers to the items used to assess 
those respondents. 𝐹(∙) is typically the logistic or standard normal function, making 
this specification similar to a logit or probit model when working with binary data. 
One key difference between the IRT model and the above specification is that there is 
typically no independent variable with observed data in IRT; rather, it is replaced by 
the 𝜌𝑖  term representing ability or another latent trait that the researcher wish to 
estimate. In other words, the outputs of a basic two-parameter model, 𝜌𝑖, are estimates 
of the latent trait for each individual in the dataset, 𝛼𝑗 refers to the estimates for how 
difficult each item is and 𝛽𝑗 indicates how well each item discriminates among 
individuals. 
In terms of corporate decision making in constructing the IRT model, Carroll 
et al. (2016) employ a model focusing on the utility or benefit which a firm receives 
from adopting or not a particular CSR-related policy. Specifically, the utility model is 
presented below: 
 𝑢𝑖,𝑗,𝑡




𝑑  (3.2) 
Where 𝑢𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑑  proxy the utility that firm 𝑖 obtains from making decision d on 
observable CSR policy j in time period t. Firm 𝑖’s utility is a function of its underlying, 
latent level of CSR which is proxied by 𝜌𝑖, the level of CSR reflected in pursuing CSR 
policy j for all firms  𝜏𝑗,𝑡
𝑑  and an error component 𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑑 . Therefore, the utility for 




the firm’s unobservable level of CSR to reflect the idiosyncratic factors that may also 
play a role in the firm’s decision. Similarly, the utility from not adopting the policy is 
a function of whether the non-adoption the policy is a function of whether the non- 
adoption is consistent with the firm’s underlying responsibility. 
The firm chooses to adopt a policy (A) rather than to reject it (R) if it receives 
a higher utility from adoption than rejection. 
 𝑧𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝐴 − 𝑢𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝐵  













𝐴 ) + 2(𝜏𝑗,𝑡
𝐴 − 𝜏𝑗,𝑡
𝑅 )𝜌𝑖,𝑡 + ( 𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝐴 − 𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑅 ) 
= 𝛼𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗,𝑖𝜌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 (3.3) 
Where  𝑧𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  proxies firm 𝑖’s net benefit for choosing to adopt a policy on 
observable j in time period d. This simplified formula shares the same structure as the 
two-item IRT model. Under the context of firm decision making in corporate social 
responsibility engagement,  𝛼𝑗,𝑡is the likelihood that a firm adopts policy j at time t, 
given a particular level of CSR. Meanwhile, 𝛼𝑗,𝑡 increases, all firms are more likely to 
adopt policy j at time t. 𝛽𝑗,𝑖 is the discrimination parameter for adopting policy j in 
time period t. A positive sign of 𝛽𝑗,𝑖 indicates more socially responsible firms are more 
likely to adopt policy j, while a negative sign suggests more socially responsible firms 
are less likely to adopt j. Therefore, 𝛼𝑗,𝑡  and 𝛽𝑗,𝑡  both indicate policy-specific 
characteristics. 𝜌𝑖,𝑡 presents the underlying responsibility for firm 𝑖 in time period t, is 
the model’s sole assessment of the firm’s latent qualities given the policy-specific 
qualities.  
This approach produces a better measure of CSR performance which offers a 
more reliable comparison across firms than simply adding up the binary indices.  By 
modelling firm behaviour over time in a single space which accounts for dynamic 
behaviour, we can make comparisons among firms, or groups of firms over time. 




way, D-SOCIAL-KLD index generated from IRT model can be better used in the 
empirical analysis for (1) making over-time comparisons within a given firm, as the 
various underlying items can be more or less important in different years while the 
KLD index does not take into account; (2) making comparison across different types 
of firms, since the KLD index does not take into consideration that firms in different 
industries could have different advantages over scoring well on underlying KLD items 
than others. Specifically, for firms with large number of potentially “offsetting” 
strengths and concerns, or cluster around the modal zero value. D-SOCIAL-KLD index 
offers a much more nuanced measure of CSR when to make over-time comparisons 
within a given firm, or across different types of firms. By employing the IRT model 
and utilizing the KLD dataset, Carroll et al. (2016) generate the 𝜌  value of the 
unobservable level of CSR for firms over time period from 1991 to 2012. They present 
05-95 inter-percentile ranges which are analogous to a confidence interval in 
frequentist statistics. In our empirical analysis, we use the 50 inter-percentile of 𝜌 
value as the proxy for firm’s CSR. We derive the dataset of firm-year D-SOCIAL-KLD 
index directly from the website3 that is now publicly available. 
3.3.5 Measure of deregulation and control variables  
Banks were not allowed to open interstate branches until the passage of the 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (IBBEA). IBBEA effectively 
permitted bank holding companies to enter other states and to operate branches across 
state lines.  It was passed in 1994 but states had the discretion to set up their interstate 
bank branching regulations under the IBBEA any time before 1997 (Krishnan et al., 
2015; Rice and Strahan, 2010). Specifically, states could set barriers on interstate 
branching in terms of four aspects: (1) the minimum age of the target institution; (2) 
de novo interstate branching; (3) the acquisition of individual branches; and (4) a state-
wide deposit cap. Following Rice and Strahan (2010), we use these four aspects of 
state powers to build the Deregulation index. We add one to the index when a state 
removed any of the four barriers as described4. Therefore, the Deregulation index can 
 
3 The data is available from http://socialscores.org/ 
4 See Rice and Stranhan (2010) for a detailed discussion on the institutional background and the 




range from zero to four with zero indicating the most restrictive stance toward 
interstate entry and four indicating the most open stance toward interstate entry.  
In our analysis, we control for a vector of firm-level characteristics that may 
affect corporate social responsibility performance. Following previous literature 
(Flammer, 2015; Godfrey et al., 2009), we compute all variables for firm 𝑖 over its 
year 𝑡. The control variables include Log total assets (the logarithm value of total 
assets), Leverage (total debt divided by total assets), Cash ratio (cash holding to total 
assets), Market-to-Book ratio (market value to book value) and ROE (return on equity). 
3.3.6 Summary statistics 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this research. 
In Panel A, we report the summary statistics for variables used in regressions. CSR is 
our dependent variable, which is D-SOCIAL-KLD index with a mean of 2.759 and 
standard deviation of 2.743. The key independent variable is the Deregulation index, 
with the average value 1.845, indicating that states on average have nearly two barriers 
when they open their local markets to outside banks. In terms of control variables, the 
average size of firm in our sample is around $13 billion and the median size is $3.9 
billion. The Age of firm is measured as ln (Age+1), and the data of age is the 
establishment date of the firm and obtained from Loughran and Ritter (2004). In our 
sample, the average age is 21 years since the establishment date. The average rate of 
Relationship Lending is 5.56%, which is measured by the sum of all bank assets held 
by banks with total assets below $100 million divided by the sum of all bank assets in 
the state-year. These figures are similar to previous studies (Cheng et al., 2014; 
Cornaggia et al., 2015; Flammer, 2015). 
In panel B, we present the Pearson correlations for the variables used in this 
study. First, we observe that the deregulation index is positively correlated with CSR, 
suggesting firms located in more competitive state tend to have higher CSR 
performance. Besides, we notice a significant and positive correlation between firms 
size and CSR(0.7132), indicating that larger firms are more likely to have a better CSR 











Table 3.1  Descriptive statistics 
This table reports summary statistics in Panel A and the correlation matrix in Panel B for the firm-year observations during 1991 -2007 in this paper’s sample, including 
dependent, independent and control variables. The dependent variable is CSR performance and the data comes from Carroll et al. (2016). Deregulation is the index of bank 
competition level followed by Rice and Strahan (2010). Panel A report the summary statistics of the sample firm Definitions of the variables are in Appendix. 
Panel A:  Summary statistics       
Variables N Mean P50 Sd P25 P75 
CSR  4,696 2.759 2.900 2.743 0.803 4.697 
Deregulation 4,696 1.845 1 1.501 1 3 
Log Total assets 4,696 8.193 8.280 1.683 7.132 9.413 
Leverage 4,696 0.245 0.239 0.173 0.128 0.344 
Cash ratio 4,696 0.0775 0.0449 0.0940 0.0158 0.103 
MV ratio 4,696 3.505 2.599 16.32 1.632 4.140 
ROE 4,696 0.177 0.141 1.913 0.0705 0.218 
Age  4,696 2.961 3.091 0.919 2.398 3.555 
WW index 4,696 -0.404 -0.414 0.167 -0.471 -0.352 
SA Index 4,696 -3.709 -3.513 1.485 -4.771 -2.628 





Panel B: Correlation Metrix 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) CSR 1           
(2) Deregulation 0.191*** 1          
(3) Log Total assets 0.713*** 0.082*** 1         
(4) Leverage 0.168*** 0.066*** 0.266*** 1        
(5) Cash ratio -0.055*** 0.049*** -0.281*** -0.315*** 1       
(6) MV ratio 0.02 -0.011 0.002 -0.023 0.014 1      
(7) ROE 0.038*** 0.026* 0.027* 0.024* 0.015 0.330*** 1     
(8) Age 0.122*** 0.106*** 0.120*** -0.062** -0.049* 0.027 -0.001 1    
(9) WW index -0.372*** -0.024* -0.513*** 0.032** 0.187*** -0.008 -0.007 -0.072** 1   
(10) SA Index -0.122*** -0.132*** -0.080*** -0.022 0.048* -0.031 0.019 -0.520*** 0.021 1  
(11) Relationship Lending ($100 million) -0.169*** -0.444*** -0.102*** 0.004 -0.144*** -0.014 -0.016 -0.011 0.017 0.061** 1 





3.4 Empirical results 
3.4.3 Empirical strategy 
Our main econometric model focuses on the relationship between bank 
deregulation and corporate social responsibility. The empirical specification we 
estimate is as follows: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡 (3.4) 
The independent variable 𝑌𝑖𝑡  is a measure of corporate social responsibility of 
firm 𝑖 located in state 𝑗 and year 𝑡.  The variable of interest is 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡, which 
is the bank deregulation index proxy for state j in year t. The coefficient, β, indicates 
the impact of bank deregulation level on corporate social responsibility. A positive and 
significant β suggests that greater deregulation improves the performance of corporate 
social responsibility, while a negative and significant β means that deregulation exerts 
a negative effect on corporate social responsibility. 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is a set of controls that includes 
Log total assets, Leverage, Cash ratio, MV ratio and ROE. We control for year fixed 
effects in 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 for nation-wide shocks and trends which may potentially influence 
corporate social responsibility performance, such as economic cycle, national changes 
in regulations and laws etc. We also control for firm fixed effects in 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 for time 
invariant, unobserved firm characteristics which affect firm’s performance on social 
responsibility. 𝑖𝑡 is the error term. We cluster standard errors at the firm level.  
3.4.4 Deregulation and corporate social responsibility: baseline results 
We report the regression results of specification (1) in Table 3.2. Our interested 
coefficient is β, which indicates the relationship between bank deregulation and CSR 
performance. Overall, the results show that bank deregulation is negatively related to 




(1). We find that the coefficient estimate on the bank competition is negative and 
significant at 1% level. In Column (2), we add a cluster of firm characteristics variables, 
including Log total assets, Leverage, Cash ratio, MV ratio and ROE.  The magnitude 
of the coefficient is similar to the results in column (1). The regression analysis 
suggests that firms located in states which completely open to interstate branching 
decrease by 0.32, which is about 11% of the median level of CSR performance 
compare with firms located in states with the most restrictions on interstate branching.   
In terms of control variables, we find that larger firms tend to have higher CSR 
performance. The explanation can be that larger firms tend to have lower average costs 
for providing CSR attributes than smaller firms but benefit more due to the scale 
economics and the visibility, thereby have greater incentives to invest on CSR 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 2000). Besides, we also find firms leverage is positively 
related to CSR performance. Since CSR disclosure increases the data availability and 
reduces the informational asymmetry between firms and investors (Cheng et al. 2014). 
Firms with better CSR performance are easier to attract external financing, thus 
increase their leverage. These results are consistent with previous empirical researches 




Table 3.2 Baseline results  
This table reports OLS regression estimates for baseline regression. The dependent variables is CSR performance and this measure derives from Carroll et al. (2016).  
Deregulation is the index of bank competition level followed by Rice and Strahan (2010). Column (1) reports the baseline regression results without any controls, and 
we include several firm-level characteristic variables as control variables in column (2). Firm-clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *,** and*** 
indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable CSR CSR 
Deregulation -0.079** -0.081** 
 (0.036) (0.035) 
Log Total assets  0.369*** 
  (0.112) 
Leverage  0.880*** 
  (0.300) 
Cash ratio  0.596 
  (0.433) 
MV ratio  0.001 
  (0.001) 
ROE  -0.003 
  (0.008) 
_cons 0.515*** -2.511*** 
 (0.078) (0.869) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes 
N 4696 4696 





3.4.5 Deregulation and the CSR: endogeneity tests 
Although the staggered deregulation of interstate branching represents an 
exogenous shock to banking competition, state-level factors that manifest differently 
across states could affect the timing of deregulation in different states (Kroszner and 
Strahan, 1999). To ensure there is no trend before the event date, we next examine the 
dynamics of the relationship between bank deregulation and CSR. We do this by 
including a series of dummy variables in the Equation (3.4) to trace out the year-by-
year effects of interstate deregulation on the CSR performance. We employ the 
regression as follows:  
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽−4𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 𝑡−4 + 𝛽−3𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 𝑡−3
+ 𝛽−2𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 𝑡−2 + 𝛽0𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 𝑡 + ⋯
+ 𝛽5𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 𝑡+5 + 𝛿𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡 (3.5) 
where 𝑖 indexed firm, 𝑗 indexes state and 𝑡 indexed the year. In specification 3, 
we replace the deregulation index with dummy variables for each year from four years 
before to five years after. The deregulation dummy variables, 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 𝑡 set to 
one in year 𝑡 where the state in which firm is located adopts interstate bank branching 
deregulation brought about by IBBEA and zero otherwise. 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 𝑡−𝑛 
( 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 𝑡+𝑛  ) equals to one for state  𝑗  in the 𝑛 th year before (after) 
deregulation.  𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 𝑡−4  ( 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 𝑡+5 ) includes years up to and 
including the fourth (fifth) years before (after) bank deregulation.  The omitted year in 
this regression is the year before banking deregulation (t-1), therefore we can estimate 
the dynamic effect of bank deregulation on the CSR performance relative to the year 
before deregulation. Similar method has been applied in previous studies (Beck et al., 
2010;Chava et al., 2013; Cornaggia et al., 2015). 
Figure 3.1 plots the coefficients of Deregulation and their associated 95% 




includes a series of dummy variables corresponding to pre-treatment lead (years up to 
and including t-4 and t-2) and post-treatment lags (t0,…, t4, and years t5 and all 
subsequent years). We also report the regression results in Table 3. We notice that the 
coefficients on the deregulation dummy variables are insignificantly different from 
zero for all the years before deregulation. If bank deregulation caused a change in CSR 
performance but not vice versa, then the CSR performance in the year before 
deregulation should be statistically indistinguishable from all other years prior to 
deregulation. This is exactly what we observe from Figure 3.1, which means the 
reverse causality is of little concern in our setting. Next, we observe that there is a 
statistically significant decrease in CSR performance after the bank deregulation, and 
such decrease continues to remain for at least five years after banking deregulation and 





Figure 3.1. The dynamic impact of deregulation on firm CSR 
This figure presents the dynamic impact of interstate deregulation on CSR performance. The impact of deregulation on CSR is presented by the connected dots; the vertical 
bars correspond to 95% confidence intervals with firm-level clustered standard error. All estimates are relative to the year before deregulation. Specifically, we report 
estimated coefficients from the following regression:  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽−4𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 𝑡−4 + 𝛽−3𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 𝑡−3 + 𝛽−2𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 𝑡−2 + 𝛽0𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝛽5𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 𝑡+5 + 𝛿𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡 . 
𝑌𝑖𝑡  is CSR performance measure derives from Carroll et al. (2016) of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡. 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 is a dummy variable set to one if the state j in which firm is located 
adopts IBBEA in in year 𝑡  and zero otherwise.  𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 𝑡−4 is set to one for years up to and including four years prior to interstate banking deregulation and zero 
otherwise. 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 𝑡+5 is set to one for all years five years after interstate banking deregulation and zero otherwise. The omitted variable in this regression is the year 






Table 3.3: Endogeneity test: dynamic results 
This table reports the trend in IBBEA deregulation and CSR in the pre-event and post event window. The dependent variables is CSR performance and this 
measure derives from Carroll et al. (2016).  𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 is a dummy variable set to one if the state j in which firm is located adopts IBBEA in in year 𝑡  
and zero otherwise.  𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 𝑡−4 is set to one for years up to and including four years prior to interstate banking deregulation and zero otherwise. 
𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 𝑡+5 is set to one for all years five years after interstate banking deregulation and zero otherwise. The omitted variable in this regression is the 
year before banking deregulation (t-1). Firm-clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *,** and*** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively.    
Dependent variable  CSR 
Deregulation j t-4 -0.230 
 (0.357) 
Deregulation j t-3 0.102 
 (0.168) 
Deregulation j t-2 0.123 
 (0.087) 
Deregulation j t -0.146** 
 (0.059) 
Deregulation j t+1 -0.297*** 
 (0.107) 
Deregulation j t+2 -0.414*** 
 (0.145) 
Deregulation j t+3 -0.506*** 
 (0.178) 
Deregulation j t+5 -0.609*** 
 (0.201) 




Control variables Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes 
N 4696 




Another concern that prevents us from drawing a causal interpretation of 
banking competition on CSR performance from our baseline regressions is the omitted 
variables problem: unobservable shocks or variables that are omitted from our analysis 
but coincide with national level deregulatory events could drive our results. To address 
this concern, we conduct placebo tests to check whether our results disappear when 
we falsify the deregulation year instead of the actual deregulation year. Following 
Cornaggia et al. (2015), we randomly assign state into deregulation years according to 
the empirical distribution provided by Rice and Strahan (2010). By doing so, we can 
maintain the distribution of deregulatory years from our baseline specification, but it 
disrupts the proper assignment of deregulation years to states. Therefore, if an 
unobserved national shock occurs at approximately the same time along with the 
deregulation, we should still observe a significant result from the regression with 
falsified regulation years.  However, if no such shock exists, then the artificial assigned 
deregulation year should show insignificant when we run the baseline regression. The 
results are reported in the column (1) of Table 3.4. We find that the coefficient 
estimates of Deregulation are statistically insignificant.   
Overall, the tests above for reverse causality and omitted variables bias support 
that notion that the increased bank competition due to the branching deregulation has 




Table 3.4 Placebo test, robustness test and alternative explanation 
This table reports OLS regression estimates of baseline with randomized deregulation years. The dependent variables is CSR performance and this measure derives from Carroll 
et al. (2016). Deregulation is the index of bank competition level followed by Rice and Strahan (2010). Column (1) is the placebo test, we randomly assign state into deregulation 
years according to the empirical distribution provided by Rice and Strahan (2010). Column (2) report the results of robust test. We include sample from year 1994 to 2005 only 
and run the baseline specification. Column (3) reports the results of adding additional two control variables: Sales Growth is the percentage change in sales from year t-1 to year 
t and R&D which measured as the R&D expense scale by sales. Column (4) reports the regression results of interactions between bank deregulation and the level of relationship 
lending which measures by the percentage of the sum of all bank assets held by banks with total assets below $100 million divide by the sum of all bank assets in the state-year.  
Firm-clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *,** and*** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: CSR  
 Placebo test Sample period: 1994-2005 Additional control variables 
Alternative explanation: 
Relationship Lending 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
Deregulation 0.048 -0.072** -0.079** -0.076* 
 (0.043) (0.032) (0.035) (0.039) 
RL(Relationship lending)    0.555 
    (1.340) 
Deregulation * RL    -0.197 
    (0.596) 
Log Total assets 0.365*** 0.403*** 0.366*** 0.368*** 
 (0.112) (0.126) (0.112) (0.112) 
Leverage 0.873*** 0.712*** 0.921*** 0.882*** 
 (0.299) (0.270) (0.306) (0.300) 
Cash ratio 0.545 0.536 0.578 0.592 
 (0.433) (0.436) (0.435) (0.433) 
MV ratio 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ROE -0.003 -0.013** -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) 
Sales Growth   -0.025***  
   (0.010)  
R&D   -0.002***  
   (0.000)  
_cons -2.473*** -2.616*** -2.490*** -2.558*** 
 (0.867) (0.982) (0.868) (0.882) 




Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes  
N 4,696 3,459 4696 4,696 




3.4.6 Subsample test and additional control variables 
Another concern may result from our choice of sample period, which covers 
the 2007-09 financial crisis period.  We hence conduct a robust test to exclude the 
financial crisis period and keep our sample period from 1994 to 2005. The results are 
reported in the column (2) of Table 3.4. The significant level and the magnitude of 
Deregulation are almost unchanged compared with the baseline regression results.  
Existing studies suggest that firms can condition their CSR engagement on the 
availability of economic resources (Campbell, 2007; Hong et al., 2012; Sun and Gunia, 
2018). Besides, firms’ R&D investment can also generate CSR characters which can 
positively correlate with CSR performance (McWilliams and Siegel 2000; Padgett and 
Galan 2010). However, more investment in R&D may also reduce the investment in 
CSR activities. Therefore, to address potential omitted variables issue which can bias 
our regression results, we add additional control variables to our regression model and 
conduct a robustness test. We further control firm Sales Growth which is the 
percentage change in sales from year t-1 to year t and R&D  which measured as the 
R&D expense scaled by the sales of firm. The results are reported in Column (3) Table 
3.4. Consistent with our baseline results, the coefficient and significance level of 
Deregulation is unchanged. However, we observe that the two additional control 
variables are both negatively and significantly related to CSR. The potential 
explanation is that firms with higher sales growth rates have less incentive to 
employing CSR to promoting themselves. While more investment in R&D activities 
will reduce the available resource to CSR projects, therefore negatively affect the CSR 
performance.  Overall, our baseline results are insensitive to controlling sales growth 
and R&D in the regression model. 
3.5 Alternative explanation  
As we argue in the previous sections, the increased competition among banks 
after the deregulation results in greater credit supply for firms and makes firms less 
likely to be captured by monopoly banks. However, these results can also be explained 
from the perspective of relationship lending, that is, reduced relationship lending but 




treated as ‘soft’ information and can represent firm’s reputation and reliability to some 
extent (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006). Under relationship lending, the lender base 
lending decision in substantial part on ‘soft’ information, e.g., the information about 
the character and reliability of the firm. Several studies find that large banks will 
specialize in standardized loans based on ‘hard information’, such as financial 
statement and credit score, while small banks tend to focus on non-standardized 
relationship-based loans using ‘soft’ information (Cole et al., 2004; Elyasiani and 
Goldberg, 2004). The deregulation enhanced competition and consolidation in banking, 
leading to a decline of small banks (Black and Strahan, 2002), while small banks are 
the key provider of personalized service and relationships based on soft information 
(DeYoung et al., 2004). As the consequence, banking organisations grow larger 
through consolidation after the interstate banking deregulation, less likely to choose to 
make relationship loans (Berger and Udell, 2002; Uchida et al., 2012). At the same 
time, the increased competition of banks after the deregulation makes it easier for 
borrowers to switch lenders, which reduces the incentive to invest in relationships at 
outset (Black and Strahan, 2002). Under this situation, CSR performance, which has 
been treated as ‘soft’ information to build the relationship with lenders, now becomes 
less impactful in lending negotiations. We thus expect that the reduction of CSR 
performance following the banking deregulation happens through the channel of the 
reduction in relationship lending. 
To empirically test this conjecture, we employ the following specification: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 × 𝑅𝐿𝑗𝑡 + 𝑅𝐿𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛿𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡 (3.6) 
Where RL (relationship lending) is the percentage of the sum of all bank assets 
held by banks with total assets below $100 million divided by the sum of all bank 
assets in the state-year. It represents the likelihood of relationship lending at the state 
level. If deregulation reduces CSR performance through the channel of relationship 
lending, we should expect an intensified impact of bank deregulation on firm CSR if 




observe a significantly positive coefficient of the interaction term between 
deregulation and share of small banks.  
We run the specification (3.6) and the results are reported in column (4) of 
Table 3.4. We do not find that the interaction term and RL are significant, indicating 
that the impact of the bank deregulation on firm CSR is independent of the bank 
lending method. Therefore, these results rule out this alternative explanation.   
3.6 Mechanism: How bank deregulation affects CSR performance 
In the previous sections, we find that there is a negative relationship between 
bank deregulation and CSR performance. We conduct a serial of tests to demonstrate 
that our results are robust. We argue that the increased competition among banks after 
deregulation create greater credit supply and lax financial constraints of firms, and 
consequently, firms are less likely be captured by banks and hence engage in less CSR 
activities. We also rule out the alternative explanation that our results are driven by 
reduced relationship lending after the bank deregulation. In this section, we provide 
direct evidence that the channel through which bank competition affects CSR 
performance is through the reduction of firms’ financial constraints after the bank 
deregulation. 
Following previous studies (Barrot, 2016; Cheng et al., 2014; Cornaggia et al., 
2015; Hadlock and Pierce, 2010), we adopt three different measures of firm external 
financial dependence. The first measure is Age, measured as the logarithm value of 
firms age plus one. Older firms tend to be less dependence on external finance. The 
second measure is WW index introduced by (Toni M. Whited and Wu 2006). Higher 
value of the WW index indicates that the firm faces more financial constraints. Lastly, 
we follow (Hadlock and Pierce 2010) to construct the SA index to measure the level of 
financial constraints, and greater value means greater financial constraints. We employ 




 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 × 𝐵𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 × 𝑇𝑜𝑝
+ 𝛿𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡 (3.7) 
Where Bottom and Top are two dummy variables. Bottom (Top) equals to one 
for firm whose external financial dependence level is in the bottom (top) half of the 
sample distribution at the year before deregulation or zero otherwise in term of the 
three external financial dependence proxies: i) Age; ii) WW index and iii) SA index. 
Bottom (Top) indicates firms are more (less) external financial dependent. The 
coefficient estimate on the interaction term between Deregulation and Bottom (Top) 
reflects the different effects of bank competition on CSR performance for companies 
at different level of external financial dependence. We would expect that firms which 
are more reply on external financing take more advantage of the greater access to credit 
after the banking deregulation and thereby decrease significantly of their CSR 
activities. 
We report the results from the regression specification Equation (3.7) in Table 
3.5. Overall, we observer the coefficient on the interaction between Deregulation and 
Bottom are all significantly negative. Compare to their counterparties, firms which is 
more external financial dependence tend to reduce their CSR activities by 8.9% to 31.2% 
as reported from column (1) to column (3) in table 3.5. We observe no significant 
evidence on less external financial dependent firms, although the coefficients across 
these three columns of Deregulation and Top are all negative. These results are 
consistent with our expectation. 
To further support the channel of financial constraints, we conduct an 
additional test conditional on firm financial strength according to financial ratios 
(Barrot, 2016). By doing so, we first measure financial strength by ranking firms based 
on Size, Leverage, Cash holding, Payout and Collateral, in the year before the 
deregulation. We follow the same procedure above and run the regression respectively. 
Bottom (Top) equals to one for firms in the bottom (top) half of the sample distribution 
at the year before deregulation or zero otherwise in term of  (1) Size (logarithm value 




measured by cash holding to total assets; (4) Payout, measured by cash dividends to 
cash holding and (5) Collateral, measured by the total net property, plant and 
equipment to total assets. The bottom (top) halves of all these variables represent firms 
are more (less) financial constrained. We would expect the firms which are more 
financially constrained before the shock would experience greater decline in CSR 
performance compared to their less financially constraint counterparties.  
Table 3.6 presents the estimation of the effect of the bank competition on CSR 
performance conditional on the five proxies of financial strength. In general, 
financially more constrained firms experience 9.5% to 12.6% decrease in their CSR 
performance. While for financially less constrained firms, they do not experience any 
decrease in their CSR performance (as all the interaction term between Deregulation 
and Top are insignificant). This result further confirms the financial constraints as the 




Table 3.5 External financial dependence with alternative proxies: Age, WW index, and SA index 
This table report OLS regression estimates the impact of banking deregulation on CSR performance. The dependent variables is CSR performance and this measure derives from 
Carroll et al. (2016).  Deregulation is the index of bank competition level followed by Rice and Strahan (2010). Bottom (Top) is a dummy variable equals to one for firm whose 
external financial dependence level is in the bottom (top) half of the sample distribution at the year before deregulation or zero otherwise in term of the three external-financial-
dependence proxies: i) Age; ii) WW index and iii) SA index. Bottom (Top) indicates firms are more (less) external financial dependent. Firm-clustered robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. *,** and*** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: CSR 
 Age WW index SA index 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Deregulation *Bottom -0.312* -0.130** -0.089** 
 (0.160) (0.053) (0.039) 
Deregulation *Top -0.058 -0.028 -0.050 
 (0.036) (0.041) (0.072) 
Log Total assets 0.389*** 0.383*** 0.365*** 
 (0.107) (0.111) (0.112) 
Leverage 0.843*** 0.871*** 0.883*** 
 (0.304) (0.295) (0.299) 
Cash ratio 0.543 0.582 0.593 
 (0.428) (0.431) (0.435) 
MV ratio 0.001* 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ROE -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
_cons -2.620*** -2.597*** -2.482*** 
 (0.837) (0.860) (0.868) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
N 4696 4696 4696 




Table 3.6. External financial dependence with alternative proxies: additional evidence 
This table report OLS regression estimates the impact of banking deregulation on CSR performance. The dependent variables are CSR performance and this measure derives from 
Carroll et al. (2016).  Deregulation is the index of bank competition level followed by Rice and Strahan (2010). Bottom and Top are dummies, equals one for firms in the bottom 
(top) half of the sample distribution at the year before deregulation in terms of  (1) Size (logarithm value of total assets), (2) Leverage, measured by 1 minus debt to total assets ratio; 
(3) Cash, measured by cash holding to total assets; (4) Payout, measured by cash dividends to cash holding and (5) Collateral, measured by total net property, plant and equipment 
to total assets.  The bottom (top) halves of all these variables represent firms are more (less) financial constrained. Firm-clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*,** and*** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
  Dependent variable: CSR 
 Size  Leverage  Cash  Payout  Collateral 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Deregulation *Bottom -0.103* -0.117*** -0.095** -0.128*** -0.126** 
 (0.054) (0.038) (0.045) (0.049) (0.050) 
Deregulation *Top -0.056 -0.034 -0.064 -0.058 -0.047 
 (0.041) (0.054) (0.046) (0.043) (0.044) 
Log Total assets  0.365*** 0.353*** 0.372*** 0.371*** 
  (0.111) (0.113) (0.110) (0.111) 
Leverage 0.940***  0.828*** 0.853*** 0.863*** 
 (0.327)  (0.295) (0.296) (0.300) 
Cash ratio 0.204 0.402  0.578 0.597 
 (0.438) (0.430)  (0.435) (0.431) 
MV ratio 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ROE -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
_cons 0.294*** -2.272*** -2.342*** -2.526*** -2.515*** 
 (0.106) (0.848) (0.874) (0.859) (0.866) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 4696 4696 4696 4696 4696 




Overall, the evidence reported in this section indicates that the reduction of 
firms’ social responsibility after the banking deregulation will be amplified if firms are 
more financially constrained. These results provide direct evidence that the impact of 
bank competition on firms’ CSR performance works through the credit supply channel.  
3.7 Conclusion 
A growing literature on CSR attempts to understand CSR activities of firms 
according to incentives or conflict of interest among stakeholders. One difficulty on 
this important topic that insiders or managers make endogenous decisions of CSR. We 
first time show that CSR can be a result of credit market frictions. Banking competition 
is an important element in a well-functioning capital market to alleviate credit 
rationing and capture in lending relationship. However, banking competition is not 
necessarily a natural outcome of the market but often a consequence of regulations. In 
this research, we study whether bank competition casts any economic effects on CSR 
performance by exploiting a regulatory change in the banking industry as the 
exogenous shock to banking competition. This research design allows us to document 
a causal effect of external banking environment on CSR. 
The interstate branching deregulation has led to an increase in competition 
among banks to supply credit. We employ the exogenous staggered deregulation of 
state-level branching laws to identify changes in banking competition. The interstate 
banking deregulation results in a drop of CSR performance at individual firm-level, 
with the magnitude both economically and statistically important. Our results hold in 
a serial of endogenous tests and robustness tests, confirming the negative impact of 
interstate deregulation on CSR is likely causal. To provide further evidence of the 
channels through which deregulation affect CSR, we test whether firms will react 
differently conditional on variations in financial constraints level and relationship 
lending. We show that the deregulation results in the negative change in CSR 
performance is unlikely to explain by the reduced relationship lending after 
deregulation. While such negative effects will be amplified if firms are more 
financially constrained. Our results support the view that firms use CSR as a strategical 
investment to accessing bank financing when credit supply is likely to be rationed due 




and relaxes firms’ financial constraints, which allows firms to make investments in 
CSR without “window dressing” themselves to please banks to credit.  
There are several important contributions that this paper makes. First, our study 
highlights that a competitive credit market is important, especially for firms that rely 
heavily on external financing. Policymakers and regulators should continue to make 
reforms to dismantle market frictions and enhance competitions in the financial market 
to increase access to credit. Second, we offer novel empirical evidence to suggest that 
firms’ CSR activities are not socially efficient when borrowers are susceptible to being 
captured by lending groups. In this sense, CSR needs to be considered jointly with 

















The impact of taxes on corporate investment is the main driving force for 
government reform strategy which have been used as one of the most important tools 
to accelerate the domestic economy. The recent Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) signed 
in 2017 which makes a significant change of the corporate tax rate, reducing from 35 
percent in 2017 to 21 percent in 2018 and thereafter, intending to stimulate corporate 
investment and employment. Majority of existing studies are focusing on how the tax 
policy affects firms’ behaviours in terms of investment, financing and payout policies 
(Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 1988; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Ohrn 2018). The 
theoretical analysis of the effect of taxes on the level of investment well developed, 
while how the tax incentive affect firm investment efficiency is rarely studied. In this 
paper, we investigate the effect of corporate tax on investment efficiency by using the 
staggered changes of corporate income tax across U.S. states from 1990 to 2015.  
Under the neoclassical theory framework, the investment is only related to the 
marginal q ratio which suggests firms will invest until the marginal cost exceeds it 
return (Abel 1983; Hayashi 1982; Modigliani and Miller 1958; Yoshikawa 1980). 
However, in the real world, the information asymmetry between insiders and outsider 
causes capital frictions and therefore distort the investment efficiency, either 
underinvestment or overinvestment (Fazzari et al. 1988; Myers and Majluf 1984). For 
example, the capital rationing can result in the capital shortage and firms may need to 
forego profitable investment opportunities, consequently underinvest. While the 
agency problem and moral hazard that suggest managers would engage in investment 
to satisfy their own interests or to achieve personal favoured financial outcomes can 
also affect the investment quality (Jensen 1986a). For example, the empire building 
resulting from the agency problem which usually associates with overinvestment.  
The corporate income tax charge on the net cash flow to the company increase 
the investment cost and reduce the after-tax profit. On the other side, because of tax 
deductibility, firms are motivated to take advantage of tax shelter to reduce the tax 
burden (Hall and Jorgenson 1967). Prior studies suggest that firms tend to maximize 
the utility of the tax deductibility by adjusting their investment strategies when they 




Ljungqvist 2015). Given that a firm’s investment decision is not only affected by firm 
specific factors but also the external policy reform, the tax serves as a key incentive to 
affect firms investment decision. When firms expose to a tax increase, firms expect to 
higher tax burden but higher tax saving per dollar tax deduction. This indicates that 
the motivation of taking advantage of tax sheltering increase simultaneously. For firms, 
the investment decision could be distorted when they considerate the tax benefits 
through an investment. Besides, managers can reduce the time and efforts in investing 
when the after tax return decreases (Atanassov and Liu, 2020). In the end, firms can 
suffer overinvestment issues. While the tax cut brings firms tax cash saving, which 
serves as an internal financing source for investment. Specifically, firms which 
experience the financial constraints will benefit most from this additional financing 
source to support their investment activities. At the same time, tax cut also reduce the 
required rate of return, consequently more investment options are profitable for firms 
to choose. With the cash windfall which created by the tax cut and greater range of 
investment choices, firms are more likely to capture the growth opportunities and 
therefore reduce underinvestment.  
To analyse the impact of tax changes on investment efficiency, we follow 
recent studies on investment efficiency which is defined as the extent of firm 
investment deviates from the expected level of investment (Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi 
2009; García Lara, García Osma, and Penalva 2016; Kim, Kim, and Zhou 2020). Next, 
we adopt a difference-in-differences approach by exploiting staggered corporate 
income tax changes at the US state level over 1990 to 2015 (Heider and Ljungqvist 
2015; Mukherjee, Singh, and Žaldokas 2017), and estimating overinvestment and 
underinvestment respectively based on whether the firm’s investment is higher or 
lower than its expected level of investment. We find that the tax changes tend to affect 
investment efficiency asymmetrically: the tax increase can aggravate overinvestment 
while the tax cut mitigates underinvestment. Specifically, with other conditions 
remaining the same, firms who expose to tax increase exacerbate overinvestment by 
0.021 compare to their counterparties with no tax rate change, which represents 14% 
increase in the mean of overinvestment. For firms experience a decline in their tax rate, 
they tend to mitigate the underinvestment inefficiency by 0.004, which represents 4.3% 




The nature of staggered state tax changes provides a clean identification 
strategy and allows us to disentangle the effect of taxes on investment efficiency from 
other factors which can affect the investment efficiency as well. Nevertheless, we 
notice that a fundamental assumption underlying of our empirical identification 
strategy is that there is a parallel trend in investment efficiency between the treated 
and control groups without the tax changes. To strength the credit of our empirical 
identification, we conduct a dynamic estimation to show the changes in investment 
efficiency around the event time. The results suggest that the pre-treatment trend are 
actually indistinguishable between treated and control groups. But we can observe the 
significant differences in their investment efficiency after the tax changes.  
Another potential concern which can undermine our baseline results is that the 
changes of state corporate income tax rate may be triggered simultaneously with other 
unobservable factors, like local economic conditions, which can be the true reasons 
affect firm investment efficiency. To address this concern, we exploit the fact that 
economic conditions are likely to be similar across neighbouring states, whereas the 
effect of state-level tax policy stops at the state’s border. We conduct a falsification 
test to examine whether firms response to their neighbouring state tax changes while 
there is no tax change in their home state. The results show that firms’ investment 
efficiency are unlikely to be affected by neighbouring states tax changes, while we 
continue to find significant impacts of home state tax changes on firms investment 
efficiency. This evidence implies that unobserved local confounding factors cannot be 
driving the observed variation in investment efficiency to tax rate change. 
To provide further evidence that the effect of corporate tax on investment 
efficiency is indeed tied to the variation in corporate tax rate, we perform cross-
sectional variation among firms in terms of their sensitivity to tax changes. Intuitively, 
firms who engage more in tax planning imply that they have stronger needs in tax 
saving and therefore should be more sensitive to tax changes. Following this argument, 
we show that the treatment effect is stronger for firms which are more aggressive in 
tax planning. In addition, if firms are less capable to manipulate their taxable incomes, 
e.g. shifting taxable incomes from high tax jurisdictions to low jurisdictions, they 
should be sensitive to their home state tax rate changes. We examine this argument by 




requirement, which restrict firms’ ability to shift taxable profits to lower tax rate 
jurisdictions. Consistent with our prediction, we find that firm located in states which 
implement combined reporting requirement shows a stronger response to tax changes. 
Firms located in states with a combined reporting mitigate (exacerbate) their 
underinvestment (overinvestment) inefficiency when they expose to a tax cut 
(increase). Overall, these results not only suggest the relationship between tax changes 
and investment efficiency varies among firms with different tax sensitivities, but such 
effect can also be driven by the tax benefits (costs) brought from tax changes.   
To support our argument of the baseline findings, we provide further tests to 
shed light on two channels through which tax changes affect investment efficiency 
respectively: the financial constraints channel and the agency cost channel. With 
respect to the financing channel, we argue that the tax cut produces a cash windfall for 
firms and increase the internal cash flow suddenly, which is a vital source for firms 
investment activities. We find that the tax cut reduces underinvestment more for firms 
which are more financially constrained. With respect to the agency cost channel, we 
argue that the tax increase induces tax motivated investment, and managers tend to 
make less efforts in investment project selection due to the lower after-tax return, 
therefore engaging in suboptimal projects. We find that firms with higher agency cost, 
higher free cash and less monitored by institutional shareholders, exacerbating 
overinvestment after the tax increase. These evidence consistent with our argument 
that taxes affect investment efficiency through different channels.  
Finally, we conduct a series of robustness tests. We use an alternative measure 
of investment efficiency by following Chen et al. (2011), which estimate the expected 
investment as a function of revenue growth; we limit observations only to domestic 
firms who have no foreign taxable incomes, to address the potential effect of tax policy 
changes impact firms with foreign subsidiaries; we also add additional state 
macroeconomic controls in the regression to control the macroeconomic conditions. 
The impact of tax changes on investment efficiency continues to be held. 
Our research contributes to several strands of literature. First, we add new 
evidence to the growing literature on the determinates of firm-level investment 




2013; Choi et al., 2020; Goodman et al., 2014). While the prior literature focuses on 
how the information asymmetry and agency problem, e.g. the quality of financial 
reporting and analyst forecasting, can affect firm-level investment efficiency. Our 
study addresses the effects of external tax policy change which is one of the most 
important factors that can affect firms investment decision making. Our results show 
that corporate tax plays an important role which influent investment efficiency in 
asymmetrical ways: the increase in corporate income tax intend to aggravate 
overinvestment inefficiency while the tax cut mitigates underinvestment inefficiency. 
These asymmetric effects of tax changes on investment efficiency indicate that the 
mechanism underlying the investment efficiency changes can be different. We provide 
further evidence to show the different channels, the financial constraints and the 
agency cost, through which the tax changes affect investment efficiency respectively. 
Second, this paper adds to the literature on tax policies and firms behavioural 
response. Previous studies on effects of taxes on corporate policies largely focus on 
firms’ investment choice and economic growth (Blouin et al., 2020; Hall and 
Jorgenson, 1967; Mukherjee et al., 2017), or the impact on firm value and capital 
structure (e.g. the trade-off theory) (Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015; Modigliani and 
Miller, 1958). In this study, we extend this body of work and examine that tax-
motivated investments distort firm’s efficiency from shareholders’ perspective. The 
recent study which is relevant to ours is the one by Blouin et al. (2020) who examine 
the impact of tax cut on mergers and acquisition and how it enhances shareholders 
wealth. The evidence found in their study shows that the tax cuts improve acquisition 
quality as well as the quantity which is consistent with the predictions of the 
neoclassical theory of firms and theory of financial constraints.  
Our research also has policy implication. The tax reform has become 
particulate prominent today and the impact of tax reform on firms’ behavioural 
changes draws much of the attention from both government and academia. Existing 
studies mainly focus on federal level tax reforms which usually bring significant 
changes to the U.S. tax system.  For example, the most recent change made on U.S. 
tax policy system is the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) signed in 2017 and the 
Domestic Production Activities Deduction (DPAD) enacted in 2004, which are the 




Thakor, and Wang 2019; Gaertner et al. 2020; Lester 2019; Poterba 2004). Actually, 
the state taxes are a meaningful part of U.S. firms’ overall tax burden which account 
for about 21% of total income taxes paid in Compustat, while there are few studies 
focus on the state-level tax policies (Heider and Ljungqvist 2015; Ljungqvist and 
Smolyansky 2018; Ljungqvist, Zhang, and Zuo 2017; Mukherjee et al. 2017). Given 
the fact that the federal corporate tax reforms which are rare and intend to affect all 
firms at the same time, state-level tax policy changes are more likely to be exploited 
by government as a short-term fiscal instrument. Therefore, understanding the real 
effects and consequence of these general tax changes is important for future tax policy 
design. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the hypothesis 
development of this paper. Section 3 describes the research identification strategy and 
present the empirical results in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
4.2 Literature Review and hypotheses development 
In this section, we review relevant literature investigating the influence of tax 
on corporate investment decisions. 
4.2.1 Tax and investment  
 
4.2.1.1 Studies in q theory 
Back to Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) who lay the foundation of a theory 
of the valuation of firms and shares in a world of uncertainty, an operational definition 
of the cost of capital and how to use that concept as a basis for rational investment 
decision making within the firm. They suggest that every project with a positive net 
present value (NPV) is funded as it arises, and negative NPV projects should be forego. 
So the key insight is that market valuation should be related to underlying claims to 
income streams in future and this assumption is built upon a world without frictions. 
This neoclassical theory of corporate investment is based on the assumption that 




by the market value of the outstanding common shares. Tobin (1969) suggests that the 
rate of investment is a function of q, the ratio of the market value of new additional 
investment goods to their replacement cost. Following that, Yoshikawa (1980) proves 
that q theory can be derived from a choice-theoretic framework which explicitly takes 
account of adjustment costs associated with the investment. The study also shows that 
the q theory explains how investment is motivated by the apparent short-run 
disequilibrium, which the adjustment cost plays a crucial role in the theory.  Further, 
Hayashi (1982) proves the optimal rate of investment as a function of marginal q 
adjusted for tax parameters. Since in the q theory, the marginal q, the ratio of the 
market value of an additional unit of capital to its replacement cost, is unobservable. 
The study proves an exact relationship between marginal q  and average q  which can 
be observed. It suggests that the marginal q is relevant to the firm’s investment 
decision should reflect tax rules concerning corporate tax rate, investment tax credit 
and depreciation formulas. Finally, the marginal q adjusted for tax parameters is then 
calculated from data on average q by assuming the actual U.S. tax system concerning 
corporate tax rate and depreciation allowances.  
Starting with Modigliani-Miller’s model, researchers examine the impact of 
taxes on investment decisions. Due to the asymmetrical tax on equity and debt, which 
provides firm’s incentive of choice of financing. Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) and 
Scott (1976) introduce the “static trade-off theory”, which suggests that firm’s 
financial structure is determined by a trade-off between the tax-saving brought from 
leverage and the financial cost of the enhanced probability of bankruptcy associated 
with high debt. The higher the tax advantages of debt, the higher the optimal debt-
equity ratio. In turn, the higher the non-debt tax shields, the lower the desired leverage.  
Feldstein and Flemming (1971) use a generalized neoclassical investment function to 
assess the effects of tax policy on investment in Britain. The results show that both the 
accelerated depreciation allowances and the use of differential taxation to induce the 
retaining of corporate profits had substantial and significant impacts on investment 
behaviours. Sandmo (1974) studies the effect of the corporate income tax on 
investment incentives. The framework of this study is under the neoclassical theory of 
investment and capital, which is the firm’s optimal use of labour and capital over time 
derived from the basic criterion of present value maximization. They prove that 
corporate income tax may distort investment decisions in many ways. For example, 




capital gains. Therefore, the corporate income tax may change relative prices in favour 
of either short-term or long-term capital goods. Summers et al. (1981) present an 
analysis of the effects of tax policy on capital accumulation and valuation based on the 
q theory of investment.  Following Tobin’s explanation, the aggregated investment can 
be expected to depend in a stable way on q,  the ratio of the stock market valuation of 
existing capital to its replacement cost. This model connects the stock market to 
investment which has been examined, but it overlooks the impact of tax policies. In 
Summers et al. (1981), the effects of tax changes on future profits are used to estimate 
the impact of those changers on stock market. In turn, the estimations are used as a 
basis for gauging the impact of the tax changes on capital formation. The results 
suggest that the most desirable investment incentives are those that operate by reducing 
the effective purchase price of new capital goods. They maximize the investment and 
minimize the windfall to corporate shareholders upon tax policy enactment. The 
increase in the after-tax return to shareholders from a reduction in dividend tax is 
exactly offset by the increased after-tax cost of retaining earnings. Reducing corporate 
tax rates has effects in between these extremes. This study also stresses the importance 
of announcement and time effects of tax changes. The use of investment tax credit or 
accelerated depreciation stimulates investment will depend on the timing of 
announcement and enactment. For example, because of the accelerate depreciation, an 
announced but not yet implemented permanent tax cut will have a larger impact on 
investment than will a permanent cut that has already been implemented. Bolton et al. 
(2011) propose a model of dynamic investment and highlight the central importance 
of the endogenous marginal value of liquidity for corporate decision. Because of the 
external financing cost, firms’ investment is no longer determined by equating the 
marginal cost of investment with marginal q. Instead, investment of a financially 
constrained firm is determined by the ratio of marginal q to the marginal cost of 
financing.  House and Shapiro (2008) use a tax policy reform, the bonus depreciation, 
to estimate the investment supply elasticity. They find that investment in qualified 
capital increased sharply. While there is no evidence that market prices reacted to the 
subsidy, suggesting that adjustment costs are internal or that measurement error masks 
the price changes. They also argue that for long-lived durable capital goods, even 
changes in tax policy that last for several years can safely be modelled as temporary. 




4.2.1.2 Empirical Studies in Tax Reforms 
On top of the theoretical studies in tax policies and corporate investment, 
empirical studies also examine the relationship between tax and investment behaviours.  
Most of them examine the real effects and consequences of the tax reforms which enact 
at country level, and how these reforms affect firms investment behaviours, e.g. level 
of capital investment, merger and acquisition activities, etc.. The literature has argued 
about whether greater internal capital corresponds to greater investment was driven by 
relaxing of financing constraints enabling investment that would otherwise have been 
forgone or whether the higher internal cash flow merely proxied for improvements in 
investment opportunities beyond the controls in their specification. Beschwitz (2018) 
studies the effect of cash windfalls on the acquisition policy of companies. The study 
employs a German tax reform that permitted firms to sell their equity stakes with no 
tax. This tax reform creates a cash windfall by selling equity states see an increase in 
the probability of acquiring another company by 14%, but additional acquisitions 
destroy firm value. Besides, firms which affected by the tax reform shows a lower 
return in acquisition announcement, and the effects are stronger for greater cash 
windfalls. Another study on the relationship between corporate tax and investment is 
conducted by Dobbins and Jacob (2016), which exploit the 2008 tax reform in 
Germany that substantially cut corporate taxes as an exogenous policy shock and 
expect domestically owned firms’ investment to be more responsive to the reform. The 
results show a significant increase in real investment of domestic firms after the tax 
reform, especially for the one who is heavily relying on internal funds or benefit more 
from the tax reform. These results suggest that tax reform created cash windfall can 
distort firm’s investment decision therefore affect the investment efficiency. 
a). Enact of Domestic Production Activities Deduction (DPAD) in 2004 
 In 2004, the enact of the American  Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) draws a lot of 
attention from academia which is one of the largest U.S. corporate tax expenditure 
since the 1990s. As a part of AJCA, Domestic Production Activities Deduction (DPAD) 
which is a corporate tax provision that allows firms to deduct a percentage of their 
domestic manufacturing income from their taxable income. Dharmapala et al., (2011) 




even for firms that appeared to be financially constrained to lobby for the holiday. 
Instead, they find an increase in shareholder payouts.  Faulkender and Petersen (2012) 
use this temporary shock to the cost of internal financing, they examine the role of 
capital constraints in firms’ investment decision. The AJCA significantly lowered U.S. 
firms’ tax cost when accessing their repatriated foreign earnings thus the cost of 
funding domestic investments with internal foreign cash. Because firms own U.S. tax 
on their foreign earnings only when they repatriate the income, which raises the cost 
of funding domestic investment with foreign cash. With the pass of AJCA which 
temporarily reducing the tax cost of repatriating foreign earnings, hopes to increase 
domestic investment. They find that, on average, there is little increase in investment 
response to the act. However, for those capital constrained, they do find a significant 
increase in investment. Different from previous studies which examine the effect of 
external capital constraints when firms are short of internal funds, they study the 
changes in the costs of funds that are already internal to firms. They suggest that when 
the cost of internal capital is not identical for all internal capital, the frictions present 
a form from allocating its internal capital in the most efficient way is important and 
need to study. They also highlight the importance of financial theory in the design of 
tax incentives. Changes in tax rates and rules can change the relative cost of funding 
sources, and these changes can affect the investment decision of the firm or only 
change the source of capital used to fund those investments. Government policy that 
attempts to increase investment must target incentives toward capital-constrained 
firms. The results found in Faulkender and Petersen (2012) is opposite to  Dharmapala 
et al., (2011). They explain that the different results are attributable to differences in 
the empirical method. Although both of them adopt a difference-in-differences 
regression method, the later one differs in how the firms in the sample are classified 
into treated and untreated groups in the DID regression. Despite these difference, we 
can still see that tax policy changes definitely can affect firms decision, either on 
investment or payout policy.  
In addition to these two studies in DPAD, Ohrn (2018) find that corporations 
respond strongly to the DPAD, and corporate income tax rate cuts more generally, by 
increasing investment and payout and decreasing debt usage. Specifically, a 1 
percentage point reduction in tax rates increases investment by 4.7 percent of installed 
capital, as well as increases payout by 0.3 percent of sales, but decrease debt by 5.3 




more liquid firms who expose to higher marginal tax rate. These results suggest that 
lower corporate tax rates and faster accelerated depreciation each stimulate a similar 
increase in investment, per dollar in lost revenue. Later, Lester (2019) find that DPAD 
indeed associates with an increase in the amount of domestic investment spending, but 
this result only holds for domestic only firms. While for multinationals, they claim the 
tax deduction incentives show an increase in foreign investment spending post-DPAD. 
One explanation for this delayed investment spending is that firms’ are different in 
their priority in terms of accounting response, they may first engage in income shifting 
across time and borders. As such activities allow firms to quickly respond to the 
incentives and reap the maximal tax saving in the first year of DPAD benefit was 
available. Blouin et al. (2020) study the impact of the DPAD on mergers and 
acquisitions and the results found in this study is a bit different. DPAD reduces 
corporate tax rates on income from work or goods made in the US. Their results 
suggest that both the quality and quantity of acquisition bids by DPAD-advantaged 
firms increase. The greater quality of acquisition may derive from incremental DPAD 
benefits, e.g. tax-related synergies.  Besides, their results also suggest that financially 
constrained firms increase their acquisition activity even more than unconstrained 
firms. All these results support predictions from neoclassical M&A theory as well as 
the theory of financial constraints, a modest tax rate changes can have substantial effect 
on acquisition activities and qualities.  
b). Enact of Tax Cut and Job Act (TCJA) in 2017 
The recent biggest change in U.S. tax system is the Tax Cut and Job Act (TCJA) 
in 2017 which is the largest gross tax cuts. The TCJA has two key elements: a reduction 
in the corporate income tax rate from 35 percent to 21 percent; and a one-tax tax 
holiday that cuts the tax on cash repatriation from foreign subsidiaries from 35 percent 
to 15.5 percent. The TCJA significant reduces the tax incentive for US corporations to 
hold cash overseas by reducing tax-related frictions in the operation of their global 
internal capital market. By employing the TCJA, Bennett et al., (2019) study the 
effects of tax cut on repurchases, leverage and investment. The TCJA generates tax 
windfalls through a repatriation tax cut and a corporate income tax cut. They find that 
the surge of repurchases after the TCJA is driven by the repatriation tax cut but not the 




firms on domestic firms’ repurchase. Also, investments increase, primarily in response 
to the income tax cut and especially for capital constrained, low leverage, or profitable 
firms. Wagner et al. (2018) also examine the relationship between tax cuts and overall 
market moves. They find that from Trump’s election until the TCJA’s pass, on those 
days when high-tax firms outperformed (underperformed) low-tax firms the market 
tended to move upward (downward). These results point out that taxes are a very 
important component of firm value.  
4.2.1.3 Studies in  State Tax Reforms  
In addition, there are several studies empirically examine the impact of 
corporate tax policy and firms responses at the state level. Different from country level 
tax policy reform, state level tax rate changes provide better identification setting for 
studies in examining the real effects of tax changes.  One key challenge of testing the 
tax effects on corporate policies is that firm’s tax status is often endogenous to its 
investment strategies. Exploiting country level changes in the income tax rate are 
usually adopted by researchers. In fact, country level tax changes are rare and usually 
far between. Moreover, such policy changes usually affect all firms in the economy at 
the same time, which makes it difficult to find a control group with which to establish 
a plausible counterfactual. An alternative approach is exploiting cross-country 
differences in tax policies. This provides a larger number of tax shocks than studies 
using country level tax changes, while whether firms classified as treated or control 
are comparable is usually a concern that can undermine the credibility of the empirical 
setting. One fact draws researchers attention is that U.S. companies pay not only 
federal income tax but also state income tax. As noticed in Heider and Ljungqvist 
(2015), state taxes account for about 21% of total income taxes paid in Compustat, 
which is a key component of the overall tax burden for firms. On top of that, changes 
in state corporate income tax rate are numerous which are staggered across states and 
time, lend themselves to a difference-in-differences research design. Such 
identification setting can disentangle the effects of tax changes from other 
microeconomic shocks that affect firms’ investment decision if the underlying 
assumptions are satisfied. This approach allows us to establish a counterfactual using 
control groups that experience similar economic conditions but are not themselves 




Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) first use state staggered corporate income tax 
changes to explore taxes’ impact on corporate capital structure (non-financial 
companies). In this study, they identify 43 tax increases in 24 states and 78 tax cuts 
across 27 states from 1989 to 2011. They find that firms increase long-term leverage 
by around 40 basis points for every percentage point increase in the tax rate. However, 
on the other hand, when the tax rate falls, firms are less likely to change their leverage. 
These results support the dynamic tradeoff model. The explanation for this 
asymmetrical impact of tax rate changes on firm’s capital structure is that the marginal 
benefit exceeds the marginal default cost and thereby shareholders are better off if they 
increase leverage. When the tax rate decreases, the marginal cost exceeds the marginal 
benefits, the firm should reduce its leverage. However, reducing debt would reduce 
the value of shareholders’ option to default; and the value of debt would rise to the 
point where the firm’s current debtholders captured the entire benefit of the reduction 
in risk. Consequently, shareholders have no incentives to reduce leverage. These 
results are consistent with the static tradeoff theory suggested. Another work conduct 
by Faulkender and Smith (2016) also provide empirical evidence to support the 
tradeoff theory of capital structure by estimating how much variation in tax structure 
arising from global operations explains the variation in capital structure among U.S. 
public traded multinational firms. They find that firms do have higher leverage ratios 
and lower interest coverage ratios when they operate in countries with higher tax rates, 
which is consistent with tradeoff theory suggested. 
Inspired by Heider and Ljungqvist (2015), Mukherjee et al. (2017) examine 
how the corporate tax rate affects future innovation. Following the empirical setting in 
Heider and Ljungqvist (2015), they find that an increase in corporate income tax tends 
to reduce firm’s future innovation: taxes affect not only patenting and R&D investment 
but also new product introductions. Similarly, firms are less likely to respond to their 
innovation activities to tax cuts. They explain that the decline in after-tax profit from 
innovation projects lead innovators to reduce o redirect effort, effecting aggregate 
innovation activities. Also, the increase tax rate raises the leverage level for firms, 
which is not the favoured form of financing for innovation.  Further evidence to show 
that tax increases lead to a significant number of investors parting with their employers 
that tax increase induces less innovation and innovators choosing to shift to less 
innovative activities.  Besides, they also find a systematic decline in the riskiness of 




Later, Ljungqvist et al. (2017) using the same setting to examine the 
relationship between corporate income tax and firm risk taking. Income tax affects 
corporate risk taking since they can induce asymmetry in a firm’s payoff. Firms should 
respond to tax increase by choosing safer projects and thereby reducing the risks they 
take due to the lower after-tax profit. Absent other frictions, firms should respond 
symmetrically to tax cut by increasing risk taking. However, higher risk reduces the 
value of claims held by creditors, for example, by means of debt covenants. Therefore, 
with frictions, the effect of tax cut on risk taking is likely attenuated for many firms. 
This study provides evidence to support these arguments: firm affected by tax increase 
reduces its earnings vitality related to other firms in the same industry that is not 
subject to a tax change in their headquarter state that year. The main ways in which 
firms achieve these risk reductions are efforts to shorten their operating cycle, and to 
fund less risky ways to commercialize their R&D projects. Besides, they also find that 
the negative effect of tax increases on risk taking is largely driven by firms with a 
limited ability to offset losses, and asymmetrically reduce risk when their ability to 
carry back losses is reduced. This study contributes to the tax literature and to the 
literature on the effects of taxes on corporate policies by documenting that firm-tune 
their risk profiles when their tax rates change. Also, this study adds a new angle to the 
literature on corporate risk taking by identifying taxes as an important determinant. 
Overall, the three studies we discussed above shows that state corporate income tax 
changes can exert impact on corporate decisions in terms of capital structure, 
investment decision and also risk taking. Besides, the staggered introduction of state 
corporate income tax policy changes can be a clean setting to help us to identify the 
real effect of taxes and its impact on firm’s investment decision.   
Another work by Atanassov and Liu (2020) examine the impact of tax cuts on 
innovation using significant decreases of at least 100 points (bps) in the top-bracket 
state corporate income tax rate.  Different from previous studies, this paper identifies 
the most relevant state to which the tax rate is applied by using the most mentioned 
state in a firm’s 10-K reports instead of the state where the firm headquartered. They 
find that tax cuts significantly increase the number of patents and citations per patent, 
and the quality of innovation is affected strongly by changes in taxes. Besides, they 
also find that tax increases have a negative and significant effect on innovation while 
the economic magnitude is smaller. They also find that corporate governance, financial 




relation between corporate income taxes and innovation. Different from Mukherjee et 
al. (2017) which fail to find an effect for tax cuts on innovation, Atanassov and Liu 
(2020)’s study mainly focus on tax cuts and also examine several previously 
unexplored mechanism to better understand why tax cuts are an important driver of 
corporate innovation. In addition, the focus of this study is on innovation output rather 
than input, demonstrate that both corporate income tax increases and decreases have a 
significant impact on the quantity and quality of innovation.  
Additional to the studies discussed above that examining the impact of state 
corporate tax on firms responses, Schandlbauer (2017) focuses on the role and 
significance of taxes for the capital structure decisions of U.S. bank holding companies. 
The study uses local U.S. state tax increases as a quasi-natural experiment and employs 
a difference-in-differences estimation approach to compare banks that affected by a 
tax increase to those that are not affected. It shows that an increase in the local U.S. 
state corporate tax rate affects the banks’ financing and operating decisions. Better 
capitalized banks raise their long-term non-depository debt once they are exposed to a 
tax increase. The reason is that the better capitalized banks have the ability to benefit 
from an enlarged tax shield of debt and therefore offset part of their larger tax expense 
by increasing their leverage ratio. This result is consistent with Heider and Ljungqvist, 
(2015). On contrast, less capitalized banks reduce their lending because a higher tax 
rate increases the tax-adjusted cost of funding, which renders the marginal loan 
unprofitable and cannot offset part of their larger tax expense via more debt. The paper 
highlight that the reaction to a tax increase critically depends on the banks’ financial 
strength. 
In conclusion, as we discussed above, we can see that corporate income tax 
intend to affect investment decision, and the impact can through at least through two 
channels, the incentives in taking advantage of tax and the tax saving/cost generated 




4.2.2 Investment Efficiency 
4.2.2.1 Agency problem and investment efficiency 
In the field of studying investment efficiency, economists have focused on how 
financial frictions affect investment decisions. For example, Jensen (1986) and Myers 
(1977) introduce agency problems at various levels of corporate structure, e.g. 
managerial team, specific claimholders. This shift of attention to agency 
considerations in corporate finance received considerable support from large empirical 
literature and the practice of institutional design. Jensen and Meckling (1976) point 
out that agency costs are as real as any other cost, and incentive problem raises the 
cost of external finance. Outside financing dilutes management’s ownership stake, 
therefore intensify incentive problem that arises when managers control the firm but 
do not own it. Later, Myers and Majluf (1984) emphasis the role of information, which 
management is assumed to know more about the firm’s value than outsider investors. 
They suggest that firms may refuse to issue stock when they need to raise cash to 
support their investment activities. When the firm’s security is underpriced in some 
conditions, managers will be reluctant to issue securities because raising the cost of 
external finance. Therefore, they may pass up valuable investment opportunities. 
Under this situation, managers will find it more attractive to finance investment with 
internal funds. Both such cases will lead to capital rationing. In Hoshi et al. (1991), 
they present evidence that information and incentive problems in the capital market 
affect investment. The moral hazard suggests that the ex post incentive problem 
reduced the amount of capital supplied ex ante. For the second case, the information 
asymmetry suggests an adverse selection problem. Managers will try to sell overpriced 
securities while being reluctant to sell underpriced securities. Rational investors will 
in response, increase the cost of capital and decrease the amount demanded. Therefore, 
in both case, frictions case the reduced amount of external capital supplied to the firm. 
However, firms who can generate internal cash flow can mitigate such effects, which 
causes capital investment to be correlated with the availability of internal financing 
source. Fazzari et al., (1988) suggest that firms that are liquidity constrained, e.g. 





There is a series of studies in investment efficiency with the introduction of the 
conception of agency cost. Jensen (1986) imply that managers have incentive to grow 
their firms beyond their optimal size. Although external financing place managers’ 
activities to be monitored and disciplined by capital providers, internal financed 
projects avoid and therefore allowing mangers to overinvest.  Blanchard et al. (1994) 
provide empirical support for this view. They examine how will firms act when firms 
receive cash windfall. In perfect financial market, mangers should return the money to 
the capital suppliers, since this cash windfall does not change the Tobin’s q ratio, 
which means the investment opportunities stay the same. However, the results they 
find that managers tend to invest in unrelated projects that typically fail. Their results 
support the agency model of managerial behaviour, in which managers try to ensure 
the long-run survival and independence of the firms with themselves. 
4.2.2.2 Accounting information disclosure and investment efficiency 
Recent studies empirically examine the determinates of investment efficiency, 
standing at the point of accounting information disclosure. These studies acknowledge 
multiple potential channels such as the reduction in adverse selection costs as well as 
moral hazard costs. Biddle and Hilary (2006) first examine how accounting quality 
related to firm-level capital investment efficiency. In this study, they point that capital 
investment can be correlated with internally generated funds because managers do not 
return to investors excess cash coming from rent or other assets in place. Following 
previous studies, which suggests information asymmetry and agency problem both 
affect firm’s investment decision, they put forward the assumption that if managers 
could commit to revealing all of their private information, then the outsiders would not 
ration capital. In their study, they suggest that higher quality accounting permitted 
perfect monitoring and alleviate the agency problem. Therefore, the higher quality 
accounting reduces the investment cash flow sensitivity at the firm level; such impact 
is more salient in economies dominated by stock markets than in those dominated by 
creditors.  
Extending the findings in Biddle et al. (2006), Biddle et al. (2009) examine the 
relationship between financial reporting quality and capital investment efficiency. 




less from predicted investment levels, and show less sensitivity to macro-economic 
conditions. These results imply that accounting reporting reduce the frictions, such as 
moral hazard and adverse selection which impede efficiency investment. Different 
from previous studies, this study not only examines the how the accounting quality 
affect the absolute level of firm capital investment, but they introduce a model to 
measure firm’s optimal level of investment, with which we can observe firm’s 
deviation and therefore investment efficiency. Similarly, Chen et al. (2011) examine 
the role of financial reporting quality in private firms from emerging markets, a setting 
in which existent researches suggest that financial reporting quality would be less 
conducive to the mitigation of investment inefficiencies. They reach the same 
conclusion as in Biddle et al. (2009) that financial reporting quality positively affects 
investment efficiency. Besides, the positive relationship between financial reporting 
quality and investment efficiency tend to be amplified in bank financing but less 
significant in incentives to minimize earnings for tax purpose. This implies that tax 
incentives also affect investment decisions of firms, especially for private firms that 
tax consideration is especially important. Gomariz and Ballesta (2014) examine the 
role of financial reporting quality and debt maturity in investment efficiency by using 
a sample of Spanish listed companies. Consistent with previous studies in financial 
reporting quality and investment efficiency, they also document the positive 
relationship between financial reporting quality and investment efficiency. On top of 
that, they take a further step to examine the role of debt maturity. Due to the less 
developed capital market compare with the U.S. or the U.K. and the higher information 
asymmetry, private debt is the main financial source for Spanish firms. Therefore, 
banks may play a more important role in monitoring of short-term debt and alleviating 
capital market imperfections. The evidence shows that shorter debt maturity mitigates 
both overinvestment and underinvestment. In those firms with lower short-term debt, 
the financial reporting quality effect on investment efficiency is stronger than for those 
firms with a higher degree of short-term debt. These results suggest that a substitutive 
role of financial reporting quality and shorter maturities in reducing information 
asymmetries and monitoring managerial behaviour to limit expropriation of creditors 
and minority shareholders. In conclusion, in those firms that present higher financial 
reporting quality, accounting information may be used to monitor investment 




To address the potential endogeneity concern in previous studies, Cheng et al. 
(2013) examine the financial reporting quality and investment efficiency by exploring 
the disclosed internal control weakness under the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act. 
Previous literature, such as Biddle et al. (2009), have already documented a positive 
relationship between financial reporting quality and investment efficiency. While one 
concern of the previous studies is that they fail to establish a causal relation for the 
positive association. In Cheng et al. (2013), they provide more direct evidence for this 
causal relation by taking advantage of a provision in the SOX Act that requires firms 
to disclose if they have a material internal control weakness (ICW) in their financial 
reporting. An ICW suggests that there is an information problem in the firm’s financial 
reporting system. They examine the investment behaviours of a sample of ICW firms 
surrounding their first disclosure of ICWs. They first find that in the year prior to the 
first disclosure of an ICW, relative to a control firm with similar financial conditions, 
financially constrained ICW firms underinvest, while financially unconstrained ICW 
firms overinvest based on the pooled sample. Next, they conduct a regression analysis 
and find that after the initial disclosure of material weakness, the investment 
inefficiency of ICW firms becomes small and insignificant relative to control firms. 
With further analysis, the result confirms the investment levels of ICW firms are no 
longer significantly different from those of the control firms with similar financial 
conditions, and a significant reduction in the investment inefficiency of ICW treated 
firms. Taken together, these findings suggest that ineffective internal control over 
financial reporting has a significant adverse impact on investment efficiency. The ICM 
disclosures lead shareholders and other stakeholders in the firm to increase their 
monitoring and hence to improve firms’ financial quality. And these changes mitigate 
agency problems such as adverse selection and moral hazard and thereby increase the 
efficiency of investment.     
4.2.2.3 Financial forecasts and investment efficiency 
Several studies examine the quality of earnings forecasts which can be used to 
infer the quality of corporate investment decision. Following the intuition that 
managers draw on similar skills when generating external earnings forecasts and 
internal payoff forecasts for their investment decisions, Goodman et al. (2014) find 
that managers with higher quality in external earnings forecasts make better 




both acquisition and capital expenditure decision.  They suggest that externally 
observed forecasting quality can be used to infer the quality of capital budgeting 
decisions within firms. Chen et al. (2017) examine the impact of financial analysts’ 
forecast quality and how it affects corporate investment efficiency. They use the 
accuracy and dispersion of financial analysts’ earnings forecasts a proxy of analyst 
expertise and quality in making forecasts. They find that high quality forecast is 
associated with higher investment if the firm is more likely to underinvest or lower 
investment if the firm is more likely to overinvest, suggesting that forecast quality 
increase firm investment efficiency. Furthermore, such effects are stronger for firms 
with higher information asymmetry and lower institutional ownership, which provides 
support to the information intermediary and monitoring agent explanation for why 
analyst quality increase investment efficiency. The information and monitoring roles 
played by financial analysts are not subsumed by other information intermediaries, 
attributes of information environment of firms, or other governance mechanisms. The 
results highlight the notion that higher quality of analyst forecast increases the 
information environment and external monitoring, which in turn increases investment 
efficiency.  
In addition to earnings forecast, Choi et al. (2020) further examine the analysts’ 
capital expenditure forecasts and how it affects corporate investment efficiency. They 
find that firms with analyst Capex forecasts show higher investment efficiency. 
Specifically, the effect is stronger when the forecasts are issued by analysts with higher 
ability or greater industry knowledge. Moreover, the effect of Capex forecasts on 
investment efficiency varies with the signals they convey about future growth 
opportunities: positive growth signals are more effective in reducing underinvestment, 
while negative growth signals are more effective in reducing overinvestment. They 
also provide additional evidence to show these effects operate at least in part through 
both a financial channel and a monitoring channel. This study further confirms that 
analysts’ forecasts convey useful information about firms growth opportunities to 
managers and investors and facilitate efficient investment. Different from the literature 
on the attributes and effects of analyst earnings forecasts, which focus on cash flow 
and revenue forecast, Capex forecasts affect corporate investment efficiency by 
serving as an informative signal about the quality of firms’ investment. This provides 
insights on a relatively new and underexplored analyst research output which can also 




4.2.2.4 Accounting attitudes and investment efficiency 
Related literature exploits the accounting feature as an attribute of the financial 
reporting system that moderates managers’ desire to engage in investment decision 
which to satisfy self-interests. García Lara et al. (2016) suggest that conservatism 
improves investment efficiency. Accounting conservatism imposes more stringent 
verifiability requirements for the recognition of economic gains relative to losses 
which improve investment efficiency by reducing managerial overinvestment. On the 
one side, conservatism mitigates underinvestment among firms facing financing 
difficulties. Since conservatism reporting discourages managers from engaging in 
risky investment because of the timely recognition of losses. Such conduct facilitates 
additional debt for financially constrained firms seeking investment but does not 
necessarily facilitate their access to additional equity. On the other side, conservatism 
also limits overinvestment problems. In general, overinvestment problems usually 
exist among firms with high investment capability, and managers are more capable to 
engage in projects which with a negative NPV but generate private benefits for them. 
Because of timely reporting of losses, makes the self-interested decisions to show up 
sooner, and more likely to be detected by stakeholders to discipline the behaviours of 
managers. Consequently, reduce overinvestment which not only through acquisitions 
but also for other harder-to-monitor types of investments. These effects of 
conservatism on investment and financing are more pronounced in the presence of 
information asymmetries. Overall, these results suggest that conservatism can lead to 
a direct benefit to investors in the form of more efficiency investments.  
Similar to García Lara et al. (2016), Laux (2020) also examine how biases in 
financial reporting affect mangers’ incentive to develop innovative projects and to 
make appropriate investment decisions. The model of innovation involves a manger 
who must first exert costly effort to develop a viable innovation and then decide 
whether to implement the innovation based on private information about its success 
probability. The study finds more conservatism reduces the probability that risky 
investments yield high earnings reports and therefore weakens the manager’s incentive 
to spend effect working on new ideas ex ante. Conservatism increase the profitability 
of  threshold above that the manager invest in a new idea, which either increases or 
decreases investment efficiency, depending on whether the manager is initially 




with previous literature. A study of  Nan and Wen (2014) who examine the effect of 
accounting biases on firm’s investment efficiency. They show that biased accounting 
information system functions better in improving firms’ financing and investment 
efficiency than a neutral system. Specifically, in industries with generally low-profit 
prospects, a more downwards bias helps mitigate both investment and financing 
inefficiency; while for industries with high-profit prospects, an upward-biased 
accounting system helps improve financial efficiency.  
4.2.2.5 Financial conditions and investment efficiency  
Another strand of literature studies the financial conditions of firms and how it 
affects investment efficiency. Richardson (2006) examines the extend of firm level 
overinvestment of free cash flow. The results found in this study is consistent with 
agency cost explanation that overinvestment is concentrate in firms with highest levels 
of free cash flow, while governance structures, e.g. the presence of activist 
shareholders, tend to mitigate overinvestment. Almeida and Campello (2007) also 
suggest that financing frictions affect investment decision. Since tangible assets 
sustain more external financing as tangible assets mitigate contractibility problems, 
which increases the value that can be captured by creditors in default status. Their 
results show that asset tangibility positively affects the cash flow sensitivity of 
investment in financial constrained firms, but no impact on unconstrained firms. By 
investigating the patterns of capital allocation between high growth and low growth 
conglomerate segments, and the overall internal capital market efficiency across the 
business cycle and across constrained and unconstrained conglomerates, Hovakimian 
(2011) provides evidence on the relationship between financial constraints and the 
efficiency of internal capital markets of diversified firms. This study finds that when 
external capital is easier to access, internal capital markets tend to be inefficiency 
during non-recession periods. However, during recessions, accessing external capital 
markets become more restrictive, conglomerates significantly enhance the efficiency 
of internal capital markets by shifting more capital to high growth segments relative 
to low growth segments. This effect is significantly strong for conglomerates which 
are ex ante financial constrained. The results also suggest that under low levels of 
liquidity, the standards of project selection improve significantly. Similar results also 
find in Chaney et al. (2012). When the value of a firm’s real estate appreciates, its 




And such impact of real estate shock on investment is salient for firms which are more 
financially constrained. All these studies suggest the role of financing constraints and 
investment decisions. 
Overall, these studies indicate that the benefit of the financial flexibility to 
reallocate capital between projects become more important when external capital 
markets are less accessible. Internal financial resource can be a key factor affect firm’s 
investment efficiency, especially when firms are financially constrained or external 
financing resources are limited. 
4.2.2.6 The role of government in investment efficiency 
A strand of literature on investment efficiency focus on the role of government 
and how they can affect firms investment efficiency. Chen et al. (2011) examine the 
impact of external governance on investment efficiency by exploiting government 
interventions which is another form of frictions can distort firm’ investment behaviour 
and leads to investment inefficiency in China. In this study, they find that the 
sensitivity of investment expenditure to investment opportunities is significantly 
weaker for State Owned Enterprises (SOE). Besides, political connections 
significantly reduce investment efficiency in SOEs but not for non-SOEs. They explain 
that the Chinese government intervenes in SOEs to help accomplish social and political 
goals such as employment, fiscal health, regional development, social stabilities, etc., 
which alter firms’ investment behaviours and consequently reduce the efficiency on 
investment. Therefore, government intervention in SOEs through majority state 
ownership or the appointment of politically connected mangers distorts investment 
behaviours and harms investment efficiency. Consistent with the view that government 
intervention undermines investment efficiency, Deng et al. (2017) examine 
government intervention affects firms’ investment and investment efficiency by 
exploiting world’s largest economic stimulus package (ESP) during the 2008 global 
financial crisis period. This action taken by Chinese government intends to restore the 
economy by promoting investment in priority areas, which provides an exogenous 
shock to firms’ investment environment and exacerbated the impact of government 
intervention on firms’ investment and investment efficiency. The results suggest that 




investment performance was poor: investment efficiency of government-intervened 
firms decreased and government-intervened firms overinvested after ESP. Specifically, 
the source of funding for investment is mainly from bank loans rather than internal 
cash flows. Chen et al. (2017) examine the relationship between ownership type and 
firm level capital allocation as captured by the sensitivity of investment expenditure to 
investment opportunities.  They argue that government and foreign institutional 
owners are associated with different levels of information asymmetry and agency 
problem. Consistent with the view that government ownership leading to serious 
information asymmetry and agency problems. They find that government ownership 
weakens investment-Q sensitivity and lower investment efficiency. On the other side, 
they find a  positive relationship between foreign intuitional ownership in newly 
privatized firms and investment efficiency. They explain that foreign institutions 
mitigate agency problems and information asymmetry by improve governance and 
transparency. This study provides evidence to show that investment efficiency is affect 
by ownership type as well, although the channel through which is similar to previous 
studies. Overall, the results suggest that government intervention can be another 
friction that distort firms’ investment decisions and invest inefficient.  
4.2.2.7 Other factors affect investment efficiency 
There are several studies on investment efficiency find other factors also affect 
firm investment efficiency, from the perspective of executive characteristics, 
institutional ownership, external industry characteristics, etc.. Eisdorfer et al. (2013) 
examine how the similarity between the executive compensation leverage ratio and the 
firm leverage ratio affects the quality of firms investment decisions. They find that 
greater gaps between these two ratios can lead to greater distortions in investment 
decisions. Firms with higher raw leverage gap display lower investment intensity, 
which managers tend to underinvest (overinvest) when their interests are more aligned 
with those of the bondholders (shareholders). This indicates that managers with more 
debt-like components in their compensation package will prefer a more conservative 
investment policy. At the same time, when the compensation leverage is lower than 
firm leverage, investment distortion in general positively deviate from the optimal 
investment level which overinvests. On the contrary, when compensation leverage 
higher than firm leverage, they tend to underinvest to increase the value of debt. Taken 




optimal investment policy in order to increase the value of the compensation package. 
Therefore, they suggest that setting compensation leverage close to firm leverage can 
reduce the agency cost. Stoughton et al. (2017) consider a strategic game of 
information acquisition where market structure plays a major role in determining the 
nature of information acquired by firms in the first place. They find that competition 
causes firms to acquire less information and investments to become more inefficient 
relative to a first-best case with the same market structure, investment tend to be more 
efficiency in concentrated industries. Ward et al., (2020) find that motivated 
monitoring by institutional investors mitigates firm investment inefficiency. The 
results show that closer monitoring mitigates the problem of both overinvestment free 
cash flows and underinvestment due to managers career concerns. Also, the 
effectiveness of the monitoring by institutional investors appears to increase 
monotonically with respect to the firm’s relative importance in their portfolio. Cook et 
al. (2019) examine how corporate social responsibility (CSR) affect firm value through 
investment efficiency and innovation. The evidence shows that firms with greater CSR 
performance tend to invest more efficiently, as well as generate more patents and 
patent citations. They explain that higher CSR performance firms actually are more 
profitable and valuable, consequences partially attributable to efficiency investments 
and innovation.  Kim et al. (2020) show that linguistically induced time perception 
relates to cross-country variation in investment efficiency. They find that 
underinvestment is less prevalent in countries where there is a weaker time 
disassociation in the language. They explain that speakers with weak future time 
reference languages apply a lower discount rate in evaluating investment projects and 
avoid decisions that would result in negative future consequences, therefore less likely 
to be underinvested. However, when strong short-term incentives or empire-building 
incentives neutralize weak future time reference speakers’ concerns about negative 
future consequences form suboptimal investment decisions, the discount effect 
prevails and weak future time reference leads to overinvestment. The results suggests 
that time encoding in languages influence speakers cognition and their investment 





4.2.3  Hypothesis Development 
The neoclassical theory suggests that a firm will invest until the value of the 
marginal return exceeds its cost (Abel 1983; Hayashi 1982; Yoshikawa 1980). The 
marginal Q ratio is the sole driver of the capital investment policy, and the internally 
generated cash flows should play no role in investment decision (Biddle and Hilary 
2006; Modigliani and Miller 1958). Therefore, managers should always adopt projects 
with positive net present value (NPV). Firms are considered as investing efficiently if 
they undertake projects with positive NPV under the scenario of no market frictions 
(Biddle et al., 2009). However, literature also document that firms can depart from this 
optimal level and invest inefficiently. The existence of information asymmetry can 
lead to capital rationing. For example, the moral hazard and adverse selection caused 
by the information asymmetry between insiders and outsider investors can reduce the 
amount of external capital supplied to firms and therefore result in the underinvestment 
(Hoshi et al. 1991). Besides, due to agency problems, managers may engage in 
suboptimal projects when all positive NPV projects have been taken. Such suboptimal 
investments can be used for specific purposes, e.g. managers’ incentive of empire-
building (Hope and Thomas, 2008; Jensen, 1986). Under this situation, firms can 
expose to overinvestment. Given these frictions, firms may depart from their optimal 
level of investment, either under- or over- invest: the former includes passing up 
investment opportunities with positive NPV, while the latter is defined as investing in 
projects with negative NPV. 
The basic principle of tax is to levy a charge on the net cash flow to the 
company resulting from its real economic activities (King 1986). The corporate 
income tax plays an important role in corporate financing, investment and also payout 
decision (Fazzari et al. 1988; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Ohrn 2018). Firms also 
adjust their investment strategy in response to tax reform (Blouin et al., 2020; 
Mukherjee et al., 2017). Any investment decision will affect pre-tax accounting 
earnings through deprecation or expensing. Corporate taxes on profit will increase the 
cost of investment while allowances for depreciation and investment tax credit reduce 
it (Hall and Jorgenson 1967). Also, the expected future taxable income not only relies 
on the net revenue from a specific project, but on the overall activities of a firm (Brown 
1962). The statutory tax change can affect firm investment efficiency through at least 




from tax policy changes. Previous studies document that managers intend to alter their 
investment decision to meet their favourable financial outcomes (Burgstahler and 
Dichev 1997; Graham, Hanlon, and Shevlin 2011; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 
2005), for example, managing reported earnings to avoid earnings decrease and losses. 
Specifically, there are two components of earnings, cash flow from operations and 
changes in working capital, are used to achieve increases in earnings. Therefore, if 
firm wants to achieve its specific earnings outcomes, it is very likely to alter its 
investment strategy which can affect both the cash flow and working capital. When a 
firm is exposed to an income tax increase, the firm will experience a decline in its 
after-tax profit, but concurrently enjoy a higher tax saving with per dollor’s deduction. 
This incentivises managers to look for tax shelter and reduce their tax obligations, 
either through interest deduction or non-debt tax shelter such as investment tax credit 
and depreciation. Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) find that firms will increase leverage 
to respond to an increase in income tax, firms with a higher marginal tax rate have 
greater incentive to take on more debt in response to a tax rise. This incentive in tax 
benefits can distort the firm’s investment decision and reduce investment efficiency. 
Also, such firms are more likely to engage in suboptimal investment to satisfy tax 
related purpose, especially firms are capable to do so (e.g. less financial constrained 
or governed). Besides, the increased tax rate reduced the profit of investment. Under 
this situation, the incentives for managers to exert time and effort in investing can be 
reduced (Atanassov and Liu, 2020), consequently, reduce investment efficiency. 
Taken together, because of the tax related benefits and the lower after-tax profit from 
investment can both distort firm’s investment decision, which leads to engaging in 
negative NPV projects especially when investment opportunities are limited. If this is 
the case, we predict that firms which are exposed to tax increases will exacerbate 
overinvestment.  
Based on the discussion above, we present the hypothesis of tax increase on 
investment efficiency,  separately for under- and over- investment as below: 
H1a: Firms expose to tax increase will exacerbate the over-investment. 




Since the tax charges on the net cash flow, the tax cut can create a cash windfall 
for firms. When there are positive NPV projects, firms will finance them either by 
internal cash flow or access the external capital market. The tax cut increases after-tax 
profit and the tax cash saving provides additional internal financing source. Previous 
studies find that firms under a tax cut experience lower internal financing costs and are 
more likely to invest in general (Dobbins and Jacob 2016; Faulkender and Petersen 
2012). Firms also increase investment if they can obtain additional financing sources. 
For example, firm increase investment when the value of pledgeable assets (e.g. real 
estate assets) experiences a climbing, who can be financed through additional debt 
issues (Almeida and Campello 2007; Chaney et al. 2012). Blouin et al. (2020) find that 
firms which can take the tax cut advantages will engage more in merger and 
acquisitions, especially for those cash-financed. The lower income tax also indicates 
the required rate of return decrease because of the reductions in the tax burden, 
therefore more investment options are profitable for firms. Taken together, under a tax 
cut, firms will benefit from the additional cash saving and are more likely to respond 
to growth opportunities, consequently mitigating underinvestment (Kim et al. 2020). 
If this is the case, we predict that tax cut will mitigate the underinvestment inefficiency.  
As we discussed above, we predict that the tax decrease exert asymmetric 
impacts on firms’ investment efficiency. We present the hypothesis separately for 
under- and over- investment as below: 
H2a: Firms expose to tax cut will not affect the over-investment. 
H2b: Firms expose to tax cut will mitigate the under-investment. 
4.3 Research Design  
We test these hypotheses by adopting following methods. We follow Biddle et 
al. (2009) to construct the measure of investment efficiency.  By employing the 
staggered changes of corporate income tax across states from 1990 to 2015, we are 
able to measure the corporate income tax changes applied to individual firms. This 




specific omitted variables and nationwide shocks. Similar identification strategy has 
been applied in Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) and Mukherjee et al. (2017).   
We first examine how corporate income tax changes affect firm investment 
efficiency. A key identifying assumption underlying the DiD strategy is that firms 
exposed to the state corporate income tax change should share a parallel trend with the 
unexposed firms in the absence of the tax change. Therefore, any differences in the 
investment efficiency between the treatment and control groups should result from the 
tax change exposure.  
To enhance the credibility of the DiD strategy, we add a series of time dummies 
before and after the tax changes and conduct a dynamic estimation of tax changes on 
investment efficiency. If our identification strategy is valid, we should not observe any 
trend of the investment efficiency between treated and control groups prior to the tax 
change, but we should observe the difference after the intervention of tax change. The 
dynamic estimation not only provides us with evidence of the time-varying effects of 
tax changes on investment efficiency, but also allows us to see how quickly firms 
respond to the tax changes and how long such effects last.  
On top of the dynamic estimation, we intend to strengthen our argument by 
addressing potential confounding factors through a falsification test. We estimate the 
tax changes which happen in a neighbouring state, and see whether firms respond to 
such exchanges when there is no tax change in their own home state. Furthermore, we 
provide evidence demonstrating that the impact of tax changes on investment 
efficiency differs among firms with different levels of tax sensitivity, and potential 
channels through which tax changes affect investment efficiency, including financial 
constraints and agency cost respectively. Last, we conduct a series of robustness tests, 
e.g. using an alternative measure of investment efficiency, limiting the sample to 
domestic firms, adding state macro-economic characterising as control variables. 
4.3.1 Measure of investment efficiency 
Following Biddle et al. (2009) we model a firm’s deviation from the expected 




measure of investment efficiency. Underinvestment and overinvestment are defined as 
the deviation from this expected level. The model is presented below: 
 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡+1 (4.1) 
Where the 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1 is the total investment and 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖 is the 
percentage change in sales from year 𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡.  The model is estimated for each 
industry-year based on the Fama and French 48-industry classification for all 
industries with at least 20 observations in a given year. The residual from estimating 
Equation (1) captures the extent to which a firm’s investment deviates from the optimal 
investment level and we take the residual as the measure of investment (in)efficiency. 
Specifically, we classify firm-year observations with positive residuals as 
overinvestment firms and those with negative residuals as underinvestment firms. We 
take the positive residual as the measure of investment efficiency of overinvestment 
firms. For underinvestment, we take the absolute value of the residual as the measure 
of investment efficiency of underinvestment firms. Therefore, a higher value of the 
measure of investment efficiency indicates a greater deviation from the optimal level 
and lower efficiency. 
4.3.2 Baseline Empirical Model 
Following Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) and Mukherjee et al. (2017), we use 
the staggered tax changes across states as a difference-in-differences approach to 
examine the effect of changes in states’ corporate income tax rates on firms’ 
investment efficiency. We estimate the baseline model using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions. Specifically, we employ the following specification separately for 





𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦  𝑖,𝑠,𝑡+1
=  α + 𝛽𝐼 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐷 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡
+ 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑠,𝑡+1 (4.2) 
Where 𝑖, 𝑠, 𝑡  proxy firms, states and years, respectively. Our dependent 
variable is  𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦  𝑖,𝑠,𝑡+1  capture the investment (in)efficiency 
which is the absolute value of the residuals from estimating the investment model. The 
main variables of interest are 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡  and 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡  which are 
dummy variables set to one if state 𝑠 increase or decrease  corporate income tax at year 
𝑡 or zero otherwise. We control for a set of variables which have been found to affect 
firm investment efficiency (Biddle et al. 2009; M. Cheng et al. 2013; Choi et al. 2020).  
We first include a vector of basic firm characteristics including firm size (Size) 
measured as the natural logarithm of total assets; leverage (Leverage) measured as the 
ratio of long-term debt to sum of long-term debt to the market value of equity; the 
market-to-book ratio (M/B) measured as the ratio of the market value of total assets to 
book value of total assets; return on assets (ROA); bankruptcy risk proxied by Z-score 
which is a measure of bankruptcy risk, calculated as 3.3*pretax income + sales + 
0.25*retained earnings + 0.5*(current assets-current liabilities), scaled by total assets; 
Tangibility measured as the ratio of plant, property and equipment (PP&E) to total 
assets; industry leverage (Ind. K-structure) which is the mean leverage for firms in the 
same SIC 3-digit industry; dividend payout ratio (Dividend) which is an indicator 
variable set to one if the firm paid a dividend and zero otherwise; financial slack (Slack) 
which is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to PP&E; cash flow from operation 
divided by sales (CFOsale). Second, Liu and Wysocki (2011) suggest that operating 
volatility can affect the cost of capital, and consequently can affect the investment 
efficiency. Therefore, we also include a set of variables which measure the uncertainty 
level of firms’ operating environment, including cash flow volatility (sd_Cash) 
measured as the standard deviation of cash flow from operations scaled by average 
total assets from year t-5 to t-1; sales volatility (sd_Sales) which measured as the 
standard deviation of sales deflated by average total assets from year t-5 to t-1 and 
investment volatility (sd_Investment) which measured as the standard deviation of 




Bayer 2014) suggest that firms in different stages of business cycle may have different 
investment strategy. To address the potential impact on investment efficiency, we 
control a series of measures of business cycle, including firm’s age (Age), the length 
of the operation cycle (Cycle) measured as the log of receivables to sales plus investor 
to cost of goods sold multiplied by 360, and the frequency of losses (Loss) which is an 
indicator variable equals one if income before extraordinary items is negative and zero 
otherwise. Last, we consider the role of analyst and institutional investors on 
investment efficiency. Several studies find that analyst earnings forecast and 
expenditure forecast can reduce the information asymmetry and enhance investment 
efficiency (Chen et al. 2017; Choi et al. 2020). Also motivated monitoring by 
institutional investors can mitigate firm investment inefficiency (Ward et al., 2020). 
Therefore, we further include institutional ownership (Institutions) which measured as 
the percentage of firm shares held by institutional investors and financial analyst 
(Analyst) which is the number of analyst following the firms as the control variables. 
Detailed variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.3.  Firm and year fixed 
effects are included to control for unobserved firm characteristics and time-varying 
trends respectively. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. As we discussed before, 
we predict that the tax increase will exacerbate overinvestment inefficiency (𝛽𝐼 > 0), 
while the tax cut will attenuate the underinvestment inefficiency (𝛽𝐷 < 0). 
4.4 Empirical Results 
4.4.1 Sample and Descriptive Statistics  
We collect financial reporting data from Compustat, analyst data from IBES 
and institutional ownership from Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) 
Database. Consistent with previous studies (Biddle et al. 2009; Heider and Ljungqvist 
2015; Mukherjee et al. 2017), we exclude firms in the financial sector (SIC  code 6000-
6999), utilities (SIC code 4900s), the public sector (SIC code 9000s) and firms 
headquartered outside the U.S. Based on the data provided by Heider and Ljungqvist 
(2015), we identify 36 instances of state tax increase across 23 states and 68 instances 
of tax cut across 26 states over our sample period. After excluding missing firm-year 
observations, our final sample for baseline regressions consists of  40351 firm-year 




Table 4.1 Panel A presents the summary statistics for the variables described 
above. The mean value of Investment Efficiency is 0.11, which suggests the average 
deviation from the expected investment level. Around two-third (27269 out of 40351) 
of the observation in our sample are exposed to underinvestment, the average deviation 
from expected investment level for underinvestment firms (0.0922) is lower compare 
to overinvestment firms (0.148). This result suggests that firms are more likely to 
subject to underinvestment inefficiency compare to overinvestment. The average 
sample firm has $1,142 (logarithm value 5.058 as shown in the table) million in total 
assets with ROA 5.32%, and trades at market-to-book ratio of 2.123. In addition, there 
are around 4.63 analysts following an average firm and 41.4% of shares outstanding 
are held by institutional investors. Overall, the pattern of these variables is similar to 
previous studies (Chen et al., 2011; Cheng et al., 2013; Choi et al., 2020).  
Panel B of Table 1 reports the Pearson correlations between our main variables. 
In general, firm size, ROA and Z-score is negatively correlated with Investment 
Efficiency, while the Market-to-Book ratio is positively correlated with Investment 
Efficiency. We find that our control variables are significantly correlated with 
investment efficiency in general, which is consistent with previous studies’ findings. 
Since the correlation includes limited information of firm and industry characteristics, 







Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics 
This table present summary statics of the control variables for 40351 firm-year observations during year 1990 to 2015 which are used in the baseline analysis. For 
variable definitions and details of the construction, see Appendix A. 
Panel A:Summary statistics 
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 
Investment Efficiency 40351 0.110 0.130 0.0370 0.0763 0.138 
Underinvestment 27269 0.0922 0.0697 0.0409 0.0766 0.128 
Overinvestment 13082 0.148 0.200 0.0291 0.0758 0.178 
Size 40351 5.058 1.892 3.683 4.939 6.295 
Leverage 40351 0.153 0.205 0 0.0589 0.236 
M/B 40351 2.123 2.256 1.081 1.501 2.350 
ROA 40351 0.0532 0.275 0.0280 0.110 0.172 
Z-score 40351 1.170 2.895 0.672 1.440 2.111 
Tangibility 40351 0.251 0.216 0.0848 0.183 0.353 
Ind. K-structure 40351 0.164 0.109 0.0754 0.130 0.227 
Dividend 40351 0.316 0.465 0 0 1 
Slack 40351 5.828 84.06 0.111 0.568 2.646 
CFOsale 40351 -1.499 74.46 -0.00143 0.0588 0.123 
sd_Cash 40351 0.0984 0.748 0.0355 0.0615 0.109 
sd_Sales 40351 0.224 0.268 0.0854 0.153 0.273 
sd_Investment 40351 1.402 130.9 0.0296 0.0637 0.145 
Age 40351 2.541 0.791 1.946 2.565 3.135 
Cycle 40351 4.674 0.844 4.281 4.773 5.182 
Loss 40351 0.343 0.475 0 0 1 
Analyst 40351 4.633 6.243 0 2 6 




   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) Investment Efficiency 1          
(2) Size -0.150*** 1         
(3) Leverage -0.085*** 0.227*** 1        
(4) M/B 0.177*** -0.132*** -0.267*** 1       
(5) ROA -0.201*** 0.343*** 0.083*** -0.276*** 1      
(6) Z-score -0.150*** 0.171*** 0.016*** -0.334*** 0.706*** 1     
(7) Tangibility -0.046*** 0.189*** 0.356*** -0.144*** 0.164*** 0.034*** 1    
(8) Ind.K-structure -0.149*** 0.201*** 0.513*** -0.232*** 0.172*** 0.121*** 0.473*** 1   
(9) Dividend -0.094*** 0.333*** 0.040*** -0.078*** 0.214*** 0.153*** 0.173*** 0.196*** 1  
(10) Slack 0.040*** -0.028*** -0.033*** 0.051*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.069*** -0.049*** -0.020*** 1 
(11) CFOsale -0.022*** 0.012** 0.006 -0.028*** 0.069*** 0.045*** -0.002 0.017*** 0.012** -0.012** 
(12) sd_Cash 0.022*** -0.048*** -0.026*** 0.040*** -0.060*** -0.039*** -0.037*** -0.029*** -0.022*** 0.011** 
(13) sd_Sales 0.042*** -0.201*** -0.052*** 0.059*** -0.069*** 0.057*** -0.155*** -0.039*** -0.127*** 0.013** 
(14) sd_Investment 0.003 -0.012** 0.006 0.003 -0.005 -0.010* 0.006 0.006 -0.007 -0.001 
(15) Age -0.097*** 0.328*** 0.079*** -0.136*** 0.177*** 0.124*** 0.077*** 0.100*** 0.383*** -0.008* 
(16) Cycle -0.023*** -0.109*** -0.126*** 0.015*** -0.052*** -0.043*** -0.322*** -0.221*** -0.039*** -0.047*** 
(17) Loss 0.091*** -0.296*** 0.074*** 0.080*** -0.528*** -0.362*** -0.095*** -0.109*** -0.280*** 0.030*** 
(18) Analyst -0.074*** 0.709*** -0.046*** 0.089*** 0.198*** 0.072*** 0.121*** -0.001 0.187*** -0.012** 
(19) Institutions -0.078*** 0.707*** -0.032*** 0.007 0.258*** 0.123*** 0.019*** -0.001 0.176*** 0.001 
Continue: 
  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
(11) CFOsale 1         
(12) sd_Cash -0.004 1        
(13) sd_Sales 0.009* 0.044*** 1       
(14) sd_Investment 0 0.023*** 0.015*** 1      
(15) Age 0.012** -0.035*** -0.182*** -0.012** 1     
(16) Cycle -0.068*** -0.003 -0.114*** -0.004 0.046*** 1    
(17) Loss -0.030*** 0.035*** 0.087*** 0.007 -0.210*** 0.015*** 1   
(18) Analyst 0.004 -0.030*** -0.133*** -0.007 0.145*** -0.070*** -0.215*** 1  
(19) Institutions 0.010** -0.037*** -0.175*** -0.010* 0.211*** -0.066*** -0.270*** 0.546*** 1.0000 





4.4.2 Baseline results 
We report the results from estimating Equation (4.2) in Table 4.2. Column (1) 
to (3)  and (4) to (6) present the estimation of tax changes on under/over investment 
efficiency respectively. We find that tax cut reduces underinvestment but have no 
significant effect on overinvestment. Be specific, firms who expose to a tax cut indent 
to reduce the underinvestment by 0.004, which presents 4.3% decrease in the mean of 
underinvestment. As we discussed before, the main reason for underinvestment is 
capital rationing. The tax cut creates a cash windfall for firms, relaxes firms’ financial 
constraints and increase internal cash flow which is a key financing source for 
investment. Consequently, firms are more likely to grasp the investment opportunities 
and mitigate underinvestment inefficiency. On the other side, the results present from 
(4) to (6) show that firms exposed to tax increase experience intensified 
overinvestment. Ceteris paribus, tax increases aggravate overinvestment by 0.021, 
which represents a 14% increase in the mean of overinvestment.  However, they are 
unlikely to respond to tax cut. When firms expose to an increase in their income tax, 
they are induced to take advantages of the tax shelter and such incentives can distort 
the investment decision. The engagement in suboptimal project, in the end, leads to 
the over investing inefficiency. We also notice that the coefficient magnitude of tax 
increase on overinvestment is greater compare to tax decrease on underinvestment, 
and this may result from the different channels that tax changes on investment 
efficiency. We will provide further discussion and evidence in later sections to support 
these arguments. 
In terms of control variables, we notice that firm size is significantly and 
positively related to underinvestment but negatively related to overinvestment. The 
potential explanation could be larger firms tend to have better monitoring, therefore 
reduce the agency problem and mitigate the overinvestment inefficiency. Similar 
pattern also finds for leverage. Firms with higher leverage and experience net 
operation loss are more like to under invest but more likely to engage in 
overinvestment. While firms with higher market–to-book value less experience 




corporate monitoring, measured by analyst covering and share of institutional investor 
are significantly and negatively related to underinvestment but such effect disappears 
in overinvestment efficiency estimation.  In general, our findings are similar to 




Table 4.2 Baseline results  
This table presents the OLS regression estimates for baseline regression. The dependent variable is investment efficiency measures by Underinvestment and 
Overinvestment respectively. The main variables of interest are 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡 and 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡  which are dummy variables set to one if state 𝑠 decrease 
or increase corporate income tax at year 𝑡 or zero otherwise. Column (1) to (3) report the tax changes on underinvestment and column (4) to (6) report the tax 
changes on overinvestment. Firm-clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *,** and*** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. The definition of variables are reported in Appendix A.3. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Underinvestment Underinvestment Underinvestment Overinvestment Overinvestment Overinvestment 
Tax Increase 0.002  0.001 0.021**  0.021** 
 (0.002)  (0.002) (0.009)  (0.009) 
Tax Decrease  -0.005*** -0.005***  -0.010 -0.009 
  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.007) (0.007) 
Size 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.068*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Leverage 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** -0.192*** -0.193*** -0.192*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
M/B -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ROA 0.007 0.007 0.007 -0.069*** -0.068*** -0.069*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Z-score -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Tangibility -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.025 -0.025 -0.026 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Ind. K-structure -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.076* -0.076* -0.075* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Dividend -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Slack 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CFOsaleS -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sd_Cash -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 




Continue       
sd_Sales 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** -0.029* -0.029* -0.029* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
sd_Investment 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Cycle 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Loss 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.041*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Analyst -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Institutions -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 0.027 0.027 0.027 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Year Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.497*** 0.499*** 0.498*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
N 27269 27269 27269 13082 13082 13082 





4.4.3 Pre-treatment trends 
One key assumption behind our difference-in-difference approach is that there 
is a parallel trend of investment efficiency between the treatment and control groups 
if the tax changes do not exist, any difference we find between the two groups should 
derive from the tax changes. Although we use one-year leading value of firm’s 
investment as the dependent variable, it is less likely that our results are driven by the 
reserve causality. However, to examine pre-treatment trends in the investment 
efficiency of the treated and control groups, we introduce a series of indicator variables. 
Specifically, we employ the equation below: 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦  𝑖,𝑠,𝑡+1
=  α + ∑ 𝛽𝐼,𝑡+𝑗 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡+𝑛
3
𝑛=−2
+ ∑ 𝛽𝐷,𝑡+𝑗 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡+𝑛
3
𝑛=−2
𝛽𝐼 + 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
+ 𝜖𝑖,𝑠,𝑡+1 (4.3) 
Where 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡 and 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡 which are dummy variables set 
to one if state 𝑠 decrease or increase corporate income tax at year 𝑡 or zero otherwise. 
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡+𝑛 and 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡+𝑛 indicate that it is n years before (or after) 
the tax increase or decrease. We consider six-year time window, spanning from three- 
year before and three-year after the tax change, and omit the year 3 before tax change 
as the benchmark year. Year and firm fixed effects are included and the standard errors 




Figures 4.1 Corporate income tax and investment efficiency: pre-trends and post-trends 
The figures below present the change of investment efficiency measured as underinvestment and overinvestment separately following the change in corporate income 
tax. Figures plot the difference in the investment efficiency between the treatment and control groups averaged around event time; the vertical bars correspond to 99% 
and 95% confidence intervals with firm-level clustered standard error. Specifically, we report the estimated coefficients from the following regression:  
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦  𝑖,𝑠,𝑡+1 =  α + ∑ 𝛽𝐼,𝑡+𝑗 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡+𝑛
3
𝑛=−2
+ ∑ 𝛽𝐷,𝑡+𝑗 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡+𝑛
3
𝑛=−2
𝛽𝐼 + 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑠,𝑡+1 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦  𝑖,𝑠,𝑡+1 is a firm-level measure of total investment inefficiency, which is the absolute value of the residuals from the estimating model (Biddle 
et at., 2009).  𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡 and 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡 which are dummy variables set to one if state 𝑠 decrease or increase corporate income tax at year 𝑡 or zero otherwise. 
All estimations are relative to the year t -3.   𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖  and 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 are year and firm fixed effects, respectively. The standard errors are cluster at firm-level.                          
 














In figure 4.1, we plot the point estimates for coefficients which estimate the 
difference in the investment efficiency between treatment and control groups averaged 
around the event time from Equation (4.3). The graph represents coefficients plots and 
their associated 95% and 99% confidence intervals respectively by the vertical bars. 
We use the year 3 ( 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡−3 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡−3) before tax change as the 
reference year. This suggests that the coefficients in these plots capture the rate of 
change in investment efficiency in any year compare to three-year before tax changes. 
The coefficients of interest are years before tax changes, as their magnitude and 
significance prove that whether there is a parallel trend between treated and control 
firms in investment efficiency before tax changes.   
Overall, we observe no significance for years before tax reform. The tax 
increase is unlikely to affect underinvestment efficiency. However, for overinvestment, 
firms respond quickly and significant in year 0, but such effect diminish in the 
following years. Similar trend also found in tax cut and underinvestment. 
Underinvestment inefficiency is mitigated (significant at 95% confidence interval) at 
the year of tax cut (year 0), but such effect disappears in following years. No evidence 
shows that tax decrease is related to overinvestment. These results are consistent with 
our previous argument. Moreover, the results also prove that firms’ reaction to tax 
changes are immediately but such effect only last in a very short time period. One 
explanation is that firms react to tax changes through adjusting their investment 
decision is a short-term strategy for taxing planning which is less likely to affect 
investment efficiency in a long run (Ljungqvist et al. 2017).  
The results found in this section have important implications. First, the 
statistically insignificant and relatively small coefficients of pre-event variables 
suggest that there is no different trend between treated firms and control firms in 
investment efficiency before the tax changes. Also, the absence of significant lead 
effects indicates that treated firms do not anticipate the future tax changes or they take 
no actions in their investment strategies. The reason can be that even if the tax changes 
are anticipatable, firms do not act in advance since they can take the advantage of the 
tax changes (e.g. tax shelter or cash windfall) only until the new tax rate takes into 
effect. Last, the fact that firms change in their investment efficiency only after new tax 




variables or reverse causality. Instead, we find firms response only when they can reap 
the benefit of tax changes.  
4.4.4 Unobservable confounding factors 
Another concern which will undermine our empirical strategy is the 
unobservable confounding local economic conditions. The local economic condition 
can drive the state tax changes, and also affect firms’ investment efficiency. This can 
lead to observing the causality between tax changes and investment efficiency which 
is found in the baseline estimation. To address this concern, we conduct a falsification 
test by examining whether firms respond to tax changes that happen in their 
neighbouring states but not in their home state.  
The tax changes can be driven by local economic conditions which 
simultaneously cause the changes in investment efficiency. However, different from 
the state income tax law changes which stop at the state borders, economic conditions 
would spill across state borders which will affect firms located in the reform states as 
well as the neighbouring ones. If this is the case, firms located in treated states and 
their neighbouring firms in untreated states should both respond to the tax changes if 
this results from the economic condition changes and which will transmit across 
borders (Heider and Ljungqvist 2015; Mukherjee et al. 2017).  
To address this possibility, we first examine whether firms’ investment 
efficiency respond to neighbouring states’ tax change. Column (1) and (2) of table 4.3 
report the results. We find that the investment efficiency actually does not react to the 
tax changes which happen in a neighbouring state, the coefficient of tax increase or 
tax decrease is both insignificant in column (1) and (2). Next, we include both home 
state tax change indicators and also the indicators for tax changes that occur in a 
neighbouring state in our regression estimation. The results are reported in column (3) 
and (4). Consistent with previous results, we find that the coefficient of home state tax 
changes are significant in both estimations and the magnitude of the coefficients are 
similar to our baseline results: firms which experience a tax cut tend to mitigate their 
underinvestment inefficiency but an intensified overinvestment following a tax 




have no impact on firms’ investment efficiency, as all coefficients of neighbouring 
state tax changes keep insignificant across column (3) and (4).  These evidence rule 
out the possibility that the tax reforms and investment efficiency changes are caused 
simultaneously by unobservable local economic conditions, and supports a causal 




Table 4.3 Tax changes and investment efficiency: unobservable local economic confounding factors  
This table report the regression result of the falsification test. In column (1) and (2), we use the neighbouring state tax changes as our independent variable to 
see whether firms respond to tax changes that occur in a neighbouring state when there is no tax changes in their home state. Column (3) and (4), we include 
both tax changes which occur in home state and neighbouring state. Firm-clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *,** and*** indicate 
significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The definition of variables are reported in Appendix A. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Underinvestment Overinvestment Underinvestment Overinvestment 
Neighbouring state tax increase 0.002 -0.008 0.002 -0.007 
 (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.007) 
Neighbouring state tax decrease 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) 
Tax Increase   0.001 0.019* 
   (0.002) (0.010) 
Tax Decrease   -0.004*** -0.011 
   (0.002) (0.008) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 




4.4.5 Tax Changes and Investment Efficiency: Tax sensitivity 
In the previous section, we proved that firms adjust their investment strategy 
to cope with the potential outcomes brought by the tax changes. In this section, we 
provide further evidence by employing triple difference-in-differences test that the 
effect of tax changes on investment efficiency is differ on their tax sensitivity. To 
capture the tax sensitivity, we focus on two aspects of firms: the aggressive level of 
tax planning and the capability of tax avoidance.   
4.4.5.1 Tax Planning 
Intuitively, firms differ in terms of their exposure to tax changes relying on 
their tax sensitivity. For firms who emphasis their tax positions and engage in 
aggressive tax planning activities should be more sensitive to tax rate changes. If the 
effect of tax on investment efficiency is motivated by the tax changes, the effect should 
be more pronounced for firms which engage in aggressive tax planning. To test this 
conjecture, we follow previous studies and use three different measures to capture tax 
planning: the Deferral, Book-tax difference (BTD) and permanent Book-Tax 
Difference (Perm_BTD) (Edwards, Schwab, and Shevlin 2016; Khurana and Moser 
2013). We calculate the Deferral as the negative value of the ratio of deferred tax 
expense to pre-tax income adjusted for special items, BTD as the annual total book-tax 
differences and the Perm_BTD is the annual permanent book difference. Greater value 
indicates more aggressive in tax planning. The detailed measure and definition can be 
found in Appendix A. The deferral-based tax planning can produce temporary cash tax 
saving in the current period, but increase cash taxes in future period. Edwards (2016) 
find that firms intend to use deferral-based strategies to increase cash tax saving to 
response to increased financial constraints. While deferral-based tax planning is a 
temporary strategy, managers are also looking for permanent tax planning strategies 
which produce both cash flow and financial reporting benefit. To capture this tax 
planning strategy, we adopt total Book-Tax Difference (BTD) and permanent Book-
Tax Difference (Perm_BTD) as alternative measure of tax planning level (Frank, 
Lynch, and Rego 2009; Khurana and Moser 2013; Rego and Wilson 2012). We then 
reestimate our baseline regression, and let the tax changes dummy interact with tax 





𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦  𝑖,𝑠,𝑡+1
=  α + 𝛽𝐼,𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡 ∗ Bottom 33
+ 𝛽𝐼,𝑡𝑜𝑝 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡 ∗ Top 67 + 𝛽𝐷,𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚
∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡 ∗ Bottom 33 + 𝛽𝐷,𝑡𝑜𝑝 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡𝑜𝑝
∗ Top67 + 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑠,𝑡+1 (4.4) 
We partition sample firms into those with tax planning measures fall in the 
bottom 33 and top 67 percentiles, respectively. Bottom 33 (Top67) is a dummy 
variable that equals one if 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖  falls in the bottom 33 (top 67) percentiles. This 
specification allows us to observe the effect of tax changes separately for these groups 
with different level of tax planning by estimating interactions between tax changes and 
those tax planning dummies. We predict the impact of tax changes on investment 
efficiency in the top 67 groups (𝛽𝐼,𝑡𝑜𝑝 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽𝐷,𝑡𝑜𝑝) should be more salient than the 
bottom 33 groups (𝛽𝐼,𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽𝐷,𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚 ). The results are reported in Table 4.4 
Panel A.  
Overall, we can see that firms in the top 67 percentiles are more likely response 
to a tax cut and consequently mitigate underinvestment inefficiency and also response 
to a tax increase and consequently experience intensified overinvestment inefficiency. 
This is consistent with our prediction that firms who engage more in tax planning 
should be more sensitive to the tax rate changes. Interestingly, In column (4), we see 
that firms lie in bottom 33 percentiles intend to reduce their overinvestment activities 
if they experience a tax cut. This result somehow supports our hypothesis of tax 
incentive of using tax shelter. When the tax increase, firms will engage more 
inefficiency investment activities to take advantage of the tax benefits. While when 
the tax rate falls, the incentive in taking advantage of tax benefits reduced, higher after-
tax return also incentive managers to make more efforts in investment selection, 




Table 4.4 Tax changes and Investment Efficiency: Tax sensitivity 
This table provides the estimation results of the impact of tax changes on investment efficiency in terms of firms’ tax sensitivity. In Panel A, we use three 
different measures of tax planning in period t to split sample firms into group which fall into bottom 33 percentile and top 67 percentile based on their tax 
pressure level, respectively. We include the tax pressure measures to control for the level effect of tax pressure. The three measures are Deferral, Book-
Tax difference (BTD) and Permanent Book-Tax Difference. In Panel B, we partition firms based on whether their state mandate combined income reporting. 
Combined (Non-Combined) is a dummy set to one if the firm headquartered is located in a state requires combined income reporting or zero otherwise. 
All regressions include control variables used in our baseline specification, and firm and year fixed effects. Firm-clustered robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. *,** and*** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The definition of variables are reported in Appendix A.  
Panel A: Tax Planning    
 Deferral Book-Tax Difference Permanent Book-Tax Difference  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Underinvestment Overinvestment Underinvestment Overinvestment Underinvestment Overinvestment 
Tax Increase*Bottom 33 0.001 0.004 -0.003 0.022 -0.002 0.029 
 (0.003) (0.013) (0.006) (0.020) (0.006) (0.022) 
Tax Increase* Top 67 0.002 0.034*** 0.001 0.031*** 0.001 0.028** 
 (0.003) (0.013) (0.002) (0.012) (0.002) (0.011) 
Tax Decrease*Bottom 33 -0.003 0.003 -0.006 -0.040** -0.007 -0.022 
 (0.002) (0.011) (0.004) (0.018) (0.004) (0.018) 
Tax Decrease* Top 67 -0.005** -0.018 -0.004** -0.000 -0.004** -0.006 
 (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.009) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons 0.033*** 0.507*** 0.028** 0.530*** 0.027** 0.532*** 
 (0.011) (0.048) (0.013) (0.051) (0.013) (0.051) 
N 25733 12312 20241 9271 20130 9209 




Panel B: Tax Sheltering 
 (1) (2) 
 Underinvestment Overinvestment 
Tax Increase*Non-Combined 0.002 0.009 
 (0.002) (0.014) 
Tax Increase* Combined 0.000 0.031** 
 (0.003) (0.013) 
Tax Decrease* Non-Combined -0.003* -0.024** 
 (0.002) (0.012) 
Tax Decrease* Combined -0.006** 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.010) 
Control Variables Yes Yes 
Year Fixed effect Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed effect Yes Yes 
_cons 0.031*** 0.497*** 
 (0.010) (0.045) 
N 27269 13082 




4.4.5.2 Tax sheltering 
Next, we examine the tax sensitivity in the aspect of their ability to shelter taxes. 
Firms can arbitrate through different tax rules across border. The difference of state 
tax policies provides firms opportunities to take the regulatory arbitrate through 
shifting income from a high-tax jurisdiction to a low tax jurisdiction. For example, a 
common state tax avoidance strategy is known as a Passive Investment Company (PIC) 
or Delaware Holding Company. The PIC strategy allows firms to shift income to their 
subsidiary corporation located in states, e.g. Delaware or Nevada, to convert taxable 
income into tax-exempt income. Combined reporting essentially treats the parent and 
most subsidiaries as one corporation for state income tax purpose, and corporates’ 
national profits are combined and the state then taxes a share of the combined income. 
Since 1990, a growing number of states are adopting the combined reporting rules 
(Mazerov 2009). The combined reporting states tend to limit, especially for large 
multistate corporations, the tax planning strategy of firms which are more likely to 
manipulate their tax by transferring across states, from where they earned to which 
they will be taxed at a lower rate. Therefore, for firms who headquartered in combined 
reporting states, the impact of home state tax changes should be more pronounced 
compared with their counterparties who are located in non-combined reporting states. 
In order to test this prediction, we first collect implementation date of combined 
reporting states from Dyreng et al. (2013) and Mazerov (2009) from 1990 to 2009, and 
we manually collect the effective date of combined reporting until 2015. In our sample 
period, we identify 26 states implement the combined reporting requirements. 
Specifically, we employ the specification below:  
 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦  𝑖,𝑠,𝑡+1
=  α + 𝛽𝐼,𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑜𝑛-𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑠
+ 𝛽𝐼,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑠 + 𝛽𝐷,𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒
∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑜𝑛-𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑠 + 𝛽𝐷,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒
∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑠 + 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖




We partition firms base on whether their state adopts combined tax reporting.  
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑠 ( 𝑁𝑜𝑛-𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑠 ) is a dummy variable set to one if the firm 
headquartered in a state enact combined reporting requirement or zero otherwise. The 
results are reported in Table 4.4 Panel B. 
Similar to the results in Panel A,  firms located in states with a combined 
reporting requirement are more likely to mitigate their underinvestment inefficiency 
after the tax cut compares to the one located in non-combined reporting state. In terms 
of overinvestment, firms located in combined reporting states response strongly to the 
tax increase and aggravate overinvestment inefficiency compare to firms in non-
combined reporting state. Also, the coefficient 𝛽𝐼,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒  is significant at 95% 
confidence level with a larger magnitude than 𝛽𝐼,𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒 . These results are 
consistent with our argument and predictions. Interestingly, we see that firms located 
in non-combined states intend to reduce their overinvestment after the tax cut. The 
potential reason can be that firms located in non-combined states can take more tax 
benefit through regulatory arbitrage across states. Once the tax rate cut, they do not 
hold the same incentive to explore the tax shelter and therefore mitigate 
overinvestment.  
4.5 Mechanism 
As we discussed in previous sections, suboptimal investment can result from 
different incentives. Our previous results show an asymmetric impact of tax changes 
on investment efficiency:  the tax cut tends to mitigate underinvestment while tax 
increase can intensify overinvestment. According to results, we predict that tax 
changes impact underinvestment and overinvestment through different channels. In 
this section, we provide further evidence to prove the potential mechanism through 
which tax changes affect investment efficiency. 
4.5.1 The financial constraints channel 
The tax cut actually reduces firms’ cash tax payment and create a cash windfall 
in a short-term time period.  The sudden increased internal cash flow provides firms 




financially constrained firms, they better benefit from the cash windfall and thereby 
engage in the investment which they have to forego without the cash tax saving (Blouin 
et al., 2020; Faulkender and Petersen, 2012; Fazzari et al., 1988). This suggests that 
tax policy may impact investment of the constrained firms, especially the quantity of 
internal funds available for investment is supported by the average tax on earnings 
from existing projects. Under this case, the tax rate faced by a firm affects its 
investment decision. To examine this prediction, we test whether tax cut has a more 
pronounced effect in mitigating underinvestment inefficiency among firms which 
experience greater financial constraints by employing the specification (4.4). We 
partition firms into top 67 and bottom 33 percentile of their financial constraints level 
which measured by three different financial constraints proxies: KZ index, WW index 
and SA index (Hadlock and Pierce 2010; Kaplan and Zingales 1997; Lamont, Polk, 
and Saá-Requejo 2001; Toni M Whited and Wu 2006). The detailed calculation is 
reported in Appendix A.3, greater value indicates more financial constraints. 
Bottom 33 (Top67) set to one if 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖  falls in the bottom 33 (top 67) percentiles 
based on the financial constraints measures. If the tax cut create the tax cash saving 
windfall and consequently provides additional investment source, we expect a 
significant and negative coefficient 𝛽𝐷,𝑡𝑜𝑝 < 0. The results are presented in Table 4.5. 
Overall, we find that the coefficients on the interaction between 
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠,𝑡𝑜𝑝   and 𝑇𝑜𝑝67 are negative and significant across all three columns 
by using different financial constraints measures. Contrast to counterparties which lie 
in the bottom percentile of the financial constrained level, firms which are more 
financially constrained are more likely response to tax cut and mitigate underinvesting. 
Collectively, these results indicate that the effect of tax cut on alleviating 







Table 4.5 Tax change and investment efficiency: Financial constraints Channel 
This table reports the results of the effect of tax changes on investment efficiency for firms with different level of financial constraints, where we use three 
measures of financial constraints: KZ index, WW index and SA index. All regressions include control variables used in our baseline specification, and firm and 
year fixed effects. Firm-clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *,** and*** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The definition of variables are reported in Appendix A. 
 KZ Index WW Index SA Index  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Underinvestment Underinvestment Underinvestment 
Tax Increase*Bottom 33 -0.000 0.001 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Tax Increase* Top 67 -0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Tax Decrease*Bottom 33 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Tax Decrease* Top 67 -0.005*** -0.005** -0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
_cons 0.031** 0.036*** 0.040*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) 
N 22837 26438 25988 




4.5.2 The agent cost channel  
On the other side, the tax increase actually provides managers incentives to 
take advantage of tax benefits which can distort investment efficiency in the end. 
Higher tax rate means more tax payment if the taxable income holds the same. At the 
meantime, higher tax rate also provides higher tax saving per dollars tax deduction. 
The tax increase provides managers incentives to take advantage of the tax shelter and 
such incentives can lead to the distort of investment decision and therefore depart from 
firms’ optimal level. Also, managers may be more incentives to engage in agency-
motivated investment, e.g. empire building, because of the reduced after-tax return. 
Specifically, when the positive projects are all undertaken, managers are induced to 
invest in projects which are less profitable and harm shareholder’s value in the end. 
Existing studies document that agency cost can arise from higher cash flows as 
managers are more capable to engage in inefficiency investment decision or satisfy 
their own specific objective (Blanchard et al., 1994; Jensen, 1986). Richardson (2006) 
finds that overinvestment is concentred in firms with the highest levels of free cash 
flow which consistent with agency cost explanations. If the impact of a tax increase on 
overinvestment efficiency is through the agency cost channel, we should see firms 
which expose to a higher agency cost problem respond overinvestment efficiency 
strongly to a tax increase. To test the conjecture, we use the specification (4.4) and 
classify firms into Bottom 33 and Top 67 by using three measures: overfirm, cash 
holding and Institutional ownership. First, we follow Biddle et al. (2009) create the 
variable overfirm. The variable is a ranked variable based on the average of a ranked 
(deciles) measure of cash and leverage. The leverage is multiplied by minus one before 
ranking so that both variables are increasing in the likelihood of over-investment. 
Therefore, the overfirm captures the potential agency cost and the tendency for over 
investing. The second measure is the cash holding of firms which is measured as the 
ratio of cash and cash equivalents to PP&E. Higher value of overfirm and cash holding 
indicates greater agency cost. The third measure of agency cost we used is the share 
of institutional owners. The institutional investors represent a monitoring mechanism 
to curb managers’ inefficiency investment decision (T. Chen et al. 2017; Ward et al. 
2020). We expect that firms with greater share of institutional investors are better 
monitored and exposed to a lower agency problem. Lower value of Institutional 
Ownership indicates less monitoring and greater agency problem. Detailed definition 




Column (1) and (2) presents the results of agency cost proxied by overfirm and 
cash holding. We find that compared to firms which lie in the bottom of the agency 
cost, the coefficients on  Tax Increase and Top 67 are both positive and significant at 
95% confidence level. These results suggest that firms which experience greater 
agency cost problems tend to intensify the positive impact of the tax increase and 
overinvestment.  Column (3) shows the result by using the ratio of institutional 
ownership as the measure of agency cost.  We find that firms with the lowest share of 
institutional ownership intend to amplify the impact of the tax increase on 
overinvestment. The coefficient of the interaction between Tax Increase and Bottom33 
is significant at 99% confidence level and also the magnitude is much larger compared 
to the coefficient on the interaction between Tax Increase and Top 67. This result 
suggests that firms with fewer institutional investors which are less monitored and 
exposed to greater agency problems, and these firms are more likely to intensify the 
positive impact of the tax increase on overinvestment efficiency. Collectively, all the 
results found in this section suggest that the tax increase exacerbate overinvestment 




Table 4.6 Tax change and investment efficiency: Agency Cost Channel 
This table reports the results of the effect of tax changes on investment efficiency for firms with different level of agency costs, where we use two measures of agency cost: 
Over Firm, Cash holding and Share of Institutional Ownership. All regressions include control variables used in our baseline specification, and firm and year fixed effects. 
Firm-clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *,** and*** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The definition of variables are 
reported in Appendix A. 
 Overfirm Cash holding Institutional Ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Overinvestment Overinvestment Overinvestment 
Tax Increase*Bottom 33 -0.001 0.005 0.057*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.020) 
Tax Increase* Top 67 0.026** 0.027** 0.007 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
Tax Decrease*Bottom 33 -0.008 0.004 -0.023 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.018) 
Tax Decrease* Top 67 -0.010 -0.015 -0.005 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
_cons 0.475*** 0.499*** 0.498*** 
 (0.048) (0.045) (0.045) 
N 13082 13082 13082 





4.6 Robustness test 
In this section we conduct a serial of robustness checks on our main findings. 
First, we examine whether our results are driven by the measure of investment 
efficiency. Therefore, we follow Chen et al. (2011) to construct the investment model 
and reestimate the investment efficiency. Different from Biddle et al. (2009), this 
model estimates expected investment as a function of revenue growth. Following Chen 
et al. (2011), we define firms as underinvestment if they negatively deviate from 
expected investment level or overinvestment if they positively deviate from the 
expected level. We take the absolute value of the residual of the model to measure the 
investment efficiency, greater value indicates less efficient. The results are reported in 
Column (1) and (2) in table 4.7, which is consistent with our baseline results. However, 
there is weak evidence shows that the tax cut will alleviate overinvestment, but such a 
result is not persistent across our empirical tests. As we discussed before, the potential 
reason can be that the reduced the tax rate also reduce managers’ incentive of using 
tax benefits, and more effort from managers in investment decision making because of 
a higher after-tax return, consequently followed with alleviated overinvestment 
efficiency. 
Another concern of our baseline results is that multinational corporations can 
adopt tax avoidance strategies through their overseas subsidiaries, as well as the tax 
rate charged by the overseas countries affect their capital decision (Faulkender and 
Smith 2016). Therefore, we exclude firms which have foreign income from our sample 
and run the baseline regression again. The results are reported in column (3) and (4). 
We continue to observe the results which we find in the baseline regression. 
Last, we add additional state-level macroeconomic factors, including GDP 
growth rate, logarithm value of GDP and the state tax revenue to GDP. All these 
macroeconomic data are derived from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. The 
results are presented in column (5) and (6). We show that our main findings remain 
unchanged. We observe that the macroeconomic factors intend to affect 




could be that the overall financial conditions tend to affect underinvestment but not 
the overinvestment. This somehow support our findings in section 4.5. that the 
different channels through which tax rate changes affect investment efficiency.  
Taken together, the results from Table 4.7 indicate a robust impact of tax 




Table 4.7 Robustness Test 
This table provides further robustness checks to the baseline regression as presented in table 4.2. Column (1) and (2) report the regression estimation of baseline by 
using alternative measure of investment efficiency. Following Chen et al., (2011), we construct the investment efficiency and estimate the tax changes on 
underinvestment and overinvestment respectively. In Column (3) and (4), we report results only for domestic firms, which with zero foreign pre-tax income. Column 
(5) and (6) report the regression estimation of baseline with additional control of state level macroeconomic characters. All regressions include control variables 
used in our baseline specification, and firm and year fixed effects. Firm-clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *,** and*** indicate significance 
level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The definition of variables are reported in Appendix A.3. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Underinvestment Overinvestment Underinvestment Overinvestment Underinvestment Overinvestment 
Tax Increase 0.002 0.022** 0.000 0.026* 0.001 0.021** 
 (0.002) (0.009) (0.003) (0.014) (0.002) (0.009) 
Tax Decrease -0.004** -0.013* -0.006*** -0.005 -0.005*** -0.009 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.007) 
GDP growth rate     0.001** -0.000 
     (0.000) (0.001) 
Log GDP     -0.033*** -0.040 
     (0.012) (0.054) 
State Tax revenue to GDP     -0.281* -0.653 
     (0.151) (0.762) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons 0.024** 0.492*** 0.047*** 0.529*** 0.462*** 1.032 
 (0.010) (0.043) (0.012) (0.056) (0.149) (0.679) 
N 26566 13785 17146 8379 27254 13079 






As the most important fiscal instrument, tax has been employed by the 
government to accelerate firms’ investment and stimulate the local economic growth 
and employment. Compare to federal corporate income tax policy reforms, adjusting 
state corporate income tax rate are employed frequently by the local government. In 
this paper, we use staggered changes in state corporate tax rate in the U.S. to examine 
the impact of tax policy on investment efficiency at firm level. We find evidence that 
the tax policy changes can affect firms investment efficiency asymmetrically, the tax 
rate increase aggravates overinvestment problem but a tax cut mitigate 
underinvestment. We further prove that this asymmetrical impacts of tax changes on 
investment efficiency are through different channels: the financial constraints channel 
and the agency cost channel. Different from existing researches on tax reform and firm 
investment decision, we provide new evidence to show the causal effect of general tax 
policy on investment from shareholders’ perspective. Importantly, tax policy plays an 
essential role in corporate investment decision making. While increasing the tax rate 
can increase the revenue for the government, it may distort firms’ investment 








This thesis studies the real effect and consequence of financial regulatory 
reform and development over the last decades, including three thorough studies 
examine the effects from different aspects. The results found in this thesis highlight 
the importance of proper regulation design and provide implications for future policy 
reform. This chapter begins with the summary of the key findings, contributions and 
implications, followed by the limitation and suggestion for future research. 
5.1 Key findings, contributions and implications 
The first study in Chapter 2 investigates how regulation and supervision affect 
individual bank’s systemic risk exposure across countries. Using data for banks from 
65 countries for the period 2001-2013, we find that bank activity restriction, initial 
capital stringency and prompt corrective action are all positively related to systemic 
risk as measure by Marginal Expected Shortfall. To address the potential endogeneity 
issue, we employ the staggered timing of the implementation of Basel II regulation 
across countries as an exogenous event and conduct a Difference-in-Difference 
estimation. We next employ country’s latitude as the instrumental variable to conduct 
the two-step least square regression analysis. Our results also hold for a series of 
robustness tests. The further results show that the level of equity and diversification 
can alleviate such effect, while bank size is likely to enhance the effect. The study 
highlights the importance of banks capability of raising capital especially when the 
overall financial system is undercapitalized. However, our results do not argue against 
bank regulation, but rather focus on the design and implementation of the regulation.  
The study contributes to the existing argument on the regulatory and 
supervisory environment in which banks operate has significant impacts on their 
systemic risk, contributing to the understanding of the association between bank 
regulation and systemic stability, providing important implications to governments 




regulatory mechanisms designed are effective in enhancing the stability of the whole 
financial system. This study also related to Ponce and Rennert (2015) which highlight 
the role and responsibility of central bank, to be the lender of last resort for banks in a 
larger range of its liquidity shortfall. Matousek et al. (2020) also emphasise the 
importance of policymakers and politicians’ timely and decisive response during a 
severe market decline. Our results provide policy implications that assisting banks in 
raising capital to smooth their capital shortfall in difficult time can mitigate the 
systemic risk they expose, which can be considered in future policy design. Our results 
echo the argument in Aikman et al. (2018) that implementation of qualitative elements 
of Basel III to avoid capital shortfall, e.g. counter-cyclical capital buffer.  
The second study in Chapter 3 examines the regulation reform in banking and 
its spillover effect on firms. Specifically, we study how firms CSR response to external 
credit market development by exploiting the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA). The IBBEA passes in 1994 which allows 
unrestricted interstate banking significantly increase competition among banks within 
states, consequently expands the availability of credit and lowers the cost of capital. 
We find that the deregulation leads to a significant and persistent decrease in firm CSR, 
indicating firms show “doing good” for the access to finance when they are captured 
by the uncompetitive credit market. The results continue to hold after the endogenous 
tests and robustness tests. We rule out the alternative explanation to our results that the 
banking relationship change from relationship lending to transaction basis caused by 
the deregulation. In the end, we provide further evidence to show that the negative 
impact of bank deregulation on CSR is through the financial constraints channel.  
In this study, we provide a clean setting on the exogenous increase in banking 
competition caused by regulations, contributing to the recent literature on the 
determinants of firms CSR activities. We first link firm CSR with external financial 
environment development, provide evidence that firms more susceptible to capture by 
banks exhibit a more pronounced decrease in CSR when such capture is dismantled by 
IBBEA. The exogenous event with IBBEA in the lending market allows us to reveal 
that banks with market monopolistic power may cause firms to invest excessively in 
CSR. Once banks’ market monopoly power disappears, firms will make the optimal 
decision in CSR by suppressing excessive investment. The evidence suggests that CSR 




groups’ interest. We also highlight that a competitive credit market is important, 
especially for firms that rely heavily on external financing.  
This study also has important implication for policy towards CSR. As 
suggested in Dharmapala and Khanna (2018), the overall CSR activity increased when 
firms subject to a mandatory requirement of the minimum spending threshold on CSR. 
however, for firms who initially spend more than the threshold tend to reduce their 
CSR expenditure after the policy implemented. Similarly, Manchiraju and Rajgopal 
(2017) also suggest the mandatory CSR policy will reduce shareholder value. Firms 
voluntarily choose CSR to maximize shareholder value. Forcing firms to investment 
on CSR is likely to be sub-optimal for firms as it can impose social burdens on business 
activities at the cost of shareholders, consequently negative impact on shareholder 
value. These evidence suggest that firms which are allowed to choose their optimal 
level of CSR tend to maximize their firm value. For policymakers and regulators, 
understanding the original motivation of CSR is important. The joint effects of 
institutional development and financial market frictions should be taken into 
consideration if they would like to see more socially responsible activities from firms. 
Similar to mandatory CSR requirement, stakeholder’s pressure can also drive firms to 
engage in involuntary CSR activity, while once such pressure has been removed, their 
CSR will drop consequently. Therefore, future policy design can also consider to give 
firms private returns from CSR activities, which can motivate firm to voluntarily 
engage more in CSR. 
In the previous two studies, we first examined the regulation development in 
banking and its impact on banks themselves. Next, we focus on the regulatory reform 
which happens in banking but its spillover effect on industry firms. In the last study of 
this thesis, we extend our study scope by investigating how general tax regulation 
change can affect corporate investment efficiency. By exploiting staggered changes in 
the state-level corporate income tax rate, we find that the tax rate changes tend to affect 
firms’ investment efficiency asymmetrically: the tax increases aggravates 
overinvestment while tax cut mitigates underinvestment. Moreover, the impact of tax 
changes on investment efficiency would be more significant for firms who are 
aggressive in tax planning or less capable in tax avoidance activities. We further 




financing channel and agency cost channel respectively. The results keep unchanged 
after the endogeneity tests and a series of robustness tests.  
This study adds new evidence to literature on the determinates of firm-level 
investment efficiency. Although existing studies on how tax can accelerate investment 
have been well established, we investigate the tax induced investment from 
shareholders perspective by examining the investment efficiency. In addition, we 
document that the underlying channels for the asymmetrical effects on investment 
efficiency, i.e. the financing channel and the agency channel. This study is also related 
to recent tax changes in the U.S., the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) signed in 2017 
which reduces the corporate income tax from 35% to 21% since 2018. Compare to 
country level tax reform which are rare and far between, state level tax rate changes 
are more frequent and are most employ by the local government. Existing studies in 
state tax rate that find tax increase can hinder innovation, increase firm long-term  
leverage and reduce risk taking (Heider and Ljungqvist 2015; Ljungqvist et al. 2017; 
Mukherjee et al. 2017), and tax decrease can foster firm’s innovation (Atanassov and 
Liu 2019). Our findings add new evidence to existing literature of state level tax rate 
changes and provide policy implications related to tax changes at the state level.   As 
the most used fiscal policy, the general corporate tax rate changes may accelerate the 
overall investment but it may at the cost of shareholders’ value.  
5.2 Limitation and future research 
The Global Financial Crisis in 2007 highlights the importance of the 
appropriate design of financial regulations, as the impact may not only on the target 
institutions but can also spillover to industry firms and the real economy. By 
conducting these three thorough studies which investigate the impact of regulation 
reforms from different aspects, we provide new evidence to show how regulations can 
affect financial institutions, industry firms and common welfare. The thesis shows that 
regulation reforms sometimes may cause unintended consequence which is 
mismatched to policymakers original purpose. Understand the potential channels of 
regulations work through are also important. We provide evidence to show the 
potential mechanism how the regulation can cause the results we found in the studies. 




In the first chapter, we highlight the importance of the capability of banks’ 
capital raising, especially when the whole system is under distress. Our findings 
suggest that the increasing similarity in the banking system due to the restriction on 
bank activities will impede banks stability through the capital shortfall channel. There 
are still several limitations for this study. First, in the empirical analysis, as suggested 
in recent literature, an alternative measure of systemic risk namely ΔCoVaR, which 
measures conditions on the distress of a single financial institution. However, due to 
the data availability of ΔCoVaR, we fail to perform the analysis by using ΔCoVaR but 
only use MES as the main measure of systemic risk11. Second, we argue that restrict 
regulation and supervision can lead to higher systemic risk, but we do not argue the 
direct impact of regulation on bank systemic risk. Therefore, one potential future 
research could be how the regulation and supervision stringency can affect banks 
assets allocation as well as their risk appetite. Both the assets allocation and the risk 
taking behaviours can affect bank’s systemic risk in the end.  
In the second chapter, our results provide new evidence to controversial views 
of why firms engage in CSR activities. Although we provide a cleaner setting by 
exploiting the staggered bank branch deregulation as a quasi-natural experiment, there 
are still several limitations. First, our empirical results are based on a relatively small 
sample of large firms due to data availability. The KLD data begins in 1991 only 
covers firms in S&P 500 and Domini 400 Social Index. We also require firms that have 
existed both before and after deregulation, therefore, the sample includes in 364 firms 
throughout the whole sample period. Also, due to the nature of the KLD data, it covers 
large firms only in the early 1990s. Therefore, for small firms, their responses to 
increased external financing access could be different from these large firms 
(Mcwilliams and Siegel 2001). We encourage future research to examine the potential 
difference between large and small firms in their CSR response to external credit shock. 
 
11 In the ΔCoVaR measure, it is required to measure the normal status of the market by using a set of 
macroeconomic condition variables, including the VIX, liquidity spread (the three-month repo rate the 
three-month bill rate), change in the three-month Treasury bill rate, change in the slope of the yield 
curve (the yield-spread between the ten-year Treasure rate and the three-month bill rate), change in 
credit spread (spread between BAA rated bonds and the Treasure rate) weekly equity market return, and 
one year cumulative real estate sector return (the return of real estate companies). We fail to use this 
measure for two reasons. First, the original proposal of CoVaR is under US market background, and the 
required macroeconomic condition variables are also based on the availability of US market. Therefore,  
we need to find same macroeconomic conditional variables to benchmark US proxies. Second, in our 
sample, we also cover a cluster of developing countries. For these countries, many of the 
macroeconomic condition variables are usually unavailable. Based on these two reasons, we only use 




Nevertheless, this study expands the current CSR researches by examining the external 
development of the financial market, and linking the literature with firms CSR 
performance as an unintended consequence of the deregulation. One caveat of our 
study is that our analysis does not argue the bank deregulation will negatively affect 
the social welfare. Instead, we would like to explore how the regulation reform can 
affect firm’s CSR behaviours.    
Last, in the third study, we exploit the corporate income tax change at state 
level and the impact on investment efficiency. We rely on the information in 
Compustat of firm’s headquarter as the identification of whether firms expose to state-
level tax change. While under the U.S. tax system, a multistate firm’s federal taxable 
income is apportioned to each nexus state using a formula based on an average of the 
fractions of the firm’s total payroll, sales, and property located in that state. Therefore, 
the extent to which a multistate firm is exposed to a give state income tax change 
depends on the extent of its nexus to that state. Due to the data limitation, we have no 
further information on firms plants’ location. This potential issue may lead to an 
underestimation of the coefficient magnitude of tax changes on investment efficiency. 
For future studies, add the firm’s plant-level information will enhance the credit of 
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A. Main Variable Definitions 
A.1. Definition of variables 
Variable name Description 
MES Average return on sample banks conditioned on 5% worse returns on the market. 
Activity Restriction A measure of a bank's ability to engage in the businesses of securities underwriting, insurance, and real estate and of the 
regulatory restrictiveness of banks to own shares in non-financial firms. The level of regulatory restrictiveness can be 
defined as “unrestricted” and coded as a score of 1. If the full range of activities can be conducted, but some or all must be 
conducted in subsidiaries, then it can be defined as “permitted” and coded as a score of 2. If less than a full range of activities 
can be conducted in a bank or subsidiaries, then it can be defined as “restricted” and counted as a score of 3. If the activity 
cannot be conducted in either the bank or subsidiaries, then it is defined as “prohibited” and counted as a score of 4. Activity 
restriction is calculated by the sum of the answers to these questions divided by 12. Greater values signify more restrictions. 
(Barth et al., 2004; Barth et al., 2013b)  
Initial Capital Stringency Whether the source of funds that count as regulatory capital can include assets other than cash or government securities and 
borrowed funds and whether the regulatory supervisory authorities verify the sources of capital. This index is based on the 
following question (for question (1), Yes=1 No=0; for question (2) and (3), Yes=0 No=1): (1) Are the sources of funds to 
be used as capital verified by the regulatory/supervisory authorities? (2) Can the initial disbursement or subsequent 
injections of capital be performed with assets other than cash or government securities? (3) Can the initial disbursement of 
capital be performed with borrowed funds? Initial capital stringency is calculated by the sum of the answers to these 
questions divided by 3. Higher values indicate greater stringency. (Barth et al., 2004; Barth et al., 2013b) . 
Prompt Corrective Action Prompt corrective action measures the extent to which the law establishes pre-determined levels of bank solvency 
deterioration that force automatic enforcement actions, such as intervention, and the extent to which supervisors have the 
requisite, suitable powers to do so. This variable is based on several questions (Yes=1, No=0): (1) Can the supervisory 
authority force a bank to change its internal organizational structure? (2) Are there any mechanisms of cease and desist-
type orders, whose infraction leads to the automatic imposition of civil and penal sanctions against the bank’s directors and 
managers? (3) Can the supervisory agency order the bank’s directors or management to constitute provisions to cover actual 




supervisory agency suspend the director’s decision to distribute bonuses? (6) Can the supervisory agency suspend the 
director’s decision to distribute management fees? Prompt corrective action is calculated as the sum of the score for each 
question and divided by 6. A higher value indicates greater supervisory power. (Barth et al., 2004; Barth et al., 2013b) . 
Deposit Insurer Power The deposit insurer power scheme is an index of the deposit insurer power to measure each country’s deposit insurance 
regime and to trace its evolution from 1999 to 2011. This index is based on the answer to the following questions (Yes=1, 
No=0): (1) Does the deposit insurance authority make the decision to intervene in a bank? (2)Can the deposit insurance 
agency/fund take legal action for violations of laws, regulations, and bylaws (of the deposit insurance agency) against bank 
directors or other bank officials? (3)Has the deposit insurance agency/fund ever taken legal action for violations of laws, 
regulations, and bylaws (of the deposit insurance agency) against bank directors or other bank officials? (4)Were any 
deposits not explicitly covered by the deposit insurance at the time of the failure compensated when the bank failed 
(excluding funds later paid out in liquidation procedures)? Deposit insurer power is equal to {[(1)+(2)+(3)]/3 + (4)}/2. This 




We collapse the four regulation measures into a single measure of bank regulation using factor analysis. We estimate the 
following equation: Yi,s,t=βi Regulations,s,t+εi,t, where the subscripts i, s, and t correspond to the country, the four regulation 
measures (Activity Restriction, Initial Capital Stringency, Deposit Insurer Power, and Prompt Corrective Action), and 
years, respectively. The left-hand-side variables are the four regulation measures, all of which are stacked into a single 
factor, whereas regulation is not observed and estimated along with the factor loadings β. We follow the standard practice 
of normalizing the proxy measures included on the left-hand side to have a mean of zero and a variance of one before we 
conduct the factor analysis. We focus on the single factor that has the greatest explanatory power. It turns out that our data 
are well described by a one-factor model, which captures approximately 55% of the variation in the four regulation 
measures. We take this factor as our final measure of overall bank regulation. 
LgTA A natural logarithm of total assets denominated in US dollars 
ROA Return on asset. Net income/ Total assets in % 
MTBV Market-to-book value, measured as Market value of equity / Book value of equity 
LLP Loan loss provision ratio, measured as total loan loss provision/net loan in % 
GDP Growth The annual growth rate of GDP. 
Inflation The percentage change of GDP deflator. 
Basel  II Dummy A dummy variable which equals to one for the time after the country adopted Basel II and 0 otherwise. 
SRISK An individual financial institution’s contribution to the systemic risk, measured in billion dollar value. 
Economic Freedom Proxy for the overall level of economic freedom from Heritage Foundation. It is a composite index that including business 
freedom, trade freedom, fiscal freedom, government spending, monetary freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom. 
property rights, labour freedom. 
Equity/Assets Total equity to total assets ratio 





A.2  Definition of variables 
Variable Definition 
CSR The D-SOCIAL-KLD index (Carroll et al., 2016) proxies firm’s CSR performance at the year t.. 
Deregulation Four minus Rice-Strahan index of interstate banking deregulation based on Rice and Strahan (2010). The deregulation index ranges from 0 (least 
deregulated,) to 4 (most deregulated) based on regulation changes at a state level.t 
Log Total assets Natural logarithm value of total assets measured at the year t. 
Leverage The leverage ratio measured as the book value of debt divided by book value of total assets at the year t. 
Cash ratio The cash holding of company scaled by the book value of total assets at the year t. 
MV ratio The ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity at the year t. 
ROE Return-on-equity ratio defined as the net income scaled by book value of equity at the year t. 
Age  The natural logarithm value of years the corporation has existed since the founding year plus one. The funding year obtain from Loughran and 
Ritter (2004) data set. 
WW index WW index is based on Whited and Wu (2006), defined as (−0.091 ∗ CF) − (0.062 ∗ DIVPOS) + (0.021 ∗ TLTD) − (0.044 ∗ LNTA) +
(0.102 ∗ ISG) − (0.035 ∗ SG), where the CF is the ratio of cash flow to assets; DIVPOS is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if the firm pays 
cash dividends; TLTD is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets; LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets; ISG is the firm’s three-digital 
industry sale growth; and SG is firm sales growth. 
SA Index SA index is based on Hadlock and Pierce (2010), 𝑆𝐴 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = −0.737 ∗ 𝐿𝑛(𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) + 0.043 ∗ 𝐿𝑛(𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)2 − 0.04 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒 . 
Relationship Lending  The sum of all bank assets held by banks with total assets below $100 million divided by the sum of all bank assets in the state-year. 
Sales Growth The sales growth is the percentage change in sales from year t-1 to year t 






A.3  Definition of variables 
Variable Name Descriptions 
Dependent variable  
Investment efficiency  A firm-level measure of total investment inefficiency, which is the absolute value of the residuals from the regression (Biddle et at., 
2009):  
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡+1 
Where the 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1 is the total investment and 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖  is the percentage change in sales from year 𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡.  The 
model is estimated for each industry-year based on the Fama and French 48-industry classification for all industries with at least 20 
observations in a given year. Specifically, we classify firms as underinvestment if the residual is negative, and take the absolute value 
of the residual as the measure of investment efficiency. In the same manner, we classify firms as overinvestment if the residual is 
positive and take the value of residual as the measure of investment efficiency. a higher value of investment efficiency indicate less 
efficiently invest.   
Independent variable   
Tax increase A dummy variables set to one if state 𝑠 increase corporate income tax at year 𝑡 or zero otherwise. 
Tax decrease A dummy variables set to one if state 𝑠 decrease corporate income tax at year 𝑡 or zero otherwise. 
Control Variable  
Size Natural logarithm of total assets 
Leverage The ratio of long-term debt to sum of long-term debt to the market value of equity 
M/B The ratio of the market value of total assets to book value of total assets 
ROA The return on assets 
Z-score A measure of bankruptcy risk, calculated as 3.3*pretax income + sales + 0.25*retained earnings + 0.5*(current assets-current liabilities), 
scaled by total assets 
Tangibility The ratio of plant, property and equipment (PP&E) to total assets 
Ind. K-structure The mean leverage for firms in the same SIC 3-digit industry 
Dividend An indicator variable which set to one if the firm paid a dividend and zero otherwise 
Slack The ratio of cash and cash equivalents to PP&E 
CFOsale Cash flow from operations scaled by sales 
sd_Cash Cash flow volatility which measured as the standard deviation of cash flow from operations scaled by average total assets from year t-
5 to t-1 
sd_Sales Sale volatility which measured as the standard deviation of sales deflated by average total assets from year t-5 to t-1 




  Age  Natural logarithm of number of firm age which is the difference between the first year when the firm appears in CRSP and the current 
year. 
Cycle The log of receivables to sales plus investor to cost of goods sold multiplied by 360 
Loss An indicator variable that equals one if income before extraordinary items is negative and zero otherwise 
Analyst The number of analyst following the firms  
Institutions The percentage of firm shares held by institutional investors 
Deferral -1 times the ratio of deferred tax  expense (Federal and Foreign) to pre-tax income adjusted for special items 
BTD Pre-tax book income – (current federal tax expense + current foreign tax expense)/the highest marginal U.S. corporate statutory tax rate, 
scaled by lagged total assets  
Perm_BTD  Pre-tax book income – (current federal tax expense + current foreign tax expense + deferred tax expenses)/the highest marginal U.S. 
corporate statutory tax rate, scaled by lagged total assets 
KZ Index KZ index is based on Lamont et al. (2001) calculated as −1.001909 ∗ [(𝑖𝑏 + 𝑑𝑝)/ 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡] + 0.2826389 ∗ [(𝑎𝑡 + 𝑝𝑟𝑐𝑐_𝑓 ∗
𝑐𝑠ℎ𝑜 − 𝑐𝑒𝑞 − 𝑡𝑥𝑑𝑏)/𝑎𝑡] + 3.139193 ∗ [(𝑑𝑙𝑡𝑡 + 𝑑𝑙𝑐)/(𝑑𝑙𝑡𝑡 + 𝑑𝑙𝑐 + 𝑠𝑒𝑞)] − 39.3678 ∗ [(𝑑𝑣𝑐 + 𝑑𝑣𝑝)/𝑙. 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡] − 1.314759 ∗
[𝑐ℎ𝑒/𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡], where all variables in italics are Compustat data items 
WW Index WW index is based on Whited and Wu (2006), defined as (−0.091 ∗ CF) − (0.062 ∗ DIVPOS) + (0.021 ∗ TLTD) − (0.044 ∗
LNTA) + (0.102 ∗ ISG) − (0.035 ∗ SG), where the CF is the ratio of cash flow to assets; DIVPOS is an indicator that takes the value 
of 1 if the firm pays cash dividends; TLTD is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets; LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets; 
ISG is the firm’s three-digital industry sale growth; and SG is firm sales growth. 
SA Index SA index is based on Hadlock and Pierce (2010), 𝑆𝐴 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = −0.737 ∗ 𝐿𝑛(𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) + 0.043 ∗ 𝐿𝑛(𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)2 − 0.04 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒 . 
Overfirm Following Biddle et al. (2009), overfirm is a ranked variable based on the average of a ranked measure of cash and leverage. Leverage 




B. Regulation and supervision and systemic risk: includes US and UK banks 
Table B.1 Robustness test: includes US and UK banks 
This table reports the panel regression results of the estimation of different regulations and systemic risk from 67 countries, including US and UK banks for the period from 
2001 to 2013. The dependent variable is the systemic risk measure by MES. Control variables include MTBV, lgTA, LLP, ROAA, GDP Growth, Inflation and Economic 
Freedom. Detailed definitions of the variables can be found in Appendix A.1. Bank fixed effect and year fixed effects are both included. The standard errors for the regressions 
are estimated as heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for banks and are presented in brackets *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% significance level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Activity Restriction Initial Capital Stringency Prompt Corrective Action Depositor Regulation Total 
Regulation 0.843*** 1.027*** 0.696*** -0.024 0.200*** 
 (0.109) (0.096) (0.094) (0.050) (0.022) 
MTBV 0.143** 0.142** 0.146** 0.146** 0.145** 
 (0.070) (0.069) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) 
lgTA -0.151** -0.227*** -0.142** -0.180*** -0.082 
 (0.065) (0.064) (0.064) (0.068) (0.067) 
LLP -0.007 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
ROA -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.027*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
GDP Growth 0.059*** 0.054*** 0.058*** 0.056*** 0.057*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Inflation 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Economic Freedom -0.000 -0.016** -0.002 0.000 0.008 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
_cons 1.289 2.961*** 1.162 1.909** 0.287 
 (0.839) (0.829) (0.842) (0.922) (0.858) 
Bank-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 9559 9559 9559 9559 9559 
adj. R-sq 0.089 0.094 0.088 0.084 0.091 
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